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Abstract
In this thesis, I argue that the interdependence between personal iden-
tity and practical concerns is overstated. In paradigmatic places where
philosophers and common sense suggest that personal identity constrains
how we should reason and care, or vice versa, the two spheres are in fact
neutral to each other. I defend this claim by considering four specific
cases. First, a rough characterization of the distinction between the
complex and the simple view is that the former takes personal identity
to consist in other relations, whereas the latter does not. I argue that the
extreme claim according to which the complex view fails to give reasons
for future-directed concern can be resisted. We maintain forward-looking
attitudes and projects not because someone will be us, but because we
relate to future selves in other, more important ways. Second, I argue
that intuitions in a range of popular imaginary cases are contaminated
by practical concerns whose relevance for personal identity is far from
straightforward. Third, I argue that on a closer look, the complex versus
simple distinction is confused. It thus cannot be what grounds differences
in judgements on what matters. Debates about personal identity should
be framed in terms of better understood notions. Finally, I argue that it
is not a constraint on rational transformative choice that decision-maker
and transforming individual are identical. Moreover, whether we are de-
ciding for ourselves or for others—the importance of informed consent
for transformative treatments is not diminished by the decision-maker’s
failure to projectively imagine the outcomes.
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You, I, and the people around us are persons. We all existed yesterday,
and will exist tomorrow, remaining one and the same. Personal identity
over time seems ubiquitous.
That each of us remains one and the same person over time does
not only seem obvious, but also appears to play a crucial role for many
practical concerns. Perry illustrates:
“Most of us have a special and intense interest in what will happen
to us. You learn that someone will be run over by a truck tomor-
row; you are saddened, feel pity, and think reflectively about the
frailty of life; one bit of information is added, that the someone is
you, and a whole new set of emotions rise in your breast.”1
In memory, pride, and regret, we take it for granted that it was the
very same person as our present self who carried out an earlier action.
In concern, anticipation, investing, and planning, we presuppose that
the very same person as the present, forward-looking self will experience
the consequences of its current and past efforts and actions. In holding
someone morally responsible, we presuppose that it was the very same
person whom we are now blaming who carried out the wrongful act. Some
people anticipate an afterlife, and in doing so they seem to presuppose
that they will be identical to an entity on the other side.2
What does it take for these presuppositions about personal identity to
be true? First of all, let us be clear about the topic. There are a number
of distinct questions about personal identity that are not always kept
apart.3 I will be concerned primarily—and unless noted otherwise—with
what I call
1Perry 1976, p. 67.
2For further examples, see D. Shoemaker 2007, pp. 317-8.
3See also Olson 2017, Ch. 1, although my framing differs slightly from his.
INTRODUCTION 3
The Diachronic Metaphysical Question: “If a person x ex-
ists at one time and something y exists at another time,
under what possible circumstances is it the case that x is
y?”4
In order to address this question, I will occasionally—especially in (chap-
ter 4)—turn to a related but distinct question:
The Diachronic Epistemic Question: If a person x exists at
one time and something y exists at another time, what
counts as evidence that x is y?
We can ask further questions about persons:
The Synchronic Metaphysical Questions: In virtue of what
is an entity a person, and in virtue of what is she a particular
person?
The Synchronic Epistemic Questions: What counts as evi-
dence for something’s being a person, and for being a par-
ticular person rather than some other person?
Colloquially, we sometimes speak of a person’s identity. In such cases,
we appear to refer to a set of properties that are thought to be distinc-
tive of a particular person, and make her the person she is. This way
of speaking can be understood as an attempt to address one of the syn-
chronic questions. In the following, the synchronic questions will pop up
occasionally, for example in (3.2), (chapter 7), and (chapter 8).
Currently, the most popular candidates for answering the diachronic
metaphysical question are psychological continuity theory and animal-
ism. Psychological continuity theory claims that person x at time t1 is
identical to y at t2 if and only if x is psychologically continuous with
y. Animalism claims that we are identical to animals, and hence that
person x is identical to y if and only if they are the same human animal.
4Ibid., sect. 2.
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There are actual and possible cases in which these theories give dif-
ferent verdicts. Suppose y is in a permanent vegetative state. Animalists
would not hesitate to deem x and y identical if they are the same human
animal. Psychological continuity theorists would disagree; x and y are
distinct, given that y is psychologically discontinuous with x by virtue
of—let us suppose—having no psychological life left at all.
Or consider a futuristic scenario in which q, who has a human body
but formerly had no cerebrum, is the recipient of a transplant of p’s cere-
brum.5 The procedure goes well and preserves psychological continuity.
Psychological continuity theory thus would judge that q is p. Animal-
ists would deny this on the grounds that they are not the same human
animal.
A further view which has been popular in the history of philosophy,
but is endorsed less often nowadays, is that x is y if x has, or is, the same
soul, ego, or monad as y. The theories differ in whether and how closely
these entities are tied to the continued existence of a particular body
and/or a particular mental life. However, some versions, such as what
Parfit6 calls the Featureless Cartesian View, allow for personal identity
to completely float free of any observable facts.
The practical concerns7 mentioned at the outset appear to presup-
5Olson (1997, pp. 44-6) argues that it is crucial that only the cerebrum, not
the whole brain, is transplanted. The latter includes the brain-stem, which is es-
sential to the human animal’s biological functioning. Following Van Inwagen (1990,
pp. 172-181), it is an option to see the whole brain as a pared down human animal.
Psychological continuity theory and animalism would then agree that q is p, but for
different reasons: the former because psychological continuity has been preserved, the
latter because they are the same human animal.
6Parfit 1984, p. 228.
7Like Olson (1997, ch. 3), D. Shoemaker (2007), and others, I use ‘practical
concerns’ as an umbrella term for practices like concern, anticipation, compensation,
moral responsibility, pride, regret, etc. As will become clear, this slides over certain
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pose personal identity. The question arises what this means for our
theorizing about the persistence of persons. Should our theory choice be
constrained in some way by how our practices appear to make sense of
personal identity? That is, do our practices have implications for what
can count as the right theory of personal identity? Or is it the other way
round: should we identify the right theory of personal identity on purely
theoretical grounds, and then come to care, hold responsible, anticipate,
compensate, etc. in accordance with this theory? Or is neither of these
dependences appropriate? Is maybe the starting point that practical
concerns operate with a notion of personal identity misguided?
As we will see in the following, authors have answered each of these
questions in the affirmative. I myself am convinced that the interdepen-
dence between personal identity and the mentioned practical concerns
is overstated. In paradigmatic places where philosophers and common
sense suggest that personal identity constrains how we should reason and
care, or vice versa, I argue that the two spheres are in fact neutral to
each other. I will argue for these claims in the course of the following
eight chapters.
Chapter 1: The Complex Versus Simple Distinction. Debates
about personal identity are often framed in terms of the distinction be-
tween the complex and the simple view. I describe some reasons authors
give in favour of their preferred view and against its competitor.
differences amongst these activities. For example, some activities might differ from
others in how they are justified, and how their justification makes reference to personal
identity. For most of the following, I will discuss the specific example of future-directed
concern. I will attempt to highlight if and when other practical activities differ in
important ways.
6 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2: The Extreme Claim. According to the extreme claim,
the complex view fails to provide reasons for future-directed concern.
Some authors take the extreme claim as a premise in a reductio argument
against the complex view. I describe two broad strategies to counter the
reductio. First, by denying that there is an asymmetry between the
complex and the simple view in terms of how well they justify concern.
Second, by arguing that the relations of continuity and connectedness
to which the complex view refers do not diminish the value of ordinary
survival.
Chapter 3: Grounds For Concern. I turn to the positive coun-
terpart of the claim that the complex view does not diminish the value
of ordinary survival. I examine proposals according to which what does
matter in ordinary survival might be related to personal identity; but it
is something else. We maintain forward-looking attitudes and projects
not because someone will be us, but because we relate to future selves
in other, more important ways. According to the first class of positions,
the relations of continuity and connectedness to which the complex view
refers provide reasons for future-directed concern. According to the sec-
ond class of positions, we need to look beyond the numerical identity of
persons over time and/or what it consists in.
Chapter 4: Transplant Intuitions. I will understand transplant
intuitions as judgements about where a person goes if psychological and
bodily continuity come apart. Coherence with transplant intuitions is
often taken to be a point in favour of a theory of personal identity,
and incoherence with these intuitions as a disadvantage. I argue that
transplant intuitions are unsuitable for tracking truths about personal
INTRODUCTION 7
identity. By taking our person-directed attitudes as evidence for where a
person goes, transplant intuitions are contaminated with practical con-
cerns whose relevance for personal identity is far from straightforward. I
conclude that transplant intuitions provide only circular evidence, seem
entirely uninformative if quasi-attitudes are possible, and diverge inex-
plicably across cases.
Chapter 5: Against The Complex Versus Simple Distinc-
tion. I examine three proposals on the difference between the complex
and the simple view: Parfit’s original introduction of the distinction,
Gasser and Stefans definition, and Noonan’s recent proposal. I argue
that the first two classify the paradigm cases of simplicity as complex,
while Noonans proposal makes simplicity and complexity turn on fea-
tures whose relevance for the distinction is questionable. Given these
difficulties, I examine why we should be interested in whether a position
is complex or simple. I describe two purposes of having a distinction,
and show that extant accounts of the complex versus simple distinction
fail to serve these. I argue that unless we find a satisfying account of the
difference between complex and simple positions, we should not frame
discourses on personal identity in these terms.8
Chapter 6: Replacing The Complex Versus Simple Distinc-
tion. After having criticized the complex versus simple distinction, I
owe an account of how else we should frame discourses about personal
identity. I argue that we should disambiguate and debate more refined
questions and proposals. I sketch and discuss three candidate notions
for expressing and debating claims about personal identity: ontological
8This material appears in Hummel 2017.
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dependence, fundamentality, and essentialism.
Chapter 7: Personal Identity and Transformative Experi-
ence. I explain Paul’s notion of transformative experience and her rev-
elation approach for making transformative choices. I defend the rev-
elation approach against objections by Shupe, according to which the
revelation approach is inappropriate if decision-maker and transforming
individual are numerically distinct.
Chapter 8: Transformative Choice and Informed Consent.
I argue that contrary to what Paul appears to suggest, the fact that
patients and research subjects are unable to projectively imagine trans-
formative diseases and treatments does not the diminish the importance
of informed consent procedures. I characterize three purposes of informed
consent, and argue that an individual’s failure to projectively imagine an
outcome does not prevent informed consent from fulfilling these purposes.
In the following, I will often refer to the complex versus simple dis-
tinction. In such cases, I am not contradicting my own advice (chapters
5, 6) that debates involving personal identity should not be framed in
terms of this distinction. Instead, I am making a concession. I grant that
there is something to the distinction. But I demonstrate that even then,
the conclusions which authors have drawn on the basis of this distinction
do not follow.
Chapter 1
The Complex Versus Simple
Distinction
10 CHAPTER 1. COMPLEX VS. SIMPLE VIEW
A common distinction in the contemporary debate about personal iden-
tity is between the complex and the simple view. Parfit defines:
“According to the Complex View, the fact of personal identity
over time just consists in the holding of certain other facts. It
consists in various kinds of psychological continuity, of memory,
character, intention, and the like, which in turn rest upon bod-
ily continuity. According to the Simple View, personal identity
does not just consist in these continuities, but is a quite separate
‘further fact.’”9
In the following, I describe a selection of reasons why authors believe
that this distinction is important. The purpose of this chapter is merely
to provide an understanding of the complex versus simple distinction in
order to set the stage for the following chapters. I do not intend provide
an exhaustive overview on the reasons that motivate authors to take
sides in the debate. Moreover, as mentioned in the Introduction, I will
eventually argue that the complex versus simple distinction is confused,
and should not be used to frame discourses on personal identity (chapter
5). Until then, I grant that there is something to the complex versus
simple distinction. In the following, I describe what authors think it is.
Since the complex versus simple distinction was first drawn by Parfit,
earlier authors do not mention it. But paradigm cases of complexity and
simplicity precede the introduction of the distinction. I will focus on the
reasons why these authors think their positions are correct, and why they
deem paradigmatic instances of the competing view mistaken.
9Parfit 1982, p. 227.
1.1. POSITIVE REASONS 11
1.1 Positive Reasons
I begin by describing reasons put forward in favour of either side.
1.1.1 In Favour Of The Simple View
Insofar as the simple view accepts accounts of personal identity, they
typically refer to the persistence of souls, Cartesian egos, or monads.
One prima facie reason in favour of these pictures is their popularity
and dominance in the history of philosophy. Martin writes:
“[f]rom Plato until John Locke personal identity was explained in
the West primarily by appeal to the notion of a spiritual substance
or soul.”10
Especially for Christian thinkers, one important attraction of such a po-
sition arises from the features typically ascribed to souls: “immaterial,
indivisible, and hence naturally immortal.”11 Souls and their persistence
were—and for many remain—crucial in explanations of how persons can
anticipate an afterlife.
Simple positions thus respect deeply held intuitions about what a
person can survive. In particular, there is nothing self-contradictory in
supposing that a person can survive the death of her body, or even a
sudden and radical change of her psychology. Swinburne writes:
“[m]any religions have taken seriously stories of persons passing
through the waters of Lethe (a river whose waters made a person
forget all his previous life) and then acquiring a new body. Others
who have heard these stories may not have believed them true;
but they have usually claimed to understand them, and (unless
10Martin 1998, p. 1.
11Ibid., p. 3.
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influenced by philosophical dogma) have not suspected them of
involving contradiction.”12
Similarly, Chisholm maintains that it is intelligible to suppose that sur-
vival is compatible with the most drastic changes. Referring to (and
twisting) a hypothetical case suggested by Leibniz,13 Chisholm writes:
“Since I am concerned about my future welfare, about the welfare
of that x such that x is identical with me, and presumably will
continue to have this concern, it will follow that, if I should learn
that x will some day become King of China, then, even though I
also learn that x will then forget everything that x had previously
been, I will be as much concerned about the life that x enjoys while
King of China as I am about my own; for, given our suppositions,
x ’s welfare will be my own.”14
According to these authors, it is a point in favour of the simple view that
it does not rule out these intelligible and conceivable scenarios. They
suggest that our survival is entirely independent from what Parfit calls
the more particular facts. Madell is convinced that
“consideration of what we can coherently imagine for ourselves
must lead us to reject the empiricist’s claim to provide a sufficient
analysis of personal identity in terms of any sort of observable
connection between experiences”15,
and also that
“the claim that objective connections between experiences are a
necessary condition only of personal identity through time is to-
tally untenable”16.
One motivation for the idea that personal identity can float free from
other facts and allow a person to survive even the most radical bodily
12Swinburne 1984, p. 25.
13Leibniz 1686, sect. 34.
14Chisholm 1969, p. 138.
15Madell 1981, p. 104.
16Ibid., p. 107.
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and psychological discontinuities is its plausibility from a first-person
point of view. Ninan writes:
“[h]ere’s something I like about the Simple View: it seems true
when I consider my own persistence through time from the inside
or from the first-person point of view. I’m not alone in finding
this aspect of the Simple View appealing. A recurring theme
in the literature on our persistence is that, when one considers
ones own persistence from the first-person point of view, it seems
as though ones persistence is a basic and fundamental fact, one
that is metaphysically independent of facts about physical and
psychological continuity.”17
Similarly, Johnston remarks that consciousness presents itself as constant
through both psychological and bodily changes:
“we can imagine many sorts of cases that seem to involve one’s
ceasing to be associated with a particular human body and hu-
man personality. These cases are particularly compelling when
imagined ‘from the inside.’ So I am to imagine myself undergoing
a radical change in my form, e.g., a change like that undergone by
Franz Kafka’s beetleman, and perhaps concurrently a wild change
in my psychology. There seems to be nothing internally incoher-
ent about such imaginings. [...] [I]t seems that such imaginings
are not ruled out by and so are consistent with our concept of a
person.”18
Johnston’s point here is that the persistence of a person appears com-
patible with the wildest discontinuities.
Another, complementary intuition which the simple view respects can
be illustrated by means of fission, i.e. the symmetrical branching of
bodily and/or psychological continuity. Suppose that before undergoing
fission, the fissioner may decide which fission product gets tortured, and
which one receives a reward. Swinburne writes:
17Ninan 2009, pp. 429-30.
18Johnston 1987, p. 70. He goes on to criticize such imaginings as “idle” (Ibid.).
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“We can make sense of the supposition that the victim makes
the wrong choice, and has the experience of being tortured and
not the experience of being rewarded; or the right choice, and
has the experience of being rewarded and not the experience of
being tortured. A mere philosophical analysis of the concept of
personal identity cannot tell you which experiences will be yours
tomorrow. To use Bernard Williams’s telling word, any choice
would be a ‘risk’.”19
Besides Johnston’s point that personal identity appears compatible with
the wildest discontinuities, fission illustrates that even if we hold bodily
or psychological continuities fixed, this seems compatible with different
identity facts.
Swinburne’s positive view is that the fissioner is identical to the one
offshoot that receives her soul. This leads to yet another feature of the
simple view: it is determinate which offshoot has the fissioner’s soul even
if both offshoots are similarly continuous with the fissioner.20 Again, this
is plausible from the first-person point of view. As Blackburn illustrates,
imagine one fission product awakes in pain in a noisy red room, and the
other awakes painlessly in a silent green room. From the inside,
“there seem in prospect to be only three possibilities: at that time
either I will experience pain, noise and red, or lack of pain, noise
and green, or I will not awake at all. There seems, in advance, to
be no other relevant possibility.”21
The simple view fits this data well. In Swinburne’s terms, the soul either
goes with one fission product, or the other, or ceases to exist.
19Swinburne 1984, p. 18.
20Ibid., pp. 18-20.
21Blackburn 1997, p. 181. He calls this the unity reaction, and actually denies that
it reflects the plausibility of a Cartesian, i.e. simple picture. Instead, he suggests that
broadly Kantian considerations are necessary to understand the reaction.
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Chisholm gives a similar judgement on the grounds that persons are
mereologically simple—a claim which not all simple positions accept.22
Chisholm believes that the bearer of my consciousness is a particular
atom in my brain.23 In his case, this belief is tied to several distinctive
claims, such as:24 only mereologically constant objects are identical over
time in the strict philosophical sense (see 1.2.2); mereologically variable
entities are merely identical in the loose and popular sense, and are logical
constructions out of the former; mereologically variable objects have their
properties that are “rooted only in the times at which they are had”25—
roughly: intrinsic properties—in virtue of the mereologically constant
objects having these properties; mental properties such as “that I now
hope for rain”26 are had by myself and not borrowed from other things.
Some think that it is a central, pre-theoretical intuition of ours that
conscious beings are mereologically simple.27 Chisholm’s simple position
respects this intuition.
1.1.2 In Favour Of The Complex View
Parfit endorses the complex view on the basis of considering a range of
thought experiments. One central case is the combined spectrum: Parfit’s
body and psychology get gradually altered and replaced until a perfect
replica of Greta Garbo results. Parfit distinguishes three reactions:
22Swinburne 1984, p. 21.
23Chisholm 1986, p. 75.
24Chisholm 1976, ch. 3.
25Ibid., p. 104.
26Ibid.
27According to Barnett (2008, 2010), the idea that consciousness requires mereo-
logical simplicity is part of our naive conception of conscious subjects. In contrast,
Madden (2015) argues that this conception makes claims not about mereology, but
topology: conscious subjects must be topologically integrated, not scattered.
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“accepting a Reductionist reply, believing that there must be some
sharp borderline, and believing that the resulting person would in
every case be me.”28
It is implausible to hold that Parfit remains himself throughout the pro-
cedure, especially at the end of the case where perfect resemblance to
Greta Garbo has been been brought about. But it is also absurd to be-
lieve that there is a point where, through one tiny and seemingly trivial
bit of extra change, a threshold of psychological and/or physical discon-
tinuity is exceeded such that Parfit does not survive.
“It is hard to believe that the difference between life and death
could just consist in any of the very small differences”29.
Not only is it implausible to believe that a tiny difference determines
whether Parfit survives. If there was such a borderline, it seems we
could never find out where it lays and when it is exceeded. It is hard to
believe that
“there must be such a sharp borderline, somewhere in the Spec-
trum, though we could never have any evidence where the bor-
derline would be.”30
It is more plausible to accept the complex view according to which per-
sonal identity consists in bodily and/or psychological facts. Parfit exists
at the outset and does not exist at the end of the spectrum. But it is not
the case that for each point in the spectrum, Parfit either determinately
survives or determinately does not survive. There is a range where it is
indeterminate whether he still exists. In these cases,
28Parfit 1984, p. 238.
29Ibid., p. 239.
30Ibid.
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“though we know the answer to every other question, we have no
idea how to answer a question about personal identity.”31
The latter question is empty : different answers do not denote different
possibilities, just different descriptions of one and the same possibility.32
Further support for the complex view comes from empirical observa-
tions. We have not yet seen facts of personal identity in the absence of
physical, biological, or psychological facts. This provides inductive evi-
dence for the idea that person facts consist in more particular facts, and
that they do so as a matter of nomological or some other kind of neces-
sity. This fits neatly with broadly naturalistic, physicalist pictures—at
least provided that psychological or mental facts, if relevant to personal
identity, are not external to natural science. The complex view thereby
“cohere[s] with the rest of what we know about the world.”33
1.2 Negative Reasons
Each of the views offers benefits. But there are also costs. I now describe
reasons against either side.
1.2.1 Against The Simple View
While the complex view appears to cohere well with the rest of what we
know about the world, authors note that the simple view lacks empirical
support. Parfit thinks that we might have had evidence for the simple
view. He provides the hypothetical case of a Japanese woman who reports
31Parfit 1971, p. 3.
32Parfit 1995, p. 23.
33S. Shoemaker 1984, p. 71.
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having lived a past life as a Celtic warrior. If we encountered such reports
and could confirm their accuracy, we might have
“to abandon the belief that the carrier of memory is the brain. [...]
We might have to assume that there is some purely mental entity,
which was in some way involved in the life of the Celtic warrior,
and is now in some way involved in the life of the Japanese woman
[...]. A Cartesian ego is just such an entity.”34
However, the problem is that
“we have no evidence to believe that psychological continuity de-
pends chiefly, not on the continuity of the brain, but on the con-
tinuity of some other entity”35.
Similar points are being made by Johnston. With regards to soul views,
he notes that
“the existence of the soul and consequently the nature of per-
sonal identity are empirical questions, to be settled by our total
evidence.”36
And the mental properties that are distinctive of persons
“seem to have definite brain functions as their conditions sine
qua non. [...] Even in cases of recovery from the specific cogni-
tive losses produced by local brain damage, there is, significantly,
no reported phenomenology of memories of an intact thinking
soul being ‘locked inside’ an inept, because damaged, brain and
body. The thoughts and mental capacities were just not there, it
seems.”37
In principle, out-of-body or near-death experiences appear to track facts
of personal identity that are independent from more particular facts, in
Johnston’s case facts about the brain. But Johnston complains that there
34Parfit 1984, p. 227.
35Ibid., p. 228.
36Johnston 2010, p. 135.
37Ibid., p. 130.
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is no actual evidence that such experiences ever resulted from instances
in which brain facts were absent. Instead, as things stand, these reports
are to be treated on par with reports of consumers of hallucinogenic sub-
stances that bring about brain states of having out-of-body experiences.
Nothing about these reports establishes that their content is not illusory.
The fact that there are no actual cases where personal identity is
secured in the absence of psychological and/or bodily relations brings the
simple view under pressure. The question arises why we should believe
that personal identity is a further fact, when we have never seen an
instance of personal identity in the absence of the more particular facts.
The simple view faces further challenges. For example, it tends to be
a merely negative view. It rejects the complex view, but does not always
provide a sufficiently detailed positive picture that could replace the view
deemed false. As one consequence, it is not obvious why the simple view
should be attractive. On the contrary, the independence of personal
identity from more particular facts seems compatible with two worlds
being indiscernible at the micro-level, but differing with regards to facts
about personal identity. This is how Zimmermann paraphrases positions
endorsed by Lowe38 and Merricks39. Zimmerman deems these “truly
heroic”40, incredible, and unmotivated. He labels such views identity
mysticism. These positions seem dubious because the connection between




40Zimmerman 1998, p. 295.
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1.2.2 Against The Complex View
The complex view takes personal identity to consist in more particular
facts. Proponents of the simple view object that these more particular
facts presuppose rather than constitute personal identity. For example,
Butler objects against Locke’s psychological account that it is
“self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes,
and therefore cannot constitute personal identity, any more than
knowledge in any other case, can constitute truth, which it pre-
supposes”41.
One way to read this worry is that as a matter of conceptual necessity,
consciousness- and/or memory-continuity require that the connected per-
son stages are (part of) the same person. This means that in the Lockean
picture of personal identity,
“the concept allegedly being defined is illicitly employed in the
formulation of the defining definition.”42
In response, S. Shoemaker suggests the notion of quasi-memory, which is
just like memory, but does not presuppose personal identity as a matter of
conceptual necessity.43 It can relate mental states of numerically distinct
persons. An account of personal identity in terms of quasi-memory thus
has the potential to avoid this particular circularity charge.
According to a different objection from Butler and Reid, the complex
view fails to give an account of personal identity over time. Butler argues
that an object which loses and gains parts over time, such as a tree, can
remain the same “as to all the purposes of property and uses of common
41Butler 1736, p. 100.
42S. Shoemaker 1970, p. 281
43Ibid., p. 271.
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life”44. Reid agrees that “it retains the same name, and is considered as
the same thing”45. However, because of the change in parts, the tree’s
similarity “is rather something which, for the convenience of speech, we
call identity”46.
In contrast, persons remain the same “in the strict philosophical sense
of the word”47. The latter “cannot subsist with diversity of substance”48,
where substance seems to refer to what a thing is made up of, or what it
consists in.49 As Reid puts it:
“The identity of a person is perfect identity: wherever it is real,
it admits of no degrees; and it is impossible that a person should
be in part the same, and in part different; because a person is a
monad, and is not divisible into parts.”50
Lockean positions reduce personal identity to relations amongst conscious
states. Butler worries that consciousness over time does not remain one
and the same thing. It consists in a sequence of distinct, successive
conscious states, e.g., perceptions at different times. Proponents of a
Lockean picture thus fail to capture identity in the strict philosophical
sense. They must think that
“personality is not a permanent, but a transient thing: that it
lives and dies, begins and ends, continually: that no one can any
more remain one and the same person two moments together, than
two successive moments can be one and the same moment: that
our substance is indeed continually changing; but whether this
be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to the purpose; since it is not
44Butler 1736, pp. 99-100.
45Reid 1785b, p. 112.
46Ibid.
47Butler 1736, p. 100.
48Ibid.
49S. Shoemaker (1984, pp. 73-4) argues that this is a specific and rather unhelp-
ful understanding of substance. There is an alternative, Aristotelian understanding
according to which a mereologically changing tree does remain the same substance.
50Reid 1785b, p. 111.
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substance, but consciousness alone, which constitutes personality:
which consciousness being successive, cannot be the same in any
two moments, nor consequently the personality constituted by
it.”51
According to the complaint, the Lockean account is not really an account
of identity over time. Conscious states at different times are distinct. The
persons that supposedly consist in these states thus must remain distinct,
too. Personal identity falls out of the picture. I call this the numerical
distinctness charge.
Butler and Reid are convinced that the Lockean picture would have
bizarre practical consequences:
“it must follow, that it is a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our
present selves with any thing we did, or to imagine our present
selves interested in any thing which befell us yesterday; or that
our present self will be interested in what will befall us tomorrow:
since our present self is not, in reality, the same with the self of
yesterday, but another like self or person coming in its room, and
mistaken for it; to which another self will succeed tomorrow. This,
I say, must follow: for if the self or person of today, and that of
tomorrow, are not the same, but only like persons; the person of
today is really no more interested in what will befall the person
of to morrow, than in what will befall any other person.”52
Because of the numerical distinctness between present and future person
stages, attitudes of concern and ascriptions of responsibility for past or
future events become unreasonable.53
A final worry about the complex view relates to indeterminacy. The
more particular facts can come in degrees. For example, direct quasi-
memory connections between person stages can be few or many, and the
resulting degree of psychological connectedness can be low or high. There
51Butler 1736, p. 102.
52Ibid.
53I will discuss these claims in (chapter 2).
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are thus conceivable instances, such as the ‘range’ discussed earlier in
Parfit’s Spectrum, in which an individual neither determinately survives
nor determinately ceases to exist. Firstly, the possibility of such cases is
surprising and counterintuitive.
“When it is applied to ourselves, this Reductionist claim is hard
to believe. In such imagined cases [where personal identity is
indeterminate; P.H.], something unusual is about to happen. But
most are inclined that, in any conceivable case, the questions ‘Am
I about to die?’ must have an answer. And we are inclined to
believe that this answer must be either, and quite simply, Yes or
No. Any future person must be either me, or someone else. These
beliefs I call the view that our identity must be determinate.”54
Secondly, it is quite unclear which attitudes we should have towards such
cases. As Williams puts it, the prospect of indeterminacy “seems to have
no comprehensible representation in my expectations and the emotions
that go with them.”55 If it is indeterminate whether a present self is
identical to a future self who will get tortured,
“fear [...] seems neither appropriate, nor inappropriate, nor ap-
propriately equivocal. Relatedly, the subject has an incurable dif-
ficulty about how he may think about [situation] S. If he engages
in projective imaginative thinking (about how it will be for him),
he implicitly answers the necessarily unanswerable question; if he
thinks that he cannot engage in such thinking, it looks very much
as if he also answers it, though in the opposite direction.”56
These reasons against a view that allows for indeterminacy need not be
decisive. But they point to puzzles that loom within the picture.
54Parfit 1984, p. 214.
55Williams 1970, p. 175.
56Ibid., pp. 176-7.
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1.3 Conclusion
The simple view is somewhat intuitive. From the inside, our survival
seems compatible with a wide range of bodily and mental changes. And
for one and the same set of facts and relations of bodily and mental
continuity and connectedness, it might seem an open question whether
the scenario contains us. Complex theorists accept that we might have
had good evidence for the simple view. But as a matter of fact, it is not
well-supported by further evidence beyond these intuitions and seemings
from the inside.
The complex view too has intuitive aspects. In Parfit’s Spectrum, it
seems plausible that Parfit does not remain himself throughout the pro-
cedure, and that there is no sharp cut-off point where the tiniest change
makes all the difference about his survival. It is somewhat attractive to
believe that Parfit’s survival depends on the more particular facts that
are gradually altered by the procedure. This idea also coheres well with
a broadly naturalistic world view, given that personal identity is taken to
be nothing over and above bodily and/or mental facts and relations. But
the complex view also faces questions. It is quite unclear which attitude
we should take towards cases where personal identity is indeterminate.
Moreover, if personal identity consists in facts and relations which by
themselves seem far less important than our survival, how can it make
sense to care about survival, to be concerned about the past and future,
to ascribe moral responsibility, and to engage in other person-related
practices? This issue might seem particular pressing in view of the in-
sight that what Parfit calls the more particular facts at different times
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are distinct. For example, my present conscious states are plausibly un-
derstood to be numerically distinct from my conscious states tomorrow.
Does this not give a sense in which I fail to remain one and the same
person over time, and in which my engagement in person-related prac-
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Most people maintain some future-directed concern. We plan, set goals,
prepare, imagine, compare scenarios, make choices, look forward to future
joy and fearfully anticipate pain, and hope that things work out. Even
people who live in the moment and do not worry about tomorrow tend to
care about more than the present; they just do not extend their concerns
as far into the future as others. One assumption on which these activities
rest is that it will be us who experience the consequences, benefit from
success, take part in the happiness of others, and suffer from accidents
or mistakes. When caring in these ways, we make assumptions—if only
minimal ones—about our survival into the future.
Unfortunately, assumptions can turn out to be false, and this can
affect our investment into activities which presuppose them. If I was
told that I will not exist tomorrow, or that I will exist but not in a way
that matters to me, I would begin to live differently today. I might seize
the day, prioritize efforts, and refrain from working towards goals that
have become unreachable. I need not stop thinking and caring about the
future. But since I myself will not be part of it, my current perspective
on it has changed.
Some philosophers think that we need not receive particularly bad
news to be forced to change our attitudes in such ways. If we started
believing the complex view, no person could take herself to survive into
the future, at least not in a sense that matters. Concern for our fu-
tures would become a deeply misguided attitude. If all that being and
remaining you involves is the obtainment of relations of continuity and
connectedness, there is no reason to care about what happens tomorrow,
or at least no more reason to care about what happens to you than to
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care about more general matters.
These prospects are troubling. The complex view might be true—
does this mean that our future-directed concern is unjustified, and that
we should care more about the present? On the other hand, our current
attitudes seem clearly justified and so natural that any theory which
conflicts with them looks dubious—are we entitled to criticize or dismiss
the complex view on the basis of our pre-theoretic concern about our
futures?
In the following, I will discuss these questions, and eventually answer
both of them in the negative. I begin by describing aspects in which the
complex view is supposed to undermine future-directed concern (2.1),
before distinguishing two more general claims in view of these findings
(2.2). I then sketch an argument for how these practical objections sup-
posedly lead to a reductio of the complex view (2.3), before characterizing
several promising variants of two broad responses (2.4, 2.5) to the idea
that the complex view has implausible practical implications. In the end,
everything will be fine. We are justified in caring about the future even
if the complex view is true. And when choosing between the complex
and the simple view, we can set our everyday concerns aside, and, if we
prefer, endorse the best option on purely theoretical grounds.
2.1 Practical Objections
The complex view has been accused of having absurd practical conse-
quences. According to the critics, these have at least two sources.57
57Whiting 1986, pp. 549-52.
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The first source is related to numerical distinctness. As mentioned
(1.2.2), Butler complains that for Locke, person stages at different times
are related by similarity of consciousness, but remain otherwise distinct.
Thus, no account of identity has been offered.
“[I]t must follow, that it is a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our
present selves with any thing we did, or to imagine our present
selves interested in any thing which befell us yesterday, or that
our present self will be interested in what will befall us tomorrow;
since our present self is not, in reality, the same with the self of
yesterday, but another like self or person coming in its room, and
mistaken for it; to which another self will succeed tomorrow.”58
Since in Locke’s picture, present and future self are numerically distinct,
the former has no reason to care about the latter. They are similar selves,
but not the same self. Butler thinks that holding accountable and caring
about the future are attitudes that presuppose numerical identity. Thus,
the Lockean cannot avoid making
“the inquiry concerning a future life of no consequence at all to
us, the persons who are making it”59
Locke’s position that personal identity consists in sameness of conscious-
ness inspires psychological continuity theory. Lewis writes:
“I find what I mostly want in wanting survival is that my mental
life should flow on. My present experiences, thoughts, beliefs,
desires, and traits of character should have appropriate future
successors [...] These successive states should be interconnected
in two ways. First, by bonds of similarity. Second, by bonds of
lawful causal dependence.”60
Such Neo-Lockean positions have received similar criticisms. For exam-
58Butler 1736, p. 102.
59Ibid., p. 99.
60Lewis 1976, p. 17.
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ple, Schechtman grants Lewis that psychological similarity and interre-
latedness of person stages keeps the contents of consciousness stable.
“The moments of consciousness themselves, however, remain dis-
tinct from one another, and what [Lewis] describes is more like
a Humean bundle than a real unity. [...] My relation to my fu-
ture self, on this view, is like my relation to someone very like
me psychologically, a kind of super psychological twin. Just as
my psychological likeness to a twin does not make it legitimate to
hold me responsible for her actions, [...] psychological continuity
and connectedness does not make it legitimate to hold me respon-
sible for the actions of my past self if that is all that her being me
amounts to.”61
Without real unity, psychological continuity falls short of providing rea-
sons why the distinct moments of consciousness should extend concern
or moral responsibility to each other.62
The second supposed practical absurdity of Lockean positions comes
from the relations of continuity and connectedness. Critics argue that
by themselves, these relations are unimportant. For example, Swinburne
thinks that Lockeans must maintain problematic claims about death and
killing. For them,
“to say that existing people would be deprived of future experi-
ences is just to say there would not be persons whose bodies are
continuous with those of the living, or who had similar memories
and character to the living, having experience. But then what’s
so important about the persons, who are to have experiences,
having bodies continuous with persons now living or having sim-
ilar memories and character? Surely in itself nothing at all. If
instead there are newly bred persons with healthier bodies, hap-
pier memories, and more amiable characters than those murdered,
why should killing be wrong just because of the lack of bodily and
61Schechtman 2014, p. 36.
62Schechtman (1996, pp. 55-60) thinks this is especially challenging for four-
dimensionalist accounts in which a person’s temporal parts are distinct from each
other. For more on this claim, see further below (2.5.1). Schechtman (2014, ch. 1)
offers a reading of Locke which she thinks survives the quoted objection.
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other continuity? In itself surely such continuity has no value.”63
Swinburne concludes that continuities can at best be evidence for what
does have such value: personal identity.
Madell formulates a similar worry about anticipation:
“[I]f I fear that I shall suffer pain what I fear is, not that the
person who suffers this pain will have a certain set of memory
impressions and a certain set of desires and intentions, but, quite
simply, that he will be me. [...] If one is told at this juncture
by the supporter of the psychological criterion that the reason I
should be concerned is that to have such memories, and so on, just
is to be me, I am again left with the feeling that no explanation
has been offered. [...] [I]t is not at all obvious that I have any
reason to be concerned about the fact that the person who will
be in pain will have a certain set of memory impressions, and it
is no clarification at all to be told that in this sort of context that
is all that being me involves.”64
Moreover:
“the only tolerable answer to the question ‘Why fear that future
pain?’ is that it is, unanalyzably, mine.”65
For both Swinburne and Madell, continuities are less important and valu-
able than personal identity. They think it follows that continuities cannot
be what personal identity consists in.66
Parfit describes one rationale for these reservations.67 Simple posi-
tions like Swinburne’s regard personal identity as a deep further fact
beyond continuities. They believe that this further fact is what gives
us reasons for future-directed concern. Continuity relations might have
some derivative practical importance once the further fact obtains. But
63Swinburne 1974, p. 246.
64Madell 1981, p. 110.
65Ibid., p. 112.
66I disagree further below (2.5.4).
67Parfit 1984, pp. 308-9.
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if one accepts Swinburne’s picture, continuities are no surrogate for the
deep further fact.
2.2 The Extreme And The Moderate Claim
Parfit distinguishes two broader claims one could endorse in light of the
foregoing objections.
The Extreme Claim “[I]f the Reductionist View is true, we
have no reason to be specially concerned about our own fu-
tures.”68
This claim concerns reductionism, which is closely related if not equiva-
lent to the complex view (5.1.2). I assume here that the extreme claim
also applies to the complex view. The alternative is:
The Moderate Claim Continuity relations (for Parfit: relation
R) give us a reason for special concern.69
These claims allow for different readings. Whiting distinguishes the fol-
lowing variants.70 First, special concern for one’s own future can be either
irrational or merely not rationally required. Second, as an absolute claim,
there is no reason to care about my future selves. As a comparative claim,
there is no reason to care about our own futures more than about the
futures of others, or no special reason for such concern.71 Whiting thus
recommends that we think of the extreme and moderate claims as “a
family of claims”72. Whenever I speak of ‘future-directed concern’ in the
68Ibid., p. 307.
69Ibid., p. 311.
70Whiting 1986, p. 549.
71Hummel 2012, p. 20.
72Whiting 1986, p. 549.
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following, I intend to be neutral between a comparative and an absolute
kind of concern.
Proponents of the claims are not always explicit about which version
they endorse. As quoted earlier, Butler suggests an absolute extreme
claim, given that it would be fallacious to be interested in anything that
will befall us tomorrow. Immediately thereafter, Butler makes the com-
parative claim that
“if the self or person of today, and that of tomorrow, are not the
same, but only like persons, the person of today is really no more
interested in what will befall the person of tomorrow, than in what
will befall any other person.”73
Moreover, Butler speaks of a fallacy to care about the future if Locke’s
position was true. This suggests that he thinks the theory makes it
irrational to have future-directed concern. Parfit seems to understand
the extreme claim in a similar way when he draws parallels74 between
future-directed concern within the complex view and Future Tuesday
Indifference,75 i.e. ordinary future-directed concern, except for being
wholly indifferent about any pains or pleasures on future Tuesdays—one
of Parfit’s paradigm cases of irrational concern.
The extreme claim and the moderate claim are not explicit about the
exact source of this rational status. For example, Street distinguishes
attitude-dependent from attitude-independent conceptions of normative
reasons.76 According to attitude-independent accounts, there are facts
about how an agent has most normative reason to live that hold inde-
73Butler 1736, p. 102.
74Parfit 1986, pp. 832-3.
75Parfit 1984, p. 124.
76Street 2009, p. 274.
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pendently of that agent’s evaluative attitudes in combination with the
non-normative facts. According to attitude-dependent accounts, no such
facts exist; an agent’s normative reasons derive solely from her evaluative
attitudes and what is entailed by them together with the non-normative
facts. I believe that the extreme claim and the moderate claim are com-
patible with either conception. The rationality status of concern against
the backdrop of the complex view can be seen as arising from facts that
are independent of the agents’ attitudes. For example, we can under-
stand the absolute version of the extreme claim such that regardless of
the agent’s actual values and desires, she would make a mistake in car-
ing about the future if the complex view was true. But alternatively,
we could also understand the extreme claim as making a point about
our actual evaluative attitudes. They presuppose something which the
complex view cannot provide. Given the insight that there are no deep
further facts of personal identity, caring for our futures becomes incoher-
ent, relative to our antecedent attitudes.
D. Shoemaker77 describes a distinctive sense in which a theory of
personal identity can be expected to give reasons for future-directed con-
cern and other practices. The theory shall not only capture and explain
facts that are necessary for these practices and their reasonableness. We
expect more: a satisfying theory of personal identity articulates condi-
tions that are sufficient for the reasonableness of future-directed concern
and other attitudes. The conditions shall make it sensible that we have
special concern for those future person stages that are related to us as
77D. Shoemaker 2007, pp. 321-2.
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specified by the theory.78 The suggested claim is not just that identity
matters. Instead, accounts of personal identity can be expected to give
us an idea about how and why identity is what matters.79 It is plausi-
ble to understand the extreme claim as a complaint about the complex
view’s failure to make it sensible why we care about our futures.
The extreme claim is formulated and discussed in the literature mostly
with respect to concern for our futures. It is fruitful to think about vari-
ations in the attitude and the temporal direction figuring in the extreme
claim. The attitude of concern looks inherently future-directed, but there
are also past-directed instances or analogues, e.g., concern about whether
it was me who did a wrongful action. Related attitudes such as regret,
pride, and feelings of responsibility are paradigmatically past-directed.
The extreme claim in this more general form, covering several kinds of
practices and temporal orientations, might be much more difficult to
defend. D. Shoemaker argues that practices like concern, moral respon-
sibility ascriptions, compensation, etc. are too diverse and not unified
enough for there to be just one grounding relation between them and per-
sonal identity.80 The plausibility of the extreme claim might differ across
the practices. Parfit’s formulation of the extreme claim is restricted to
future-directed concern. In the following, I will focus on this version of
the claim.
Parfit acknowledges that the extreme claim is defensible if one be-
lieves in deep further facts of personal identity. Compared to them, con-
tinuity relations seem unimportant. For example, in Swinburne’s picture
78For a similar point, see S. Shoemaker 1984, p. 71.
79As I explain below (4.5), D. Shoemaker himself discards this claim (2016, p. 323).
80D. Shoemaker 2007, pp. 353-4.
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of fission, even if continuity relations branch symmetrically, the further
fact of personal identity obtains for at most one of the offshoots. The
other offshoot “will not be a mere stranger”81, and thus should not be
treated by the fissioner like everyone else. But the fissioner should re-
gard this offshoot as a “mere instrument”82, and can rationally will the
offshoot’s death if it threatens to interfere with the fissioner’s projects.
Within Swinburne’s picture, continuity relations are not enough to mo-
tivate special concern that normally goes with the deep further fact.
Moreover, the extreme claim is defensible if one does not believe in
deep further facts of personal identity. In that case, Parfit believes that
the relation to the offshoots is as good as ordinary survival. This claim
is neutral on whether special concern is warranted in ordinary survival.83
The moderate claim is defensible, too. We care specially about people
we love even without a deep further fact of personal identity between us
and them. However, Parfit is unsure if this does the trick:
“Suppose I learn that someone I love will suffer great pain. I shall
be greatly distressed by this news. I might be more distressed
than I would be if I learnt that I shall soon suffer such pain. But
this concern has a different quality. I do not anticipate the pain
that will be felt by someone I love.”84
He thus agrees that the moderate claim can be denied. In conclusion,
he suspends judgement on whether the extreme or the moderate claim is
correct: “I have not yet found an argument that refutes either.”85
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I close with one constructive suggestion. If we draw Whiting’s dis-
tinction between absolute and comparative versions, a possibility arises
for combining the extreme claim with the moderate claim: comparative
extremism (the complex view does not give us reasons for special con-
cern for our own futures) is compatible with absolute moderatism (the
complex view does give us reasons to care for our futures). Maybe Parfit
struggles to choose between the extreme and the moderate claim because
his preferred, particular versions of the claims are not in opposition. For
example, he seems to sympathize with idea that absence of a deep further
fact motivates comparative extremism: the relation between me and my
future selves is less deep than we thought, and thus special concern for
my future selves is unmotivated. Moreover, fission shows that identity is
not what matters in survival. If anything does matter in survival, it is
relation R, a combination of psychological continuity and connectedness.
This motivates absolute moderatism: continuity relations do give us a
reason for future-directed concern.
2.3 A Reductio Against The Complex View
The extreme claim does not by itself undermine the complex view. But
it figures in arguments against the complex view. As described in (1.2.2),
Butler, Madell, and others defend the following argument:86
86I use an comparative phrasing by speaking of special concern, but a similar
argument could formulated with an absolute phrasing.
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(P1) If the complex view is true, we have no reason for special con-
cern for our own futures.
(P2) We have reasons for special concern for our own futures.
(C) The complex view is false.
The conclusion is the result of a reductio. If we assume the truth of the
complex view, there would be no reason for special concern. But since
we do have reasons for special concern, the complex view must be false.
In the following, I argue that the reductio against the complex view can
be resisted.
2.4 Response 1: Deny A Complex/Simple
Asymmetry
The reductio is supposed to be a challenge specifically for the complex
view. I now characterize three mutually compatible ways to deny this.
2.4.1 The Simple View And Concern
Simple theorists must claim that they can give reasons for special con-
cern. Otherwise, the reductio would not be a competitive disadvantage
of complex positions, but apply to simple ones as well. As Johansson
notes, this would render the extreme claim less threatening:
“[o]ne could hardly fault a theory for being unable to provide
something that no theory can provide.”87
However, simple theorists say little about why their positions are superior
in justifying concern. Instead, they typically take for granted that the
87Johansson 2007, p. 642.
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persistence of one’s soul or ego is necessary and sufficient for concern.
As mentioned, Parfit thinks the extreme claim is defensible, given
that the complex view denies deep further facts. Pre-reflectively, we are
inclined to believe in these facts, and our ordinary concerns presuppose
them.88 But Parfit does not explain what it is about these deep further
facts that would motivate or demand concern.89
One problem is that the more featureless souls or egos are taken to
be, the less it is clear what about them could matter. Whiting suspects:
“my soul—if I’ve got one—is no different from anyone else’s except
in so far as it has my experiences, memories, intentions and so on.
Without these things, my soul is nothing to me.”90
Similarly, Wolf writes:
“given that a Cartesian ego is independent of personality, mem-
ories, even physical and psychological continuity, surely that is
not a very strong or sensible ground for caring about someone.
There is at least as much reason to care about individuals that
are connected to my present consciousness in other ways.”91
If a soul is merely the locus of experiences, memories, intentions and the
like, then souls of different people do not seem to differ much. They are
just neutral bearers of properties and relations of continuity and connect-
edness. This is particularly obvious for the Featureless Cartesian View,
where facts about the ego can completely float free from psychological or
bodily continuity. For Whiting and Wolf, sameness of ego or soul would
matter only derivatively, if it could guarantee or sustain psychological
88Parfit 1984, p. 281.
89S. Shoemaker 1985, p. 452.
90Whiting 1986, p. 547.
91Wolf 1986, p. 707.
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continuity. But because it does not, the importance of sameness of ego
or soul is questionable.
Locke makes a similar point about action. He imagines that a present
person has the same soul that was in Nestor or Thersites. Unless this
person is also conscious of Nestor or Thersites’ actions, he cannot be
concerned about their actions or attribute their actions to himself.
“For this would no more make him the same person with Nestor,
than if some of the particles of matter that were once a part
of Nestor were now a part of this man; the same immaterial sub-
stance, without the same consciousness, no more making the same
person, by being united to any body, than the same particle of
matter, without consciousness, united to any body, makes the
same person.”92
With regards to action, even if all these people share a soul, as long as
they are not conscious of each others’ actions, it is as if their souls would
be distinct. By itself, having the same soul is insufficient to warrant
concern for past actions.93
These criticisms concern souls’ or egos’ qualitative features, or lack
thereof. A different aspect which could make egos or souls important is
that their presence gives a sense in which one and the same subject has
the different experiences, memories, and intentions, which according to
the foregoing objection can vary so wildly. Even then,
“we might well worry that numerical sameness of subject alone is
not a very reasonable basis for concern.”94
The same goes for the suggestion that the presence of egos or souls
provides—although not necessarily one and the same subject of experien-
92Locke 1690, Book II, xxvii. 14.
93Note how Swinburne’s worry that continuities by themselves are unimportant is
just an instance of this argument, but turned against the Lockean position.
94Kind 2004, p. 543.
42 CHAPTER 2. THE EXTREME CLAIM
ces—at least one and the same entity that exists at different times. This
by itself does not avoid comparative extremism; it does not explain what
it is about one’s soul that requires prioritized concern over the soul of
someone else.95 Neither is it obvious how the presence of souls would
avoid absolute extremism; the question remains what it is about souls
that requires concern at all. More needs to be said on why souls and not
continuity relations are proper objects of concern, and why death should
seem bad only if it means cessation of the former. In other words, these
suggestions only push back the problem. The question remains why
numerical identity between present and future souls motivates future-
directed concern.
Another problem is that the deep further facts of personal identity
are epistemically inaccessible, even to the subjects themselves. After all,
in Swinburne’s picture of fission, both offshoots would be convinced that
they are identical to the fissioner, while only one can be right. It is not a
particularly attractive view that such entirely inaccessible facts are the
rational basis for concern.96
Although the reasoning of simple theorists about how their positions
justify future-directed concern is mysterious, I make one charitable sug-
gestion. The persistence of her soul or ego might provide the present self
with a sense of ownership of future experiences. If a future experience
is mine, we still have not been told much about what this involves and
which justificatory role it plays with regards to concern. But we could
tentatively grant that a sufficient condition for my concern is satisfied.
95Johnston 2010, pp. 176-8.
96Gasser 2013, p. 278.
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At this point, in order to determine whether this point is a competitive
advantage of simple positions, the focus should shift to their complex
opponents (2.5).
2.4.2 Sources Of The Reasonableness of Concern
The first premise of the reductio is the extreme claim: if the complex
view was true, we would have no reason for special concern. I see two
presuppositions under which the premise could be true: first, the complex
view, or a theory of personal identity more generally, is the only potential
source for such reasons.97 Second, whatever other reasons there seem to
be for special concern, coming to realize the truth of the complex view
cancels them out.
One suggestion to dispute the premise and its presuppositions is pro-
vided by D. Shoemaker. He proposes that for some attitudes, the ques-
tion of whether they are justified is a non-starter. For example,
“[l]ove, rather notoriously, seems to operate independently of,
even against, rational considerations. A mothers love for her son
is, we say, unconditional: her love obtains (or should obtain) no
matter what. [...] And if rational grounding is off the table where
the love of others is concerned, surely it is even farther off the
table where love of self is concerned. [...] asking the question
about rational justification in either case fails to take seriously
the deeply natural commitment we have to the practices as they
stand.”98
One inspiration for this position comes from Strawson. He claims that
even in view of determinism, our reactive attitudes which ground the
practice of holding each other responsible are “part of the general frame-
97Kind 2004, p. 550.
98D. Shoemaker 2007, pp. 348-9.
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work of human life, not something that can come up for review”99. De-
manding justification of such attitudes is misguided. D. Shoemaker’s
suggestion is that concern for our futures is similarly natural and non-
rational—as opposed to irrational. Such attitudes are not the right kind
of states to be backed up by reasons.
D. Shoemaker ends up discarding this suggestion. Even if we grant
that loving family members and maintaining reactive attitudes are non-
rational, many concerns are proper objects of rational evaluation.100
Sometimes people do seem to make genuine mistakes about concern, for
example in Future Tuesday Indifference, or when caring too much about
themselves. These judgements presuppose that concern can be evalu-
ated in light of reasons.101 Moreover, in tension with the non-rationality
thesis, we can reason ourselves out of certain ways of caring. Buddhists
and Stoics even manage to reason themselves out of concern as such in
view of their descriptive and normative beliefs. D. Shoemaker agrees
that it might be difficult to say something principled about the rational
grounding of concern. Still, he concludes that given these examples, it is
not attractive to regard instances of concern or the practice as such as
non-rational.
Wolf seems to defend a D. Shoemaker-style non-rationality thesis, at
least about special concern for our own futures. She thinks that the ques-
tion why we should have such concern is one instance of the more general
99Strawson 1962, p. 14.
100D. Shoemaker 2007, pp. 349-52.
101Note also how D. Shoemaker’s quoted remarks about parental love are slightly
puzzling. Given that his case rests on the basis that parents should love their children,
the attitude seems to be at least somewhat responsive to normative reasons. The
question then arises how it can be a paradigm case of non-rational concern.
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question why we should care about some people more than others. In all
these cases, Wolf is convinced that justifying special attachments is mis-
guided. Any facts we might mention, such as family relations, a common
history, or particular features of the person we care about, are neither
suitable nor intended as justifications.102 Instead, Wolf argues that we
do not typically think that these concerns are in need of justification.
“[T]he answer to the question, Why care about one person rather
than another? may be that indeed, there is no reason. But on the
other hand, we do not want or expect reason to govern here.”103
Moreover, Wolf argues that it is conceptually and biologically impossible
not to care about one’s future. Forming intentions and making rational
decisions inevitably involve future-directed concern for oneself.
“The answer to the question, Why care especially about oneself?
then, may be that one cannot help but care about that, and that,
in any case, it should not be necessary to justify one’s special
self-concern.”104
According to Wolf, a slightly different question is reason-responsive:
Why care about persons? Plausible answers will refer to the complexity
of lives which persons can lead and distinguish them from other beings.
Wolf also makes a vivid case that caring about persons as opposed to
R-related beings makes the world a better place: “life, or if one prefers,
the world, is better that way.”105 Otherwise, friendships, parent-child
relations, etc. would suffer and impoverish. For example, if what we
value in our friends is R-relatedness, it seems we should be averse to our
friends developing and undergoing psychological changes. This would
102See also Adams 1989, p. 455.
103Wolf 1986, p. 719.
104Ibid., p. 720.
105Ibid., p. 713.
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seem bizarre. Thus, justifications can be given for why we should care
about persons rather than R-relatedness. However, Wolf’s point is that
these justifications invite
“contemplation of a variety of issues with respect to which the
metaphysics of personal identity plays no obvious role.”106
To the extent that concern for persons can be backed up by reasons,
personal identity is unimportant to this rational grounding.
A related picture is defended by Johnston. In his view, concern is
rationally justifiable, but the justification mentions personal identity only
in a minimal way. In particular, Johnston is convinced that whether the
complex or the simple view is true is irrelevant. Like Wolf, he identifies
concern for our own futures as part of a wider pattern of self-referential
concerns that are directed at close persons and relationships. These
concerns seem so fundamental and natural that Johnston is happy to
accept them as “basic pattern[s] of concern”107 which are prima facie
reasonable. Just like certain fundamental beliefs, they enjoy
“a defeasible presumption in favour of their reasonableness; they
cannot all be thrown into doubt at once, for then criticism would
have no place from where to start.”108
Johnston’s only requirement is that such basic concerns are coherent and
robust against informed criticism.109 Concern for friends and family is
reasonable independently of the metaphysics of friendship and family,
and the same goes for concerns about future selves:
106Wolf 1986, p. 708.
107Johnston 1992, p. 599.
108Ibid.
109Hummel 2012, p. 37.
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“[j]ust as these concerns require only the ordinary fact that one has
friends and acquaintances, so self-concern seems only to require
the ordinary fact that one exists and will exist.”110
For the justification of concern, the ordinary fact of personal identity
suffices. The justification is agnostic on whether the complex or the
simple view gives the right account of personal identity.
Sider articulates his view on the relation between metaphysics and
practical concerns with similar terminology. He introduces a distinc-
tion between ordinary facts and claims about the ultimate reality which
underlies ordinary facts.111 Metaphysics is concerned with the latter. Or-
dinary facts can mention facts and entities which, according to our meta-
physics, are false or do not exist. For example, even mereological nihilists,
if liberal enough, can accept the truth of statements about tables if un-
derstood as claims about ordinary facts. But strictly speaking, for the
nihilist ultimate reality does not contain tables. No composite objects
occur at the most fundamental level.
Sider believes that a number of ordinary facts are entirely neutral on
their underlying, fundamental reality. For example, the claim that
“(F) Princess Diana’s entire life would have been better for her,
had she not died when she did, than it in fact was”112
is neutral on whether presentism or eternalism is true. And although
Sider does not explicitly say so, we might add that (F) is true or false
irrespective of whether or not ultimate reality contains persons and/or ir-
respective of how persons persist. Metaphysicians might disagree whether
110Johnston 1992, p. 600.
111Sider 2013, pp. 157-8.
112Ibid., p. 162.
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Diana ultimately is a human animal or an essentially mental entity. They
might disagree on whether what we ordinarily take to be her parts really
compose a whole, or whether they are just mereological simples arranged
a certain way. But no such claims about ultimate reality are being made
by ordinary fact (F).
In this picture, it seems possible that ordinary claims like (F) are
justified solely by virtue of other ordinary facts, none of which makes
claims on the nature of ultimate reality. For example, Sider suggests
that (F) can be accepted on the grounds that an event is bad if
“a person’s entire life would have been better for her if the state
of affairs had not occured than if it had occured.”113
These grounds are metaphysically austere. If we extend this picture,
we can argue that the reasons for concern about a future experience do
not involve claims about the ultimate reality of personal identity. In
particular, the explanation is neutral on how whether the complex or the
simple view is true. It is not the case that if the complex view failed to
give reasons for concern, our concerns would be unjustified. The reasons
could still come from other sources, e.g., ordinary facts that are neutral
on ultimate reality.114
The foregoing authors agree that the relevance of personal identity for
the justification of concern is minimal at best. Kind accepts this,115 but
develops a more permissive position. We may mention theories personal
113Sider 2013, p. 162. This suggestion comes from Feldman 1991, p. 215.
114Presumably, responses along the lines of Johnston and Sider are particularly
attractive for animalists. Olson (1997, p. 70) and DeGrazia (DeGrazia 2005, p. 63)
agree that the mere fact that a future being is the same biological organism as me falls
short of giving me reasons for concern. These authors agree that further considerations
are necessary.
115Kind 2004, pp. 550-2.
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identity when giving reasons for special concern. For example, if we
accept that concern for our present experiences is justified, the theories
are informative about how to project this concern across time.
“As I move through time, I am going to carry my present-self
special concern with me. Knowing that, I want now to direct my
concern to the future and, in doing so, I want to apply it to the
future self that is me. To answer the question ‘Which self is me?’
I rightly look to a theory of personal identity.”116
Similarly, Johansson maintains that even if we accept that we are justified
on caring about our own futures, and that theories of personal identity
are irrelevant to this justification,
“[w]e still have to enter into the debate between different accounts
of my persistence conditions [...] in order to find out which future
individual I am justified in caring specially about”117.
Pace Wolf, Kind and Johansson maintain that theories of personal iden-
tity can be relevant for justifying future-directed concern. Such theories
help us to understand what it would mean to extend justified, present
concern for ourselves across time. However, in this respect there is, again,
no asymmetry between the complex and the simple view. Both tell us
which future selves would be us.
Moreover, Kind emphasizes that which weight this insight has de-
pends on us. Whether it will be me who has a future experiences might
be relevant to whether I am justified in caring about the experience.118
But acceptance of this link between personal identity and concern im-
poses no constraints on the outcome of our evaluation.119 In particular,
116Ibid., p. 547.
117Johansson 2007, pp. 654-5.
118Kind 2004, pp. 543-4.
119This resembles Korsgaard’s position that we may be guided by beliefs about
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the link is compatible with us ending up discarding the suggestion that
particular concerns or concern as a whole is justified. Our judgement
depends on what we make of the fact that a future self will be us.
I conclude that the reasonableness of concern need not be based on
the complex view, the simple view, or personal identity in general. It can
have motivations that are entirely neutral on or external to these matters
(for two examples, see 3.2). The truth of the complex view then would
not diminish the reasonableness of concern.
2.4.3 Dependence Between Personal Identity And
Concern
There is another problem with the premise that the complex view would
render special concern unjustified. I just argued that there might be
other justifiers that can take over. But let us grant that a theory of
personal identity is indispensable for justifying special concern, and that
the complex view indeed fails to give reasons (to be discussed in 2.5).
The reductio is a modus tollens : supposedly, the complex view implies
that we have no reason for special concern; in fact, we do have such a
reason; the complex view thus must be false. But note that alternatively,
complex theorists could defend the following modus ponens : the complex
view implies that we have no reason for special concern; the complex view
is true; we thus lack a reason for special concern.
metaphysics, but that normative considerations determine which weight these beliefs
carry: “the metaphysical facts do not obviously settle the question [of which motives
to choose; P.H.]: I must still decide whether the consideration that some future person
is ‘me’ has some special normative force for me. It is practical reason that requires
me to construct an identity for myself; whether metaphysics is to guide me in this or
not is an open question” (1989, p. 112). More on Korsgaard below (3.2.1).
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Just as simple theorists say little on which aspects of their positions
justify concern (2.4.1), it is difficult to reconstruct their grounds for pre-
ferring the modus tollens over the modus ponens.120 They seem to regard
our possession and the justifiedness of special concern as natural and
basic, something which is taken for granted in everyday life and so in-
grained in our practices that overthrowing it comes with serious costs.
This perspective is shared by some complex theorists. For example, recall
Johnston’s presumption that self-referential concerns are reasonable:
“One can fail to identify with [and thus fail to have non-derivative
concern for; P.H.] one’s future self. But this will seem reasonable
only if there is some considerable reason to inhibit the natural
tendency to so identify, the natural tendency around which is
built one’s concern that one’s own life continue, go well, and be
worthwhile.”121
These authors would have serious reservations about assimilating spe-
cial concern to irrational attitudes like Future Tuesday Indifference. The
theory must render the concern sensible, or at least not remove justifica-
tion. The conclusion of the modus ponens—we lack a reason for special
concern—is not an option. In a slogan, the obviously justified practice
constrains what can count as the right theory.
The truth of this slogan is not obvious if one considers alternatives.
As we just saw, Kind defends a much weaker relation between concern
and personal identity: by explaining what it takes to be identical to a fu-
ture experiencer, theories of personal identity tell us how we can project
concern about our present selves into the future. But in this picture,
theories of personal identity can remain agnostic on whether the concern
120Kind 2004, pp. 541-2.
121Johnston 1997, p. 157.
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that gets projected is justified in the first place. That is, these theories
by themselves do not settle whether we have reasons—in the present or
in the future—for caring about ourselves, and/or caring about ourselves
in a special way. The picture is compatible with the modus ponens de-
scribed above. Although there is a link between personal identity and
the justifiedness of concern, the slogan that practice constrains theory
is too simple. Things can go the other way round. We might be con-
ceding too much if we accept the modus tollens and debate whether the
complex or the simple view justifies special concern better. It is at least
an option to conclude, on the basis of endorsing the complex view, that
special concern is unjustified. Even if the extreme claim is accepted, we
need not reject the complex view.
Parfit seems to reject the slogan. His imaginary cases convince him
that a revision of our theory of personal identity is warranted. “The truth
is very different from what we are inclined to believe. Even if we are not
aware of this, most of us are Non-Reductionists.”122 But the simple view
is false, and the complex view is true. For Parfit, this has consequences
for how we should think about our futures.
“Is the truth depressing? Some may find it so. But I find it
liberating, and consoling. When I believed that my existence was
a such a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life
seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster
every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I
changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now
live in the open air. There is still a difference between my life and
the lives of other people. But the difference is less. Other people
are closer. I am less concerned about the rest of my own life, and
more concerned about the lives of others”123.
122Parfit 1984, p. 282.
123Ibid.
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With the extreme claim and the reductio against the complex view, Parfit
shares the premise that there is an important connection between theories
of personal identity and the reasonableness of concerns. But Parfit dis-
agrees on which sphere has priority and ultimately restricts the other.124
If the right theory of personal identity fails to ground special concern,
then we should get rid of the concern. D. Shoemaker formulates the
following guiding assumption:
“whatever turns out to be the correct account of personal identity
will fix our practices and concerns accordingly.”125
I am not defending either Parfit’s or Kind’s picture of the relation and pri-
ority between personal identity and concern. What matters for my pur-
poses is that there are plausible alternatives to the particular supposition—
the slogan—that is implicit in the reductio against the complex view.
More needs to be said by proponents of the reductio to rule out a modus
ponens with the conclusion that concern is unjustified.
2.5 Response 2: Continuity Relations Mat-
ter
One obvious way to resist the reductio against the complex view is to
dispute the extreme claim that within the complex view, there are no
reasons for special concern. Given the objections outlined earlier (2.1),
124As I will explain later, once our theory is revised and Parfit’s position accepted,
he thinks that the modified concerns do not track identity anymore. That is, for Parfit
the priority of matters of personal identity is compatible with the claim that upon
reflection, identity is not what matters.
125D. Shoemaker 2007, p. 319. He is not explicitly attributing this assumption to
Parfit.
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I will pursue two lines for responding to the extreme claim. Firstly, one
could deny the numerical distinctness charge launched by Butler and
others. Secondly, one could accept the numerical distinctness charge,
but maintain that the distinctness between stages of one and the same
person is innocuous.
2.5.1 Against Numerical Distinctness: Persistence
Theories of persistence can deny the numerical distinctness objection
in different ways. Three-dimensionalists believe that objects, including
persons, are spread out in space, and are wholly present at each time of
their existence. Four-dimensionalists maintain that objects are spread
out in both space and time, and have temporal parts at each time of
their existence.
“Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists
at various times; this is the neutral word. Something perdures iff it
persists by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different
times, though no one part of it is wholly present at more than one
time; whereas it endures iff it persists by being wholly present at
more than one time.”126
According to one version of four-dimensionalism, objects persist by per-
during. Sider127 and Hawley128 introduce stage theory, or exdurance, as
an alternative to perdurance. Stage theory shares with perdurantism the
view that objects have instantaneous temporal parts. But contrary to
perdurantism, these instantaneous parts rather than their composites are
the satisfiers of sortal predicates. A person stage at a time, not the aggre-
126Lewis 1986, p. 202.
127Sider 1996.
128Hawley 2001, ch. 2.
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gate person composed of a maximal set of person stages, is a full-fledged
person and the referent of the respective person name.
How would these theories address the numerical distinctness charge
that within the complex view, persons at different times are similar at
best, but never identical? I begin with endurantism. It is notoriously
difficult to say what it means to be wholly present.129 What is clear is
that according to endurantism, if a person endures, all of her is wholly
present at more than one time. Endurantists pride themselves of being
able to make sense of the claim that
“[a]n enduring object that exists at one time is identical to itself
existing at another time.”130
It is not the case that two similar but distinct things, e.g., distinct tempo-
ral parts, are present at these times. It is thus built into the definition of
endurantism that objections along the lines of the numerical distinctness
charge against the complex view do not apply.
The question arises whether endurantism is compatible with the com-
plex view. Merricks denies that endurantism can be combined with psy-
chological continuity theory.131 Endurantists understand personal iden-
tity as numerical identity between a person wholly present at one time
and a person wholly present at another time. Merricks thinks psycholog-
ical continuity relates distinct psychological states at different times.132
129For some discussion, see Merricks 1994, pp. 180-2, 1999b, pp. 423-4; Sider 2001b,
sect. 3.3; Crisp and Smith 2005; Hofweber and Velleman 2011.
130Merricks 1994, p. 166.
131Merricks 1999a.
132I am not convinced by Merricks’ case that the relata of psychological continu-
ity cannot be persons. He seems to think that psychological continuity with myself
precludes variation in my psychological states, “[f]or a person has all and only the psy-
chological states that she has” (ibid., p. 985). Could a person not be related to herself
by psychological continuity if she has one set of states at one time, and a different
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Numerical identity is neither the same as non-branching psychological
continuity nor can be analyzed in terms of it. Because of this, psy-
chological continuity either cannot be regarded as necessary and suffi-
cient for personal identity, or can be regarded as necessary and sufficient
without thereby offering a reduction of personal identity, i.e. the latter
would remain a further fact beyond the proposed necessary and sufficient
condition—something which psychological continuity theory supposedly
seeks to avoid. A middle way would be that personal identity is consti-
tuted by non-branching continuity. But Merricks rejects this suggestion
on at least three grounds.133 First, the constitution relation is myste-
rious.134 Second, without much argument he asserts that even if we
concede that there are paradigm cases of constitution, e.g., statues and
bronze, personal identity and psychological continuity are disanalogous
to these cases. Third, numerical identity is primitive, not constituted by
anything. Although Merricks targets psychological continuity theory, his
points seem to translate to accounts of personal identity that focus on
bodily continuity.
Merricks’ discussion has received critical responses.135 I am defending
neither endurantism nor its compatibility with the complex view. For
my purposes, it suffices to note that if complex theorists can respond to
Merricks’ criticism and endorse endurantism, they would circumvent the
but continuous one at another time? This matters because it undermines Merricks’
claim that personal identity and psychological continuity must have different relata.
133Merricks 1999a, pp. 992-3.
134We could refer Merricks to the suggestions in (chapter 6).
135Rea and Silver (2000) argue that if Merricks was right, a parallel argument
would establish that perdurantism is incompatible with psychological continuity the-
ory. Merricks disagrees (2000). Brueckner (2009) offers an endurantist formulation
of psychological continuity which he thinks is perfectly defensible. Langford (2014)
argues that both Merricks and Brueckner are mistaken.
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numerical distinctness charge.
Let us now turn to four-dimensionalism. For the perdurantist, per-
son stages at different times are distinct, but can be stages of one and
the same person. This picture aligns neatly with the complex view. A
person’s temporal parts are typically seen as causally continuous and
connected, and so can instantiate the relations which the view takes to
be constitutive of personal identity.136 For example, Lewis calls the re-
lation which unites the stages of one single person the I-relation, and
suggests that it can be analyzed in terms of mental continuity and con-
nectedness.137
The perdurantist has a response to the numerical distinctness charge.
On the one hand, she can deny the charge for persons and other maximal
aggregates of object stages. The person to whom the person stages belong
is one and the same at each time of her existence. On the other hand,
she must accept the numerical distinctness charge for person stages. The
temporal parts of one and the same person are distinct. However, the
perdurantist can go on to deny that this implies that one stage has no
reason to care about other, I-related person stages, or has no reason to
care about them more than about non-I-related stages. Both stages are
temporal parts of one and the same person. The stages are distinct, but
they need not be left without reasons to care about each other.138
136The picture is even compatible with the simple view. Persons and their souls or
egos, and maybe even Madell’s irreducible self, can have temporal parts.
137Lewis 1976, p. 21.
138For more discussion on the interests of person stages, see 3.1.2 and 3.1.3.
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The locus of concern in Lewis’ proposal is a person stage. Common-
sense concerns are about persons, not stages.139 This is one motivation
for stage theory, or exdurantism. The stage view seems to be compatible
with the complex view for the same reasons as perdurantism. It shares
Lewis’ stance that person stages can be I-related, but is distinguished by
the claim that instantaneous stages are full-fledged persons. Although
they are instantaneous, they satisfy tensed predicates by virtue of being
I-related to stages at other times—just as in Lewis’ counterpart theory, a
world-bound individual is possibly F by virtue of having an other-worldly
counterpart that is F.
Sider explicitly deals with a version of the numerical distinctness
charge. He clarifies that the stage view does not have the consequence
that “statements that look like they are about what once happened to
me are really about what once happened to someone else.”140 Although
satisfaction of a tensed predicate is analyzed in terms of satisfaction of a
non-tensed property, the possessor of the tensed predicate is the present
person stage.141 If you face pain tomorrow, the person stage experiencing
the pain is distinct from your present self. But this only appears to invite
a numerical distinctness worry. Your present self satisfies the predicate of
going-to-be-in-pain-tomorrow.142 She thus need not be concerned about
the predicates that are satisfied by someone else; she will be concerned
139Sider 1996, pp. 435-7. In this context, consider also Wolf’s claim, aimed at Parfit,
that momentary person stages cannot be the primary objects of practical concerns:
“If the reason we care about persons is that persons are able to live interesting,
admirable, and rewarding lives, we may answer that time slices of persons, much less
experiences of times slices, are incapable of living lives at all” (1986, p. 709).
140Sider 1996, p. 437.
141See also Hawley 2001, sect. 2.6.
142See also Johansson 2007, p. 652.
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about the predicates she herself satisfies.
I conclude that endurantism, perdurantism, and exdurantism all pro-
vide promising resources for responding to the numerical distinctness ob-
jection. These theories explain how persons persist such that they, and
not a distinct entity, will have certain experiences in the future. The the-
ories are neutral on how concern is justified, and so will not by themselves
refute the extreme claim. But provided we are entitled to care about our
experiences, these theories make sense of how future experiences will be
ours—even when combined with the complex view.
2.5.2 Quasi-Anticipation
Suppose that the numerical distinctness charge goes through. Does this
mean that caring about our futures is unjustified?
We do maintain reasonable concerns for persons distinct from us, e.g.,
our loved ones. This suggests that even if we grant that the complex view
is committed to numerical distinctness of persons at different times, it is
implausible to endorse the absolute extreme claim that we have no reason
for any future-directed concern. At the very least, we seem entitled to
extend the unproblematic concern we maintain for our loved ones to our
own futures.143
Still, there might be a shortcoming. When assimilating concern for
our own futures to concern for others, we seem to ignore some distinctive
features of concern for ourselves. As quoted earlier, Perry illustrates:
143One might support the absolute extreme claim on the grounds that even caring for
loved ones is unreasonable within the complex view, given that their present selves are
numerically distinct from their future selves. Besides pointing at the aforementioned
theories of persistence, I would refer the objector to (2.5.4).
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“Most of us have a special and intense interest in what will happen
to us. You learn that someone will be run over by a truck tomor-
row; you are saddened, feel pity, and think reflectively about the
frailty of life; one bit of information is added, that the someone is
you, and a whole new set of emotions rise in your breast.”144
One of Butler’s points was that the complex view renders this reaction
unjustified; you should be “no more interested in what will befall the
person of tomorrow, than in what will befall any other person.”145
How is concern for our own futures special? Parfit writes:
“Suppose I learn that someone I love will soon suffer great pain. I
shall be greatly distressed by this news. I might be more distressed
than I would be if I learnt that I shall soon suffer such pain. But
this concern has a different quality. I do not anticipate the pain
that will be felt by someone I love.”146
Johnston notes:
“The vivid sense that one will oneself undergo certain experiences
in the future gives one’s future-directed self-concern its special and
urgent quality”147.
These authors think that concern for ourselves has a distinctive phe-
nomenology. Parfit mentions anticipation, which D. Shoemaker charac-
terizes as
“a matter of having certain beliefs or expectations about what it
will feel like to undergo a certain set of expected experiences. It
thus includes both doxastic and phenomenological components.”148
Special concern for our own futures and its distinctive phenomenological
quality seem to be related to anticipation. In the Parfit quote, lack of
144Perry 1976, p. 67.
145Butler 1736, p. 102.
146Parfit 1984, p. 312.
147Johnston 1992, p. 600.
148D. Shoemaker 2007, p. 343.
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anticipation is taken as indicative of a lack of special concern. Sometimes
anticipation and special concern are used interchangeably.149 Velleman
directly ties the concern’s importance to anticipation:
“To imagine a future pain, for example, as it will feel in the psy-
chological wake of my hereby imagining it is to do more than just
imagine it. It’s to imagine the pain as befalling a mind that has
somehow been prepared by this very prospect of its occurrence.
And to imagine a pain as experienced by a mind hereby so pre-
pared for it is already to brace for the pain, to shrink from it, or
to be otherwise caught up in it in some way. Anticipation that’s
cognizant of its effect on the prefigured experiences is thus a form
of mental engagement with them that, to some degree, already
constitutes their mattering.”150
In this picture, one condition for special concern with regards to a fu-
ture experience is a particular kind of anticipation—one in which the
experience is imagined as prefigured by the anticipation itself.151
We are considering whether in view of the numerical distinctness
charge, the complex view could simply assimilate concern for our own
futures to concern for others. The foregoing suggests that it cannot.
Concern for our own futures has special features. Concern for others
might be justified, but this does not show that the distinctive concern
for our own futures is justified. The comparative version of the extreme
claim remains a live option.
It is striking that Parfit and others merely assert that concern for
our own futures is special. Perry claims that once I learn that I am
the individual in the truck case, a whole new set of emotions rise in my
149For example ibid., p. 320.
150Velleman 1996, p. 73.
151Velleman argues that what counts as our own histories and futures in this context
is not tied to identity, but to reflexive, first-personal thought. “[S]ome of the deepest
concerns expressed in terms of personal identity are actually perspectival concerns
about the self” (ibid., p. 67).
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breast.152 This is doubtlessly true. But it is also true that once I learn
that it is you, or a third person, who gets run over by a truck, a whole
new set of emotions rise in my breast. The question whether empirical
evidence supports the claim that concern for our own futures is special
is surprisingly neglected.
Of course, it might be a conceptual truth about anticipation that we
anticipate only our own experiences.153 More substantive would be the
claim that one can quasi-anticipate only one’s own experiences, where
quasi-anticipation is just like anticipation but does not conceptually
require identity between anticipator and experiencer.154 Do we quasi-
anticipate only our own experiences?
We can certainly think of circumstances where quasi-anticipation
could occur. Although denied by Parfit, concern for family members or
loved ones looks like a promising example. Of course, we do not quasi-
anticipate the experiences of just anyone. Quasi-anticipation might well
require particular relations obtaining between the anticipator and the
future self, or at least an expectation of the anticipator that such rela-
tions obtain. One candidate relation is psychological continuity. Indeed,
Whiting points at two ideas put forward by psychological continuity the-
152However, according to Perry, the importance of identity and the justification of
special concern for our own futures are only derivative upon our future selves’ ability
to carry out our present projects. He accepts that apart from ego projects which
essentially involve ourselves, e.g., that I raise my children, we would be perfectly
justified in caring specially about others if we could be sure that they advance our
projects just as well as our future selves. But this latter condition is satisfied only in
outlandish cases; Perry 1976, pp. 80-4.
153For example: “anticipation is a necessarily reflexive state, because one can only
anticipate what is conceived to lie in ones own future” (Higginbotham 1995, p. 237).
154This suggestion parallels S. Shoemaker’s introduction of quasi-memory (1970,
p. 271) when discussing whether the memory criterion for personal identity is circular.
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orists.155 First, there are scenarios in which the degree of psychological
connectedness between two person stages is just below the threshold that
is necessary for personal identity. Second, entitlement to quasi-projective
imagination and anticipation is proportional to the psychological distance
between the anticipator and the future self. As a result, it is sometimes
plausible to care for others more than for one’s own future selves.
“This sort of graduated concern, though difficult to achieve given
current cultural practices, seems to me both psychologically possi-
ble and phenomenologically plausible: the difference between the
sort of anxiety I might have about giving a talk (or having an oper-
ation) tomorrow and the sort of anxiety I might have about giving
a talk (or having an operation) ten years from now is, I think, po-
tentially similar to the difference between the sort of anxiety I
might have about my daughter’s impending performance (or op-
eration) and the sort of anxiety I might have about my niece’s
impending performance (or operation).”156
Note that Whiting not only claims that we sometimes quasi-anticipate.
She also defends the idea that these quasi-anticipations are perfectly
justified. Sometimes, what justifies anticipatory concern is present across
lives more than within a life.
Similarly, Persson argues that a fissioner can quasi-anticipate the ex-
periences of her offshoots regardless of whether or not she is identical to
them. “It is, then, not identity that provides experiential anticipation
with its distinctive character”157.
Given these possibilities, it is surprising that Parfit- and Perry-style
assertions that we only quasi-anticipate our own experiences are not
backed up by empirical evidence. In fact, there are neuroscientific ex-
155Whiting 1999, pp. 455-60.
156Ibid., pp. 459-60.
157Persson 2005, p. 316.
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periments, e.g., by Ehrsson158 and others,159 which examine the effects
of centering of visual images to the perspective of the viewer. Through
video goggles, individuals receive visual inputs whose perspectival pre-
sentation brings about feelings of identification with the experiencer in
the imagery. In some experiments individuals receive visual images that
show other bodies, but filmed from the perspective from which the indi-
viduals would see their own body. Observed reactions, self-reports, and
even brain scans suggest that the individuals quasi-anticipate touches
and pains to the bodies in their visual fields as occurring to themselves.
Experiments like these might not demonstrate more than that through il-
lusions, subjects can briefly be tricked into quasi-anticipating experiences
of individuals that are in fact distinct from the anticipating subject. The
doxastic attitudes involved in anticipation are fallible; anticipation can
involve mistaken beliefs about which future experiences will be mine.160
It remains an open question whether quasi-anticipation occurs. Still, the
role of such empirical evidence could be to invite further justification of
the claim that quasi-anticipation and special concern can only be directed
at one’s own future selves.
Velleman offers an account of how quasi-anticipation can fall short of
grounding special concern, or “what matters about future selves”161. For
example, when quasi-anticipating the experiences of fission products, we
fail to have the sort of intimacy we have with real future selves. This
is because anticipation would need to be tied to the perspective of a
158Ehrsson et al. 2007.
159For an overview on this stream of research, see Blanke 2012.
160Recanati 2007, p. 158 makes the analogous point about quasi-perceptions.
161Velleman 1996, p. 76.
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particular fission product, and therewith involve one thought too many:
“I could no longer think just about how the future would look;
I’d have to think about how it would look to particular, specified
observers. [...] [T]here would be no life that I could anticipate
without first picking it out for the purpose of projecting myself
into it. Surely, a position from which I must deliberately project
myself into a life is not a position on the inside of that life.”162
The idea seems to be that deliberate and conscious projection precludes
the immediacy and urgency of anticipations, features which rest on the
anticipator’s “ability to regard their subjects unselfconsciously as ‘me’”163.
Quasi-anticipation does not guarantee this ability.
Similarly, Recanati thinks although quasi-anticipation is coherent,
emotions like delight, remorse, guilt, and pride are in fact caused by
modes of memory and anticipation which “[guarantee] that the remem-
bered actions are actions we performed”164. Recanati thinks that if these
attitudes were caused by quasi-memory and -anticipation, they would be
much weaker than they actually are.
I have two reservations about these ways of arguing that quasi-antici-
pation is not what justifies special concern. First, it is not obvious to
me that quasi-anticipation is less immediate than genuine anticipation.
For example, it is hard to see why just because concern for one of my
fission products presupposes that I first determine which fission prod-
uct’s perspective I am occupying while anticipating, the urgency, quality,
and importance of my concern will—or should—be mitigated. For one
thing, even with ordinary future-directed concern, something similar is
necessary: that I specify some time-frame, e.g., whether I am concerned
162Ibid., pp. 75-6.
163Ibid., p. 73.
164Recanati 2007, p. 163.
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about my 40-year old self or my 80-year old self. Moreover, after having
picked out the perspective of my fission offshoot who will experience pain,
while the other offshoot receives pleasure, it is just not obvious why my
quasi-anticipation, -fear, and their urgency would be reduced by the prior
process of selecting this particular offshoot’s point of view. Recanati’s
response reveals how worries along these lines do not fully appreciate
the suggestion of quasi-attitudes. Per hypothesis, quasi-attitudes and
their genuine counterparts are phenomenologically perfectly alike. If one
worries that quasi-anticipations are weaker and less urgent than genuine
anticipation, one is not playing the game of entertaining the possibility
of quasi-anticipations. This insight is not conclusive, but it suggests that
the aforementioned responses change the topic.
Secondly, suppose we grant that genuine anticipation is more urgent
and immediate than quasi-anticipation. The question remains whether
we are justified in caring about ourselves with special immediacy and
urgency. Indeed, Whiting argues that although we actually operate with
anticipation rather than its quasi-counterpart,
“this may be an artifact of a deep-seated evolutionary or cultural
bias toward something like the Simple View.”165
It is one thing to argue that we anticipate rather than quasi-anticipate,
but another thing to establish that we are justified in caring specially
about ourselves.166
I began by accepting the numerical distinctness charge against the
complex view. But I have characterized ways how special concern still
165Whiting 1999, p. 459.
166See also Parfit 1984, p. 308, and Rachels and Alter 2005, pp. 314-5.
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makes sense in this picture. Anticipation is what grounds special concern,
and quasi-anticipation can obtain across distinct persons. The numeri-
cal distinctness charge against the complex view does not establish the
extreme claim that if the complex view was true, we would not be jus-
tified in caring about future experiences, and caring about some future
experiences more than others.
2.5.3 Insights From Fission
For Parfit, fission suggests that identity is not what matters. Here, re-
lation R branches symmetrically. He discusses a number of different
descriptions of the case, e.g., that the fissioner does not survive, or that
she survives as one or even both of the offshoots. Each of them has
shortcomings, but Parfit thinks that fission is most plausibly described
as a case of non-identity.167 But this, Parfit argues, actually addresses an
empty question. The options are not distinct possibilities, but different
descriptions of one and the same possibility. Even without privileging
one description, all the facts are clear. The much more interesting ques-
tion is whether fission secures what matters. Parfit thinks it does.168
What matters would be secured if there was only one offshoot.
“The relation between me now and that future person is just an
instance of the relation between me now and myself tomorrow.
So that relation would contain what matters. In the Double Case
[with two offshoots; P.H.], my relation to that person would be
just the same. So this relation must still contain what matters.
Nothing is missing. But that person cannot here be claimed to be
me. So identity cannot be what matters.”169
167Parfit 1984, pp. 255-60.
168Ibid., pp. 261-3.
169Parfit 1995, p. 42.
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Parfit shares this view with S. Shoemaker, who argues that non-identity
between fissioner and fission products does not make the fissioner’s future-
directed concern and the fission products’ backward-looking attitudes of
remorse or pride less reasonable.170 Olson thus speaks of the “Parfit-
Shoemaker Thesis”171 about personal identity and what matters.
One can deny that the symmetrical branching of continuity relations
is best described as a case of non-identity. As mentioned, some simple
theorists believe that when continuities branch, the person does not re-
ally split. Instead, her soul or ego goes with one of the offshoots (2.2,
6.3). We also just saw Merricks’ denial that personal identity can be
analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. If so, Parfit is not enti-
tled to regard non-branching psychological continuity as personal iden-
tity, and hence to equivocate the claim that non-branching psycholog-
ical continuity is unimportant with the claim that personal identity is
unimportant.172 A different objection comes from Parfit’s fellow complex
theorists. Lewis holds that prior to branching, there were as many per-
sons as there are now branches. These persons shared all their spatial
parts.173 The branching thus does not bring about non-identity; it merely
separates entities which so far overlapped spatially.
This is a point of agreement between at least some paradigm cases
of complexity and simplicity. Since in Swinburne’s and Lewis’ pictures,
identity and continuities never diverge, fission does not provide evidence
for the irrelevance of identity even if one grants that it secures all that
170S. Shoemaker 1970, p. 284; 1984, pp. 130-2.
171Olson 1997, p. 54.
172Merricks 1999a, pp. 994-7.
173Lewis 1976, pp. 24-9.
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matters. In a sense, these theorists share the view that fission cannot
occur. Whenever it seems like one person divides into two or more, this
seeming can be explained away.
These objections to Parfit rest on particular descriptive pictures of
what happens in fission. Another class of objections accepts Parfit’s de-
scription, but rejects his evaluative judgement that fission is as good as
ordinary survival. As a first example, Wolf points out that the fission off-
shoots would have equal claims for the resources of a single life. Awkward
questions arise about how to balance these claims. Should we divide the
fissioner’s resources amongst the offshoots? Should we declare one of the
offshoots the fissioner’s successor, and ask the other to begin a new life?
Either way, at least one offshoot would be worse off.
“[O]ne has strong reason to prefer nonbranching psychological
continuity and connectedness. That is, one has strong reason
to prefer personal identity.”174
As mentioned earlier, Wolf also speculates that the world would be worse
if people would care about relation R rather than identity.
Second, Sosa denies that fissioner and each offshoot standing in the
same intrinsic relations as in ordinary survival establishes that fission is
as good as ordinary survival. Extrinsic features can matter, too.175 The
value of exclusive ownership, marriage, competitions, and prizes arises
partly from the extrinsic fact that no one else instantiates the relation.
Similarly, it is defensible to regard it significant that a second offshoot is
present in fission.
174Wolf 1986, p. 716.
175Sosa 1990, pp. 319-20.
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Finally, Johnston argues that if we concede that fission is as good as
ordinary survival, it does not follow that relation R is what ordinarily
matters. Circumstances in fission are extraordinary. Two presupposi-
tions of ordinary concern are violated: that it is determinate who will
be who, and that one has at most one R-continuous successor. When
these presuppositions are violated, it might be defensible to care about
relation R.
“But this is not because identity is never what matters. Instead,
this is because caring in this way represents a reasonable extension
of self-concern in a bizarre case.”176
In other words, the outlandish case of fission is not informative about
what matters ordinarily, only about reasonable local modifications of
concern when ordinary presuppositions are not satisfied.
Even if we grant Parfit that these objections can be met, insights
from fission do not suffice to refute the extreme claim. Fission might be
as good as ordinary survival. But how good is ordinary survival?
2.5.4 Ordinary Survival In The Complex View
According to the objections described earlier (2.1), the value of ordinary
survival would be diminished if the complex view was true. If the extreme
claim shall be resisted, arguments making a positive case for the value
of continuity relations are needed.
Parfit’s positive suggestion is that relation R, i.e. psychological con-
tinuity and/or connectedness,177 is what matters:
176Johnston 1992, p. 611.
177Belzer (1996) notes that Parfit is not consistent about whether relation R en-
compasses psychological continuity, connectedness, or both. This introduces compli-
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“What we value, in ourselves and others, is not the continued ex-
istence of the same particular brains and bodies. What we value
are the various relations between ourselves and others, whom and
what we love, our ambitions, achievements, commitments, emo-
tions, memories, and several other psychological features. [...] I
believe that, if there will later be some person who will be R-
related to me as I am now, it matters very little whether this
person has my present brain and body. I believe that what fun-
damentally matters is Relation R, even if it does not have its
normal cause.”178
These are suggestions about what we actually value. What we want to
know is whether we are we justified in valuing relation R. As mentioned,
Parfit thinks that relation R is metaphysically less deep than personal
identity as understood by the simple view. Insofar as our concerns rest
on the assumption of metaphysically deep facts, they are unjustified.
However, it is not clear at all how a lack of metaphysical depth should
deflate future-directed concern. To begin with, the notion of metaphysi-
cal depth itself is unclear. Presumably, charitable rephrasals include that
metaphysically deep facts are not grounded in other facts, or grounded in
fewer facts than metaphysically less deep facts (6.1), and/or fundamental
facts as opposed to derivative ones (6.2).
Once made precise, it is not clear why it should be rationally im-
permissible to value facts that are metaphysically less deep in just the
same way as metaphysically deep facts can be valued. For example,
Brink argues that future-directed concern can be understood as being
cations. In order to have a fission case, it seems enough that continuity branches;
fissioner and offshoots need not be directly connected. If we accept that fission is as
good as ordinary survival, Parfit is entitled to conclude that identity’s non-branching
requirement is not significant relative to what matters. But fission by itself is silent
on what exactly does matter, including whether it is continuity, connectedness, or
both. Only connectedness is a matter of degree; continuity is not. Fission alone thus
does not fully support Parfit’s further claim that what matters comes in degrees.
178Parfit 1984, pp. 284-5.
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attached to “functional role, rather than to its metaphysical or compo-
sitional analysans.”179 Materialists and dualists alike should avoid pain,
regardless of how they analyze pain states. Brink admits that sometimes,
a metaphysical analysis does influence an entity’s role in our conceptual
network. For example, learning that the gustatory properties of choco-
late ice supervene on fat content may affect its desirability. However, the
analysis provided by the complex view should not have such influence on
future-directed concern. As Whiting puts it:
“It has always mystified me how reasons for concern are lost in
the move from a pain’s being unanalyzably mine to its being an-
alyzably mine.”180
With Sosa181 and Johnston182, we can add that this holds even if we
accept that facts and relations mentioned in the analysandum appear less
important than the analysans.183 Neither the simple theorists nor Parfit
have said enough about how the insight that personal identity consists
in continuity relations makes caring about our futures less reasonable.
Note that these points need not be taken to show that identity is not
what matters. All that has been suggested is that the view that personal
identity is constituted by non-branching continuity relations does not
diminish the importance of survival.
This suggests that absolute extremism—the idea that the complex
view leaves us with no reason whatsoever for caring about the future—is
179Brink 1997a, p. 117.
180Whiting 1986, p. 552.
181Sosa 1990, pp. 320-1.
182Johnston 1997, p. 167.
183On this issue, see also Parfit’s argument from below (1984, p. 286, 1995, pp. 29-
32, 2007, pp. 32-6) versus Johnston’s argument from above (Johnston 1997, pp. 167-8,
2010, pp. 307-16), and D. Shoemaker’s commentary (2006) on the exchange.
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unmotivated. The complex view does not take away from our reasons
for concern. Moreover, we could even deny comparative extremism and
maintain that we have good reasons for special concern for our own fu-
tures. On the one hand, continuity relations give us no reason to care
specially about our own future selves, where ‘our own’ signalizes iden-
tity. But on the other hand, we are entitled to care about some future
selves—e.g., those R-related to us—more than others. This concern does
not require identity. But it is special by virtue of being based on R-
relatedness between the caring, present self and the future self that is
the object of concern. Indeed, consider again Chisholm and Swinburne’s
position on fission. Suppose the fissioner knows in advance that the off-
shoot who inherits her soul receives pleasure, while the other offshoot gets
tortured. It would be bizarre to deny that the fissioner lacks a reason to
have special concern for the tortured future self.184
These moves remain primarily defensive: the fact that personal iden-
tity consists in relations of continuity and connectedness does not take
away from the value of ordinary survival and the justifiedness of concern.
In the next chapter, I will examine detailed accounts of positive pictures
about how continuity and connectedness confer value upon future selves.
2.6 Conclusion
The complex view supposedly has implausible practical consequences
(2.1). First, according to the numerical distinctness charge, the com-
plex view fails to offer an account of personal identity. It only captures
184Johansson 2007, p. 654.
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similarity amongst distinct person stages. Second, the relations which
the complex view takes to obtain amongst person stages do not matter
in the way identity matters. In light of these objections, one can endorse
the extreme claim, and hold that the complex view gives us no reason for
future-directed concern (2.2). Alternatively, one can respond by endors-
ing the moderate claim, and argue that the complex view does give us
reasons for concern. I noted that these claims are ambiguous. In partic-
ular, authors are not always careful to distinguish absolute from relative
instances of the claims, i.e. whether they pertain to any kind of concern,
or some kind of special concern we have—or should have—for ourselves.
I then sketched a reductio argument advanced by some opponents of
the complex view: if the complex view was true, we would be left with
no reasons for concern; we do have such reasons; hence the complex view
must be false (2.3). In the remainder of the chapter, I distinguished two
broad ways to respond to the reductio.
First, by showing how it is equally problematic for the simple view.
If the simple view was true, we would not be left with reasons for special
concern either. Alternatively, reasons for concern do not come from the
complex or simple view anyways, so it is not a competitive disadvantage
if one of them fares worse in justifying concern. Finally, it is defensible
to maintain that our concerns are unmotivated, for example because the
complex view is true and fails to give reasons for them.
Second, by denying the extreme claim. Theories of persistence can
be combined with the complex view and give a sense in which the nu-
merical distinctness objection—one of the motivations of the extreme
claim—is false. And even if numerical distinctness cannot be eliminated
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from the picture, the suggestion that we are sometimes justified in quasi-
anticipating the experiences of others shows how this need not deprive
us of reasons for concern. Although fission is one example for such cases,
I argued that even if we read Parfit charitably and grant that objections
to both his descriptive and evaluative remarks about fission can be ad-
dressed, it has only been shown that securing continuity relations is as
good as ordinary survival. Finally, I argued that the value of ordinary
survival is not diminished by the complex view.
As a result, we can reject the reductio. Concern for our futures is
neither rendered unreasonable by the complex view nor constrains our
theory choice. Let me note two further implications.
The discussion motivates more general challenges for positions ac-
cording to which an everyday practice constrains what can count as an
eligible theory. From proponents of such positions, we would want a pre-
cise account of the practice in question, what counts as a reason relative
to the practice, and on which descriptive assumptions it rests. More-
over, we would need clarification on how these assumptions are in line
with some theories more than others, and how certain theories cannot be
made consistent with these assumptions. Only then can we appreciate a
genuine conflict between engaging in the practice and endorsing a theory.
For example, one lesson from Sider’s discussion is that the assumptions
of the practice might be coarse-grained and austere enough that none of
the particular theories is in tension with them. Finally, we need inde-
pendent motivations for the picture that practice is prior to theory and
constrains what we can reasonably believe.
Moreover, Parfit’s remarks on how the complex view lessened his fear
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of death appear permissible. His antecedent reasons for caring about
the future in specific ways are lost upon endorsing the complex view.
But it is far from clear that everyone should rationally react in this
way. The complex view preserves a robust sense of ownership of future
experiences. And it is not clear why being related to future experiencers
through continuity and connectedness rather than a metaphysically deep
further fact—whatever this means—should reduce my immediate and
urgent interest in their well-being. Leaving the glass tunnel might be
liberating. But the complex view entitles us to such liberation only
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In the previous chapter, I argued that the extreme claim is not a reason
to reject the complex view. For the sake of the argument, I granted
that within the complex view, present and future selves are distinct and
cannot be connected by a deep further fact. It turned out to be unclear
why this affects the value of ordinary survival. I now turn to the positive
counterpart of this claim: what does matter in ordinary survival might
be related to personal identity; but it is something else. We engage in
forward-looking projects and attitudes not because someone will be us,
but because we relate to future selves in other, more important ways.
The views I will consider endorse two broad strategies respectively.
First, they make the complex view more precise. Personal identity con-
sists in particular relations amongst person stages, and these relations
are proper objects of concern. Second, they implement a suggestion
described earlier (2.4.2) and look beyond the metaphysics of personal
identity in order to give reasons for concern. Both strategies agree that
what matters is not determined independently of us. We are involved in
generating and constructing our relations to future selves. I will argue
that the exact meaning of this claim needs to be clarified and qualified.
3.1 The Importance Of The More Partic-
ular Facts
Parfit characterized the complex view as taking personal identity to con-
sist in more particular facts. Whiting and Brink are convinced that the
relevant more particular facts encompass practically important relations
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between person stages. Something that matters is constitutive of per-
sonal identity. This directly defeats the extreme claim. I first describe
their positions, before offering reflections.
3.1.1 Whiting On Friends And Future Selves
According to the extreme claim, the complex view cannot give reasons
for future-directed concern. Within the complex view, person stages
are numerically distinct. Supposedly, this makes it mysterious why one
should be concerned about the other (1.2.2). Moreover, Madell and Swin-
burne argue that psychological continuity by itself is unimportant (2.1).
Whiting’s aim is to address these objections on behalf of psychological
continuity theory.
There are ways for complex positions to deny that person stages at
different times must be distinct (2.5.1). Moreover, even if the complex
view keeps person stages are distinct, this need not matter. The distinct
stages can be part of one and the same person. But Whiting rejects
appeals to numerical identity for justifying future-directed concern on
the following grounds.185 Suppose I face fission, and my fission offshoots
will experience pain. If identity would be what provides reason for special
concern, I have reason to care specially about the pain if only one offshoot
survives. If two offshoots survive, I will not be identical to them, given
that identity cannot be one-many. If identity is what matters, special
concern would be unjustified. But it is quite implausible that the presence
of a competitor affects whether I have reason to care specially.186 I am
185Whiting 1986, pp. 555-6.
186This is an instance of the Parfit-Shoemaker Thesis (2.5.3).
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entitled to such concern in both scenarios, yet only one is an instance
of identity. Identity cannot be what grounds special concern. Thus, we
need not even bother to reject the numerical distinctness charge in order
to justify concern for our future selves.
Whiting’s positive proposal is motivated by the following observation.
Special concern extends not only to our future selves, but also to friends
and family members. For example, special concern for our friends allows
for interpersonal compensation: to some extent, benefits to our friends
compensate us. Moreover, we seem justified in having special concern
for our friends. If friendship justifies concern in the absence of identity,
maybe psychological continuity with future selves can achieve something
similar.
Whiting claims that what justifies concern for our friends is that
we share experiences, desires, interests, values, and have interactions
which shape these desires, interests, and values.187 She notes that the
same things give rise to psychological continuity between my present
and future selves. For example, we are connected by memories, and
share character traits, intentions, desires, and values. Friendship is a
two-way relationship in which friends share, shape, and reciprocate these
attitudes. On reflection, the relation to our future selves is similar. We
obviously shape our future selves, e.g., through choices in the present.
But our future selves also shape our present selves: we anticipate their
desires and interests, and balance them with our current interests, e.g.,
when making planning efforts. Given these parallels, Whiting suggests
that psychological continuity is to concern for our future selves just like
187Whiting 1986, pp. 558-560.
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friendship is to concern for our friends.
If psychological continuity was limited to memories, it would be pas-
sive and oriented towards the past. It would fall short of underpinning
the persistence of agents. But psychological continuity encompasses more
than just memories. In particular, Whiting focuses on personal desires.
A desire is personal if it
“essentially includes its subject’s being in certain states or doing
certain things”188,
for example my desire that I raise my children. Two points about per-
sonal desires are central to Whiting’s position.
First, she suggests that psychological continuity theory can under-
stand personal desires in a distinctive way: the desirer and the individual
enjoying the desired state need not be numerically identical. All we need
is that
“I desire the subjects under descriptions making use of first per-
son indexicals [...] So I can have personal desires for the future
satisfactions of subjects with whom I am not numericallly identi-
cal.”189
For the psychological continuity theorist, being me—and thereby being
eligible to figure in my personal desires—means being psychologically
continuous with me.
Secondly, such personal desires
“are primitive forms of concern for those subjects—that is, prim-
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With primitive concerns, Whiting means that general concern for our fu-
ture selves derives from them191. Again, the analogy is friendship, which
begins by taking particular interests in others. Whiting’s example is an
initial desire that my squash training partner wins her match. As time
goes on, I learn more about her interests, projects, etc., and start to care
about these things, too. As this progresses and she becomes my friend,
general concern for her results: a second-order desire that her first-order
desires are satisfied. According to Whiting’s analogy, general concern for
future selves arise in the same way from primitive first-order concerns,
specifically personal desires that my future selves do and experience par-
ticular things.
But now note the following. Psychological continuity, which according
to psychological continuity theory makes certain future selves ours, has
concern for our future selves as a component. It is not the case that we are
related to our future selves in a certain way, in this case psychological
continuity, and derive reasons for concern from this relation. It is the
other way round: we have primitive concerns qua personal desires which
give rise to psychological continuity rather than deriving from it—just
like friendship does not obtain independently of concern for friends, and
reasons for concern for friends derive from it. Having, maintaining, and
developing the concerns constitutes friendship.
“In this sense, we make our future selves by coming to care about
them in much the same way that we make friends by coming to
care about others.”192
The fact that I am specially concerned about a future subject is part of
191Whiting 1986, p. 565.
192Ibid., p. 566.
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what makes it my future self in the first place.
Whiting distinguishes two grades of psychological continuity and con-
nectedness. A thin version obtains through passive states like memories
and impersonal beliefs and intentions. Personal desires and the resulting
intention-connections are components of thick psychological continuity.
This distinction allows Whiting to express the following.
First, it is not a disanalogy between friends and future selves that the
former exist independently of our concern. Thin psychological continuity
gives a sense in which
“there will in the future be subjects who are psychologically con-
tinuous with us in ways which are relatively independent of our
concern for them.”193
This thin relation holds independently of whether I, through my special
concern, make these subjects my future selves.
Second, Whiting avoids voluntarism about future selves.194 My future
selves are not simply the selves about whom I care specially. Just like my
desire to be friends with you does not suffice for establishing friendship,
my special concern about future selves does not suffice for making them
my future selves. In both cases, further conditions need to be met. Only
if my concern brings about intention-connections and other varieties of
thick psychological continuity between my present self and the future
self will the latter be mine. Since there are no thick connections between
your future selves and me, my concern about your future selves does not
make them my future selves.
193Ibid.
194Whiting 1999, pp. 465-6.
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Whiting’s account faces a circularity worry:195 ordinarily, learning
that a future subject will be me gives me reason for concern. But on the
proposed account, this would be circular; the subject is my future self in
virtue of me having the concern. It now looks as if I have reason to be
concerned for my future self because I care about it in the first place.
Whiting responds that for friendship, the circularity doesn’t seem so
bad. It is fine to say that friendship gives us reasons for caring even if
caring partly constitutes friendship. Moreover, the force of the circularity
worry depends on whether we can give reasons for the initial or prim-
itive concerns which eventually give rise to general concern for friends
or future selves respectively. If we cannot give independent reasons for
these initial concerns, then indeed all we can say about why we should
have the general concern is that we are already caring in the first place.
However, if the initial concern is itself responsive to independent reasons,
then circularity could be avoided. Whiting suggests that for both friends
and future selves, initial concern rests on our appreciation of character,
projects, desires, and commitments of which we approve independently
of our relationship to the friend or future self respectively. And once the
initial concern thus motivated has constituted general concern, we get
additional reasons to care about them.
If we follow Whiting, we can conclude that there is something fun-
damentally wrong with the objections (2.1) that motivate the extreme
claim. It is not the case that because person stages at different times
are distinct, they cannot be related by concern. And it is not the case
that psychological continuity by itself is unimportant, given that personal
195Whiting 1986, p. 570.
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desires are components of psychological continuity.
If convincing, this shows that we should care about our future selves.
But one remaining question is whether we should care for our future
selves in a special way. After all, justification of concern for future selves
is analogous to justification of concern for friends. This seems to allow
that we should care about friends and future selves in similar ways, and
not necessarily privilege our own futures.
Although her primary concern is to disarm the extreme claim as a
reason to reject the complex view, Whiting actually agrees with one
version of the extreme claim: we are not rationally required to care more
about our own futures than others. She gives two reasons.
First, although maintaining at least minimal personal desires might
be practically necessary, e.g., in order to form and act upon intentions,196
we are not rationally required to have personal desires, and are free to
renounce them entirely—just as becoming invested into characters and
projects of potential friends is admissible but not required.197
Second, if we maintain personal desires, there is no rational require-
ment to prioritize them over concern for others. Personal desires might
be weak compared to at least some impersonal desires we have with re-
gards to others,198 e.g., when parents care more about their children than
themselves. In that case, too, a comparative version of the extreme claim
is appropriate, and there is a sense in which we need not care for ourselves
in a special way.
196Ibid., pp. 568-9. As mentioned in 139, Wolf (1986, p. 719) is skeptical about the
conceptual possibility of agents giving up all personal desires. Kind (2004, p. 548)
argues that the personal desires one maintains can be extremely short-lived.
197Whiting 1986, p. 575.
198Ibid., p. 576.
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One vague worry about Whiting’s picture is that it presupposes too
much concern for others. If when seeking reasons for concern about my
own future, I need to take for granted that I am justified in caring about
others, some would wonder whether I have assumed something way more
demanding than I set out to justify. In view of reservations along these
lines, it is fruitful to turn to Brink’s position. He justifies concern for our
own future and concern for others in ways that resonate with Whiting’s
approach, but does so from the perspective of rational egoism.
3.1.2 Brink On The Separateness Of Persons
Brink’s position on personal identity and special concern focuses on one
distinctive way in which we can be concerned about our own futures: by
having prudential concern. According to prudence, one should promote
one’s own overall interests through equal concern for all parts of one’s
life. Rational egoism is the view that all there is to practical reason is
prudence.
Prudence faces a parity challenge:199 it requires an agent bias but no
temporal bias, i.e. the agent shall care specially about her own interests,
but care equally about all times of her existence. The question arises
why one should not distribute goods and harms by the same principles
within lives and across lives. Parity considerations motivate the view
that each of us should either favour herself now (presentism) or renounce
any agent- or time-biases (neutralism).
In order to justify the hybrid structure of prudence, Brink refers to
199Brink 1997a, pp. 98-102; Brink 2017, sect. 2. The parity worry goes back to
Sidgwick 1907, p. 418, and is also stated in Nagel (1979, pp. 99-100) and Parfit (1984,
p. 144).
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two thoughts of Sidgwick.200 First, in order to make sense of tempo-
ral neutrality, prudence must tell us why we should make sacrifices in
the present if the benefits are enjoyed in the future.201 The underlying
thought is that if an individual makes a sacrifice, some form of appro-
priate compensation is needed to make the sacrifice rational. Secondly,
the key to this is the separateness202 of persons, i.e. the fact that “the
distinction between any one individual and any other is real and funda-
mental”203. The separateness of persons justifies present sacrifices for a
later benefit:
“In the intrapersonal case, benefactor and beneficiary are the same
person, so compensation is automatic. In the interpersonal case,
benefactor and beneficiary are different people; unless the benefi-
ciary reciprocates in some way, the benefactors sacrifice will not be
compensated. Whereas intrapersonal compensation is automatic,
interpersonal compensation is not. This fact about compensation
appears to rationalize intrapersonal neutrality without rationaliz-
ing interpersonal neutrality.”204
Some sense of personal separateness is presupposed in making sacrifices
for the sake of future benefits. I am justified in having a bias towards
myself in caring and planning because if the same separate person will
enjoy the outcomes, compensation is automatic.205 What matters is that
I receive the benefit; all things being equal, the temporal location of
the benefit does not matter. This is how we arrive at prudence, the
combination of agent bias with temporal neutrality.
200Brink 1997a, p. 105; Brink 2017, sect. 3.
201Sidgwick 1907, p. 418.
202This notion of separateness is not to be confused with Parfit’s characterization
of the simple view according to which persons are separately existing entities beyond
physical or psychological states and relations (5.1.1).
203Sidgwick 1907, p. 498.
204Brink 2017, sect. 3.
205Brink 1997a, pp. 106-7.
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Brink discusses objections. For example, one might be concerned that
me-now and me-later are distinct, too. Why does this separateness not
threaten intrapersonal balancing? His response is that there are several
reasons to refrain from regarding person stages as agents.206 If we take
momentary time slices of a person as the relevant units, the problem is
that they do not persist long enough to enjoy any benefits of a sacrifice.
If we focus on larger sub-personal units, we will always have continuum
many overlapping person segments at a given time, and it becomes in-
determinate which one is engaged in comparing sacrifices and benefits.
These problems disappear if the relevant unit is the maximal set of con-
tinuous person segments. This makes sense, given that many values,
beliefs, desires, and intentions that are distinctive of persons pertain to
our lives as a whole rather than segments of it. Brink follows Korsgaard’s
claim (to be discussed in 3.2.1) that working towards these ends requires
close cooperation amongst our person stages. They are thereby unified
in a sense that makes it legitimate to focus on the person as a whole.
An important question is how an agent can be ‘all there’ if some of his
parts lie in the future. In response, Brink draws an analogy to nations.207
They are represented by and act through some of their parts, namely
representatives. We do not therefore conclude that nations cannot act or
possess interests. Similarly, the present self can act as a representative
of the temporally dispersed entity, the person. If so, the fact that the
temporally extended person is not ‘all there’ is not a reason to deny that
its interests determine what agents have reason to do.
206Brink 1997a, pp. 110-6; Brink 2017, sect. 3.
207Brink 1997a, pp. 115-6.
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Another worry stems from fission. It suggests that identity is not
necessary for securing what matters. Identity with the beneficiary thus
does not seem necessary for justifying a benefactor’s sacrifice. Why, then,
should concern have an agent bias, as prudence requires? Brink suggests
two replies.208
First, psychological continuity can extend a person’s interests. Even if
my fission products are distinct from me, psychological continuity extends
my interests such that their benefits compensate me for a sacrifice I make
now. This move modifies the nature and range of my interests, but would
keep prudence intact.
Second, we could introduce quasi-prudence which requires benefactor
and beneficiary to be psychologically continuous rather than identical.
Personal identity and compensation are sufficient for justifying prudence.
But quasi-prudence is sensible even in the absence of identity, provided
there is psychological continuity.
Like Whiting, Brink thinks that because intimates share and mutu-
ally shape experiences, beliefs, desires and actions, they are justified in
regarding their individual interests as extended by the interests of the
other.209 Fission shows that psychological continuity is what extends a
present self’s interests forward in time. And since psychological continu-
ity can obtain interpersonally, interests can also extended across persons.
Fission is one instance of such extension.210 But there are more mundane
208Brink 2017, sect. 4. See also Brink 1997a, pp. 125-8.
209Brink 1997b, p. 126; ibid., p. 141.
210If fission preserves what matters, it is normally understood to be as good as
ordinary survival. If the fissioners interests extend to fission products, one counterin-
tuitive consequence is that fission can be better than ordinary survival: since there are
two fission products, we stand a chance to receive compensation twice. In principle,
Brink could argue that in such cases, the net value or utility per compensation is
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ones, too. Intimate friends share their mental lives to a significant degree;
their individual experiences, beliefs, desires, ideals and actions depend
upon those of the other. In contrast to fissioner and fission products,
the shared mental lives of friends are shaped reciprocally rather than
one-directionally. In this sense, Brink thinks that the closest analogue
to fission is the parent-child relation: the child owes its existence and
physical and psychological nature to the parents,211 just like the fission
products owe their characteristics to the fissioner.
Regardless of symmetry and direction, psychological continuity and
connectedness extend an agent’s interest, and thereby give even rational
egoists a “derivative but non-instrumental reason to be concerned about
others.”212 What Brink means is that an agent’s consideration of the good
of other, psychologically continuous beings is not just a useful means,
but valuable for its own sake in virtue of being constitutive of the agent’s
own good.213 The only reason to care more for oneself than for others
is that psychological continuity and connectedness are stronger in the
intrapersonal case.
The resulting picture is complex. Brink endorses Sidgwick’s idea that
the separateness of persons is indispensable for making sense of prudence;
personal identity matters in the sense that the separateness of persons is
the backdrop against which special concern for one’s own future in gen-
lowered by the fact that someone else—the other fission product—receives it, too. If
so, fission need not be better than ordinary survival. But the prospects of this reply
seem limited. As argued earlier, some forms of compensation depend on uniqueness
(2.5.3). But it seems doubtful that compensation always does.
211Brink 1997a, pp. 126-7.
212Ibid., p. 127.
213Brink 1997b, p. 147.
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eral, and prudence in particular, make sense.214 This being said, personal
identity between benefactor and beneficiary is not necessary for making
a sacrifice reasonable. Psychological continuity either extends a person’s
interests beyond the separate unit she is, or grounds a quasi-prudence
according to which continuity rather than identity matters.
Whiting’s discussion suggested even more. It is not just that iden-
tity is not necessary for special concern. Brink agrees with Whiting
that Sidgwick’s claim should be reversed: special concern is part of what
constitutes psychological continuity and thereby the separateness of per-
sons. The latter involves acting from a distinctive perspective on the
world. Apart from displaying concern for one’s own future and trusting
one’s own previous deliberations even if imperfect and inferior to oth-
ers’ deliberations, this involves having personal desires and intentions.215
Moreover, individuals stand in social relationships that help to define
their lives and generate reasons to care about others. In this picture, an
agent’s reasons to care specially about her own future does not derive
from the separateness of persons. Instead, the agent’s bias is part of
what constitutes her separateness.
Besides reversing the relation between separateness and prudential
concern, Brink takes Whiting to show that psychological continuity ob-
tains not only within the life of one and the same person, but also across
persons:216
214Brink 2017, sect. 5.
215Brink 1997a, pp. 103-5.
216If I understand Whiting correctly, Brink’s reading here is not precise. For ex-
ample, he writes: “Just as special concern is partly constitutive of interpersonal
psychological continuity, Whiting argues, special concern for ones future self is partly
constitutive of intrapersonal psychological continuity” (2017, sect. 6). In contrast,
Whiting does not talk about interpersonal psychological continuity. In her picture,
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“[i]nterpersonal psychological continuity is quite common and found
in many form of interpersonal association between spouses and
domestic partners, family members, friends, colleagues, neighbors,
etc. In these cases, the mental states and intentional actions of
each person depend on those of her associates in various ways.”217
He describes some dimensions of interpersonal psychological continuity.
It includes affective components which make us fond of our friends and
future selves. It also includes behavioral dispositions to help with their
projects, and to invest efforts into their success and well-being. Finally,
it involves trusting their advice, help, criticism and support.
In both the intra- and the interpersonal cases, psychological continu-
ity is “anchored”218 in a thinner relation that does not require, and is
prior to, special concern. In the intrapersonal case, it is something like
Whiting’s notion of thin psychological continuity. In the interpersonal
case, individuals stand in “associative relations”219 through past interac-
tions and shared histories. These weaker relations get reinforced through
caring and planning for one’s personal desires and potential friends re-
spectively, and thereby give rise to personal identity and friendship. In
this way, personal identity depends on special concern for one’s future
selves, not the other way round.
What kind of concern is it that partly constitutes personal identity?
Special concern requires that one cares differently for oneself than for
mere strangers. Brink has shown that prudence, i.e. an agent bias in
combination with temporal neutrality, is one rationally admissible way
special concern for friends is constitutive of friendship, not of psychological continu-
ity. She seems agnostic on whether there is genuine psychological continuity across
persons; cf. Whiting 1986, pp. 557-8.
217Brink 2017, sect. 6.
218Ibid., sect. 6.
219Brink 1997b, p. 143.
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to do this. But special concern need not take a prudential form. Brink
seems to agree with Whiting that it is up to us how we weigh personal in-
terests and projects with those of others.220 The same goes for time bias.
Temporal neutrality could be defended as a normative claim, but it is not
a constraint on practical reason that arises from concern’s constitutive
role for personal identity.
One remaining question is how special concern can both require per-
sonal identity, more precisely the separateness of persons, and be con-
stitutive of personal identity.221 This view unites insights from Sidgwick
and Whiting. But it seems threatened by circularity, given that Brink
also endorses a no priority thesis : neither explanatory direction is more
fundamental than the other. He admits that this symmetric dependence
looks circular, but proposes to distinguish two different ways in which
personal identity and special concern depend on each other: special con-
cern is metaphysically prior to personal identity because it contributes
to the obtainment of personal identity.222 But personal identity is nor-
matively prior to special concern because special concern can be justified
only if there is personal identity. If persons are separate, then there can
be intrapersonal compensation that is automatic, which justifies caring
about these separate units in a special way.
220Like Whiting, Brink wonders whether persons could be altruistic enough to re-
nounce special concern for their own future and have self-concern “be regulated by
her ultimate aim in which her own good is just one among many, with no privileged
position” (2017, sect. 7).
221Further below, I argue that Brink tacitly shifts from concern constituting the
separateness of persons to concern constituting personal identity (3.1.3).
222Brink (2017, sect. 8) is neutral on the exact constitutive role of special concern.
If special concern is distinguished by affective components, then it might be neither
necessary for nor exhaustive of the psychological continuity relation that constitutes
personal identity. If special also includes dispositions to trust, cooperate, plan, and
invest, then it is arguably necessary for personal identity.
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3.1.3 Reflections: The Constitutive Role Of Atti-
tudes
Each of these positions offers an important insight about how personal
identity relates to future-directed concern. Whiting argues that special
concern for our friends is justified. Thus, special concern for future selves
can in principle be justified as well, even if the numerical distinctness ob-
jection against the complex view goes through. Brink explains how we
can make sense of the finding that special concern presupposes the sepa-
rateness of persons, while personal identity itself depends on our special
concern for our future selves. Special concern depends normatively on the
separateness of persons; only if persons are separate is special concern
sensible. Personal identity depends metaphysically on special concern;
the latter partly constitutes personal identity.
It is easy to overstate Whiting’s analogy. Earlier, I mentioned Parfit’s
worries about assimilating concern for our own futures to concern for
others (2.5.2). He thinks that the analogy
“still leaves something out. Perhaps some people care about them-
selves only in the kind of way in which they care about certain
other people. But, when we think about our futures, most of us
have another attitude, which might be called [...] instinctive con-
cern. Such concern has [...] a ‘special and urgent quality’. This
concern may not be stronger than our concern for certain other
people, such as our own children. But it seems distinctive.”223
I argued that Parfit and others have not made a convincing case that we
have concern with this distinctive quality only for ourselves. But even if
one were convinced that concern for ourselves feels fundamentally differ-
ent from concern for others, Whiting’s view is not in tension with this.
223Parfit 2007, pp. 21-22.
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She is not making claims about what concern for our future selves is like.
Her analogy pertains to the justification of the respective concerns, not
their quality. In fact, Whiting’s picture offers resources to make sense
of a special and urgent quality of concern for our own futures: prior to
coming to care about our future selves, we are already thinly psycho-
logically continuous with them. The fact that there is this antecedent
connection to our future selves that gets reinforced by coming to care
about them could be a first step towards explaining how once concern
for them has developed, there is an urgent immediacy to its quality that
is absent when caring for others.224 From here, one could argue fur-
ther that such antecedent connection is lacking for others, and thereby
explain how concern for oneself is special. But on the other hand, one
could point out that prior to becoming friends, there is some interrelated-
ness between us and others that is the counterpart to thin psychological
continuity. It could be a general concern for others which we have re-
gardless of whether they are our friends, and which then gets reinforced
and supplemented through acquaintance and friendship. Or it could be
the initial shared experiences and interests that precede the development
of friendship. Either way, we would have resources for expressing that
concern for our own futures is not fundamentally special and/or different
in kind from concern for others. The fact that Whiting’s analogy can be
developed further in these directions shows that she is not committing
224Recall Velleman’s claim that the immediacy of my concern for my own future
requires that I regard the future self unselfconsciously as me—something which I
supposedly cannot do for my fission offshoots. With Whiting, we could offer an
alternative, less demanding explanation: it is not identity that must be presupposed;
instead, being thinly psychologically continuous is what accounts for and enables the
concern’s immediacy.
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herself to the particular picture that Parfit deems shorthanded.
For the following reason, Whiting’s analogy might not be a decisive
reason to reject the extreme claim. While it is difficult to be entirely
without friends, we do renounce friendships and thereby, according to
Whiting, our second-order concerns for the first-order desires of the for-
mer friend. Similarly, while it is difficult, if not incompatible with being
a person, to renounce the totality of our personal desires and maintain
exclusively impersonal desires, we do sometimes renounce some of our
personal desires. This being said, Whiting further maintained that it is
rationally admissible to be without personal desires just as it is rationally
admissible to be without friends. Here, one might be worried that Whit-
ing begs the question against Butler and other proponents of the extreme
claim. It was precisely their worry that concern for our futures becomes
unmotivated. For them, the insight that there is no rational requirement
to have friends will turn the analogy on its head—surely we do have a
rational requirement or at least a strong motivation for future-directed
concern. Thus, friends and future selves are disanalogous after all.
In response, Whiting could insist that personal desires are not ra-
tionally required, but accept that personal desires are indispensable in
a broader sense, e.g., essential to our flourishing. Or she could admit
that the analogy between friends and future selves can go both ways.
Maybe concern for friends and future selves is rationally required. Fur-
ther arguments would then be needed from Butler and others to explain
why there is this rational requirement. Until then, the analogy, if re-
ceived charitably, suggest that denying this rational requirement would
not be absurd and discontinuous with other practices that involve con-
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cern. Thus, Whiting is indeed in disagreement with Butler and others
who think that concern is rationally required. But she is not just beg-
ging the question. She is offering an argument from analogy against the
requirement. And if the simple view struggles just as much with giving
reasons for concern for our futures (2.4.1), Butler and others actually
take an interest in accepting the argument. As a result, we are prima
facie entitled to retain psychological continuity theory even if it assimi-
lates the justification of concern for our own futures to concern for our
friends.
Brink and Whiting agree that a momentary person stage cannot be
considered a full-fledged agent. Amongst others, the possession, imple-
mentation, and satisfaction of intentions and desires requires a temporal
extension which person stages lack. The locus of agency is the person
whom the person stage represents at a time. Brink sees person stages
as representatives of a whole person just like some individuals are rep-
resentatives of states. Whiting and Brink compare the way in which we
care about our future selves to the way we care about our friends. Once
friendship is established, I maintain a second-order desire for the first-
order desires of my friends. Their good is a constitutive of my own good.
Similarly, the good of my present self makes essential reference to the
good of my future selves.
They further share the idea that particular attitudes I take towards
myself generate further, more general reasons for future-directed concern.
In Whiting’s case, it is the possession of primitive concerns in the form
of personal desires. Brink takes on much of this picture and argues that
personal desires give rise to an agent bias that is part of what constitutes
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the separateness of persons, a necessary condition for compensation being
automatic. Neither proposal faces a deep circularity threat. It is true that
part of the justification of special concern for our own futures mentions
the fact that we are somehow caring for us in the first place. But this
seems unproblematic. First, initial concern or practical necessities get
us going in caring about ourselves in a more general way. Once this
has happened, new reasons for concern arise, for example through the
fact that the general concern contributes to the individual’s separateness
from others. Initial concern and the resulting general concern are not
responsive to the same kinds of reasons.
Does either the initial or the resulting general concern presuppose
personal identity? On why we should care specially for ourselves, Brink
says: because if your future selves receive benefits, your compensation is
automatic. On reflection, this reasoning raises questions. He does not say
much about what it means for compensation to be automatic, and even
less about why this is important. On the face of it, one would expect
that what matters for the rational egoist is that she gets compensated,
whether automatically or not. I suppose that automatic compensation is
maximally reliable: the agent can be sure that she will be compensated
if benefits are accrued intrapersonally, i.e. the future self receiving ben-
efits is psychologically continuous and connected with the agent. If the
benefit goes to someone else, it is not clear whether the agent feels com-
pensated. However, note that by Brink’s own lights, benefits to someone
else can compensate me. One of his key contributions is that psycholog-
ical continuity and connectedness can obtain across distinct persons. It
is not clear why in such a case, compensation should be less automatic.
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Granted, the agent might feel compensated only if the beneficiary is suffi-
ciently connected and continuous with her, such that the agent’s interests
are extended the beneficiary. This seems to be a given for the agent’s
future selves (although see 7.1). But the agent cannot be sure that she is
continuous and connected in this way if the recipient is someone else. If
so, this suggests two things. First, automaticity of compensation matters
only derivatively, in virtue of being sufficient for a future benefit being
reliably compensating in the eyes of the present agent. Secondly, auto-
maticity was key in justifying the agent bias. But now it seems that the
justifiedness of the agent bias is relative to the agent’s epistemic stand-
ing: it depends on whether or not the agent has good reason to think
that the future benefit compensates her. Automaticity gives one such
reason. However, were she absolutely sure that a future benefit to some-
one else compensates her, she would have no reason for an agent bias in
this instance. Thus, whether an agent bias is justified is contingent upon
the agent’s evidence and interrelatedness with others. The more reason
she has to think that benefits to others compensate her, the less an agent
bias seems motivated.
All this need not be a problem for Brink’s project, which is about
rational admissibility in the first place: the egoist can justify caring for
others. And she can justify having an agent bias but no time bias. It is
not an objection to Brink that we need not be rational egoists. More-
over, if I understand correctly, there is a sense in which interpersonal
compensation actually reduces to intrapersonal compensation. The rea-
son why benefits to others can compensate us is that our interests are
extended to them. Their good is part of our own good. In this sense,
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we are still receiving the benefit intrapersonally, but via the other as a
vicarious, interpersonal beneficiary. Somewhat in contrast with Brink’s
own rhetoric, this would mean that compensation is necessarily intrap-
ersonal, and talk about the significance of intrapersonal compensation’s
automaticity misleading; intrapersonal compensation is the only kind of
compensation there is.
This leads to the question in what sense persons are separate units,
and thereby potential recipients of intrapersonal compensation. Refer-
ring to Sidgwick, Brink says compensation requires the distinction be-
tween persons to be real and fundamental. He calls this realism about
personal identity. This sounds as if metaphysics is crucial for future-
directed concern after all. The latter cannot be reasonable if metaphysics
fails to establish the separateness of persons. Against this, and in the
spirit of (2.4.2), it seems to me that the needed notion of separateness
is metaphysically much more austere than Brink and Sidgwick make it
sound. Even in paradigmatically anti-realist views, separateness could
be preserved. For example, even if persons are just fictional constructs
out of sequences of experiences, we can maintain a sense in which it
is one and the same constructed self that takes an interest in receiving
benefits for its earlier sacrifice. In terms of Velleman’s position (2.5.2),
this requires that there is a future self whom the agent can now regard
as her. But this requirement seems compatible with a wide range of
metaphysics, including anti-realist ones. I am not suggesting that the
agent can make arbitrary choices about which future self she considers
her, only that the requirement is silent on what it takes to be her. We
can thus conclude that the reasonableness of future-directed concern is
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constrained by metaphysics in the sense that a separate unit is needed in
which sacrifices and benefits are balanced, but that the constraint itself
is minimal. This deflates Brink’s claim that special concern for our own
futures presupposes personal identity.
Still, Whiting and Brink provide detailed resources for strengthen-
ing the case against the extreme claim further. Special concern for our
own futures can be justified within the complex view. Its justification
mentions personal identity and separateness in a sense that can be fully
captured by accounts of personal identity in terms of relations of con-
tinuity and connectedness. Moreover, what matters obtains within the
life of persisting persons, but can also be realized across persons. And
the relations that ground special concern are not straightforwardly con-
strained by person boundaries. They even play a part in defining what
the person boundaries are.
Finally, one striking and underexplored question is how essential psy-
chological continuity is to these positions. Consider an analogy not be-
tween friends and future selves, but between biological relatives and fu-
ture selves. Interestingly, this substitution preserves a range of aspects
of Whiting’s initial analogy: the relation between others and myself is
similar in kind to the relation between my present and future self. The
analogy lends itself to the rhetoric of primitive concerns for biologically
related selves giving rise to general concern for their well-being. There
is even a remote and admittedly complicated sense in which biological
continuity has concern as a component: caring in certain ways is adap-
tive and brings about facts of biological relatedness—just like caring in
certain ways shapes future strands of psychological continuity. Turning
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to Brink, surely biological continuity is one candidate relation for under-
pinning the separateness of persons, and for extending an individual’s
interest forward in time. On the face of it, biological continuity can play
a similar role as psychological continuity does for Whiting and Brink.
On the other hand, the analogy breaks down at certain points. Bio-
logical continuity might sometimes provide prima facie reasons for con-
cern, interpersonal compensation, etc. But the reasonableness of these
attitudes is easily defeasible.225 I am neither particularly concerned nor
compensated by benefits to a close relative whom I have never met, or
whom I have met but whose character and values deviate radically from
mine. And it is conceivable to be perfectly justified in caring and feel-
ing compensated despite biological discontinuity. Fancy cases include
mentality transfers between biologically discontinuous bodies (4.2), more
mundane examples are, e.g., step-parents and -child relations. These
reservations about the connection between biological continuity and what
matters suggest that the prospects for biological analogues to Whiting’s
and Brink’s positions are dim.
3.2 Self-Constitution Accounts
According to the foregoing positions, psychological continuity and con-
nectedness through intentions, desires, and other attitudes ground the
reasonableness of concern. However, one might worry that these rela-
tions still fall short of capturing what is important and valuable about
our future experiences. The following positions suggest that we need
225See also D. Shoemaker 2007, pp. 321-2.
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to look beyond the numerical identity of persons over time, and instead
focus on other senses of identity.
3.2.1 Korsgaard On The Unity Of Agency
Whiting suggested that in order to see why the extreme claim is mistaken,
we need to realize that there is more to psychological continuity than
just memory. Korsgaard takes precisely this thought as a starting point.
Via a different route, she arrives at conclusions that seem congenial to
Whiting’s picture.
Parfit’s account of personal identity focuses on the experiences and
memories of person stages. He argues that they fail to constitute a deep
further fact. In response, Korsgaard stresses that persons are agents.
Agents are not just passive bearers of experiences. They are able to
reason and deliberate about how to act, and can act in accordance with
their deliberations. Parfit’s account focuses only on experiences, but does
not mention agency. His account is thus incomplete.
Korsgaard claims that even if the simple view is false, I have practical
reasons for regarding myself as the very same rational agent over time.226
She motivates this diachronic case by means of considerations about the
synchronic case. At a given time, I see myself as one particular person
not because of metaphysical claims I accept, or a unity of which I am
conscious. Instead, two kinds of activities unify me at a time. First, I
eliminate conflicts among my various motives. Some of my motives are
incompatible with each other, and through reasoning I determine which
motives I adopt and implement. Secondly, I do not merely act according
226Korsgaard 1989, p. 109.
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to my strongest desires. Instead, I deliberate about conflicts among my
desires. I choose on which ones I act based on reasons. Such choice is
expressive of my will.
“When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and
above all your desires, something that is you, and that chooses
which one to act on.”227
Being “a law to yourself”228 in this sense does not presuppose the truth
of the simple view, i.e. the existence of a separate or irreducible self. The
unity of agents arises from the practical necessity of making deliberative
choices.
Against the practical conclusions which Parfit draws from the com-
plex view, Korsgaard notes that the role of metaphysics in this delib-
eration is not settled. Metaphysical findings can have impacts on my
choices. For example, it can be significant to learn that a future self will
be me. But whether and which impact metaphysics has on my choices is
not determined prior to my own, personal deliberation.
“It is practical reason that requires me to construct an identity
for myself; whether metaphysics is to guide me in this is or not is
an open question.”229
These are considerations about the synchronic unity of agents. Kors-
gaard transfers these insights to the diachronic case. In one sense, her
view is consistent with Parfit’s: personal identity is not a deep further
fact, but rather like the identity of a nation. But Korsgaard clarifies that
a state provides the better analogy than a nation. The connection be-
tween present and future selves is not as loose as the one between people
227Korsgaard 1989, p. 111.
228Ibid.
229Ibid., p. 112.
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who happen to live in the same territory and share some history. A state
is the result of the citizens’ decision to constitute a single unified agent.
Persons over time are similarly unified. They do not merely consist in
person stages that happen to precede and follow each other. Their de-
cision to unify by extending their interests to each other is a practical
necessity; there is an imperative to unify—just like for a Kantian, there
is an imperative to form a state.
This practical necessity to unify arises from the fact that agents make
choices whose fulfillment takes up time, e.g, choices about careers, health,
friendships, family, life plans. Even a trivial choice involves a future-
directed attitude. This is why for Korsgaard, the question whether and
why a person stage should be concerned about a future self is misleading.
The question suggests that the stage already has independent reasons
for action, and needs to be convinced why it should take future stages
into account. But more appropriately, the stage’s reasons derive from
identification with future stages in the first place.
“When the person is viewed as an agent, no clear content can be
given to the idea of a merely present self.”230
It is misleading to demand reasons why one person stage should be con-
cerned about another. Person stages at different times are not discon-
nected, but closely interrelated through intentions, desires, and other
states and attitudes with essentially diachronic orientations. Like Whit-
ing and Brink, Korsgaard thinks that person stages in isolation cannot
be full-fledged agents in their own right. They do not have independent
interests that could be weighed against interests of other person stages.
230Ibid., p. 113.
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The extreme claim is thus fundamentally misguided.231
Moreover, while she shares Parfit’s conviction that interpersonal and
intrapersonal concern are not fundamentally different, her reasoning is
distinctive: our being unified into agents is what generates reasons that
transcend the boundaries of persons. The reasons that arise from uni-
fication into agents are called personal reasons.232 And Korsgaard is
convinced that each of us is unified not only into the agent who occupies
a particular body. Instead, we are also part of and intertwined with other
agencies of fellow persons, families, organisations, nations, etc.:
“the personal concern which begins with one’s life in a particular
body finds its place in ever-widening spheres of agency and enter-
prise, developing finally into a personal concern for the impersonal—
a concern, that is to say, for the fate of one’s fellow creatures,
considered merely as such.”233
If I understand correctly, not only does the synchronic case generalize to
the diachronic case; the diachronic case generalizes to the interpersonal
case. Person stages at a time are so intertwined with person stages at
other times that their interests cannot be understood in isolation. Agents
“come in different sizes”234, and persons are only the smallest units. The
agents occupying our bodies are not only unified; they further unify into
interpersonal agents. Unification into a group agent gives individual
agents personal concern for others. Personal reasons have force not just
231Korsgaard 1989, pp. 126-7.
232Note that this notion of a personal reason or concern is not exactly the same as
what Whiting calls a personal desire. For example, Korsgaard’s personal reasons are
the result of a practical necessity to unify, whereas Whiting makes no such claims, and
seems to allow that person desires can be renounced entirely. And unlike Whiting’s
notion, Korsgaard’s personal reasons can be essentially tied to others, not the agent;
see below.
233Korsgaard 1989, p. 127.
234Ibid.
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for an agent’s own life, but also govern her relationships and interactions.
Despite a number of disagreements with Parfit, Korsgaard’s view
seems to have the potential to invite improvements rather than radical
revisions of psychological continuity theory. She suggests that psycho-
logical continuity and connectedness should encompass more than pas-
sive mental states of memory and experience. Instead, they should be
extended to active states and attitudes that are constitutive of agents.
Under this description, Korsgaard’s and Parfit’s views have structural
similarities; they just pick out (or emphasize) different psychological re-
lations. Another parallel is that what matters can come apart from iden-
tity. For Korsgaard, the unification of agents is what generates practical
reasons. Her phrasing of agents occupying particular bodies235 suggests
that it is possible that agents come apart from their bodies. Presumably,
agency need not adhere to the logic of identity, e.g., it can branch.
What is distinctive and goes beyond psychological continuity theory
is Korsgaard’s normative claim that in conceiving of oneself as an agent,
one thereby incurs the practical necessities she describes. This motivates
practical conclusions that differ significantly from Parfit’s. For example,
Korsgaard rejects paternalistic interventions and utilitarian distribution
patterns on this basis.236 Although Korsgaard is not explicit about this,
I also suppose that since an agent is unified over time, she has no reason
to accept a Parfitian discount rate for future-directed concern237 that re-
flects the degree of psychological connectedness. However, these disputes
do not seem to rest on a fundamental difference in descriptive pictures;
235For example ibid., p. 126.
236Ibid., Ch. V.
237Parfit 1984, pp. 313-4.
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Korsgaard’s diachronic relations between person stages seem in principle
describable in terms of rich enough variants of psychological continuity
and connectedness.
Then again, some of Korsgaard’s claims are ambiguous. When she
says that, as quoted, practical reason requires me to construct an identity
for myself, it is not clear what kind of identity is being constructed here.
It could be that exercising practical reason generates, or is constitutive
of, a person’s numerical identity over time. But she could just as well
be read as saying that regardless of which facts about numerical iden-
tity over time obtain, agency and practical reason provide the necessary
and practically relevant unity to justify judgements and attitudes about
moral responsibility and future-directed concern. This reading seems ap-
propriate when she says that understanding ourselves as agents follows
from seeing ourselves as first causes of our actions, an attitude that is
“forced upon us by the necessity of making choices, regardless of
the theoretical or metaphysical facts.”238
In other words, it is not entirely clear whether her position is intended
to capture personal identity over time, or merely the sameness of a prac-
tically relevant unit that can come apart from personal identity.239 I
argue below (3.2.3) that if Korsgaard intends to focus on the sameness of
a practically relevant unit, the question arises why she takes issue with
238Korsgaard 1989, p. 120.
239DeGrazia (2005, p. 79) writes: “I cannot tell whether [Korsgaard] is addressing
numerical identity, narrative identity, or some merging of the two”. Mackenzie (2008,
pp. 2, 8-11) understands her as discussing the “practical identity” of agents, which
must presuppose our numerical identity or unity over time and is constrained by
facts about embodiment, but arises from practical rather than metaphysical necessity.
Schechtman (2014, pp. 44-9) reads her as speaking primarily to a form of agent
identity that is distinct and independent from personal identity and other theoretical
or metaphysical notions.
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Parfit’s reductionism. After all, the latter position is a proposal about
the numerical identity of persons over time. By itself, it is neutral on
whether persons are the practically relevant unit.
I now turn to Schechtman’s position which draws a clear boundary
between the numerical identity of persons over time and a more practical
sense of identity.
3.2.2 Schechtman On Narrative Identity
Schechtman points out that there are two senses of personal identity that
are usually conflated.240 Reidentification criteria address
“the question of what makes a person at a time t2 the same person
as a person at the time t1”
241.
Schechtman emphasizes that there is another important question about
persons and their existence over time, the characterization question:
“this question asks which actions, experiences, beliefs, values, de-
sires, character traits, and so on (hereafter abbreviated “charac-
teristics”) are to be attributed to a given person. [...] [C]haracter-
ization theorists ask what it means to say that a particular char-
acteristic is of a given person.”242
In contrast to the reidentification question, the relata mentioned in the
characterization question are not two person stages, but one person and
one or more characteristic. The attribution of characteristics comes in
degrees. Some characteristics are part of us and our lives, but only
incidentally so. They are part of our histories, but they are not central
240For endorsements and applications of Schechtman’s view, see for example Blus-
tein 1999, and DeGrazia 2005, ch. 3.
241Schechtman 1996, pp. 1-2.
242Ibid., p. 73.
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to who we are. This is different for certain other characteristics. They
determine our identity in the sense of defining us and making us the
individuals we are. Here, characterization is
“not [...] about ‘identity’ understood as ‘the relation which every
object bears to itself and nothing else,’ but rather as ‘the set of
characteristics that make a person who she is’.”243
The reidentification and characterization questions are related. In order
for an action to be attributable to a person, we need reidentification
identity between the addressee of the attribution and the agent who
performed the action. Still, Schechtman maintains that the questions
are distinct.
Schechtman thinks that in the past, philosophers tried to provide cri-
teria for personal identity that manage to justify what Schechtman calls
four basic features of our lives: we survive events, we ascribe moral re-
sponsibility, we have self-concern, and people who carry burdens have a
right to be compensated. Psychological continuity is the most promis-
ing relation for making sense of the four features. However, psychological
continuity theory has a number of shortcomings. First, direct psychologi-
cal connections between person stages are sufficient for personal identity.
But as Reid’s brave officer objection244 shows, they are not necessary.
Psychological continuity theorists are forced to concede that indirect con-
nections of psychological continuity can suffice. Schechtman claims that
this move deprives the view of its intuitive appeal.245 Direct psychologi-
cal relations did seem to capture a good sense in which another person
243Schechtman 1996, pp. 75-6.
244Reid 1785a, p. 276.
245Schechtman 1996, pp. 28-30.
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stage’s experience are mine. In contrast, indirect psychological connec-
tions do not seem as important as we thought identity would be.
Secondly, identity is all-or-nothing, psychological connectedness al-
lows for degrees. Parfit and others thus introduce a threshold of psycho-
logical connectedness that is necessary for personal identity. Schechtman
thinks that any threshold is inevitably arbitrary.246
Thirdly, psychological continuity theory takes personal identity to
consist in similarity relations between person stages. But similarity is
unsuitable for grounding the four features.247 I am responsible only for
what I did, not what someone who is very similar but distinct from
me did. I am specially concerned about what I experience, not what
someone who is just like me but distinct from me experiences. Psycho-
logical continuity thus leaves open why I should care about my future
selves.248 In other words, Schechtman endorses the extreme claim, and
her motivations are similar to the ones described earlier (2.1).
The key to address these shortcomings is to realize that reidentifica-
tion is unsuitable for grounding the four features. Instead, characteriza-
tion questions need to be discussed. Schechtman’s proposal for answer-
ing the characterization question is called the narrative self-constitution
view. Persons do not only conceive of themselves as a persisting subject
that has past, present and future experiences. They see these experiences




249According to Mackenzie (2008, p. 9), this is a parallel to Korsgaard’s view: both
think that self-constitution is what brings about practically relevant forms of identity.
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“a person creates his identity by forming an autobiographical
narrative—a story of his life. [...] According to the narrative
self-constitution view, the difference between persons and other
individuals [...] lies in how they organize their experience, and
hence their lives. [...] Some, but not all, individuals weave stories
of their lives, and it is their doing so which makes them per-
sons. On this view a person’s identity (in the sense at issue in
the characterization question) is constituted by the content of her
self-narrative, and the traits, actions, and experiences included in
it are, by virtue of that inclusion, hers.”250
There are constraints on what qualifies as an admissible narrative: it
should not contain obvious falsities, and it shall cohere reasonably well
with the narrative others tell about oneself. The reason is that person-
hood is a social concept; one essential component of being a person is
playing one’s part in a web of social relations. Amongst others, this re-
quires “a self-concept that is basically in synch with the view of one held
by others.”251 Moreover, the episodes of the narrative need to fit and
connect reasonably well such that they make up an intelligible story.252
Most persons will have their narratives only subconsciously or implicitly,
and this is compatible with Schechtman’s position.253 However, it should
be in principle articulable.254
The crucial feature of proper narratives is that they extend a person’s
consciousness over time. Consciousness at a time is unified. Synchronic
experiences are not a mere set or conglomerate of distinct component
experiences. Instead, different sensual inputs, such as visual, auditory,
tactile and olfactory inputs
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“mutually interact in a way that produces a unified experience in
which each plays a role, and plays the role it does because it serves
as an interpretive context for the others, which in turn provide its
context.”255
Narratives achieve something similar in the diachronic case. Just like
mutual interaction among simultaneous inputs and states results in a
unified experience at a time, narrative interconnectedness among a per-
son’s moments of consciousness at different times results in them being
unified over time. The individual comes to understand herself as tempo-
rally extended rather than momentary.
“The moments of conscious awareness in a single person’s life
are not distinct entities that are somehow strung together, but
rather a dynamic interactive system that integrates to produce a
subjectivity that extends over time. [...] [T]he experiences woven
together into a person’s narrative interact and alter one another in
such a way that the narrative itself becomes the primary unit. [...]
The experience of a person is thus had by an extended narrative
subject, and not by a time-slice.”256
In other words, having a narrative structure unifies the moments of ex-
perience and thereby produces one single, persisting subject.257
In contrast, children, dementia patients, and others cannot organize
their experiences into a narrative self-conception.258 For them, experi-
ences remain without context and do not hang together with other mo-
255Ibid., p. 139.
256Ibid., pp. 143-4.
257Schechtman offers analogies for how her picture of the relation between a person’s
life and her experiences contrasts with others. Sameness of substance views (of which
the simple view is an instance) see the person’s experiences like beads on a string:
distinct, separable experiences belong to one and the same person. The complex view
compares it to a river: a continuous flow of distinct, separable experiences is all there
is to a person’s life. In contrast, the narrative self-constitution view offers the picture
of “a complicated stew or soup” in which the different ingredients interrelate and
combine into something new by “seasoning and altering one another” (ibid., p. 144).
258Ibid., pp. 146-7.
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ments of consciousness. Instead of being extended in time, they expe-
rience only a succession of disconnected episodes. They are unable to
project themselves forward or backward in time. Consequently, they
lack the phenomenology and capacities of narrating subjects, and cannot
satisfy the conditions of personhood that are relevant for characterization
and underpin the four features.259
The narrative self-constitution view promises that
“the kinds of connections between the different temporal portions
of a person’s life which provide a basis for the four features are
created by the having of a self-conception.”260
How does having a narrative self-conception ground the four features? I
here describe the example of future-directed concern. For Schechtman,
being a narrator has two crucial aspects. First, anticipating a future ex-
perience in one’s narrative influences the character of present experiences
in a certain way:
“what makes a future one’s own on this view is that its anticipated
character can cause pleasure or pain in the present. The present
person thus has an obvious and immediate stake in anticipating a
pleasant future.”261
Second, the narrative extends the narrator’s consciousness forward.
“Thought of one’s future [...] brings the sense that there is more
than just what is present at the moment, and this makes the
present a wholly different kind of thing.”262
By narrating, the individual orients itself towards the future. She consid-
ers herself as the subject not only of present moments of anticipation and
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fear, but also of future experiences that are anticipated. Because antici-
pated experiences shape the quality of present experiences, and because
her narrative extends the individual into the future and makes it the
case that she will be having the anticipated experiences, narrative self-
constitution can ground the reasonableness of future-directed concern.
The view “capture[s] the intuitive relation between personal identity [in
the characterization sense; P.H.] and the four features.”263
Schechtman’s position motivates a suggestion for why it is so hard to
decide whether animalism or the psychological continuity theory provides
the right criterion of personal identity. She argues that for reidentifica-
tion, animalism is superior, whereas psychological relations are superior
for addressing characterization and giving reasons for the four features.264
The failure to distinguish these question explains why our intuitions con-
flict. Both criteria are indeed appealing, but each of them with respect
to a different question.
Schechtman’s recent work develops several aspects of the narrative
self-constitution view further.265 She nowadays thinks that character-
ization is too coarse-grained.266 It does not reflect the fact that some
features and actions can be attributed to us qua moral selves, whereas
others belong to us qua forensic units. If I trip and break a lamp, this
event is attributable to me qua forensic unit : I am a suitable target
for the attribution. However, mere attribution does not settle whether
I am morally responsible. If I can rightfully be held accountable for the
263Ibid., p. 99.
264Ibid., pp. 68-70.
265It is not always clear whether she intends to replace or extend her earlier theory;
see for example D. Shoemaker 2016, p. 325.
266Schechtman 2014, pp. 41, 101-2.
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action, then it is attributable to me qua moral self. This distinction
matters because neglecting it has resulted in crude pictures of the rela-
tion between personal identity and practical concerns where the former
depends straightforwardly on the latter, i.e. x and y are identical iff
they are the same moral self.267 Against this, Schechtman proposes that
we tie personal identity to forensic unity, i.e. regard persons as loci for
attributions of responsibility, concern,268 compensation, etc. Her new
positive picture of personhood is the person life view :
“To be a person is to live a ‘person life’; persons are individuated
by individuating person lives; and the duration of a single person
is determined by the duration of a single person life.”269
What exactly counts as a person and the protagonist of a person live
depends on society’s “person-space”270—the culture, norms, and insti-
tutions surrounding person-related practices. I here see the person life
view as picking up on the idea that the narratives of persons are inher-
ently social concepts: leading a person life requires standing in social
relations and interacting with others. Person lives typically involve de-
velopmental trajectories, including the possession of different abilities at
different life stages, e.g., reflective self-consciousness and self-narration as
an adult, but less demanding abilities at early and late stages of life. As
such, beings who according to the narrative self-constitution view would
not count as narrators can nevertheless live person lives. Schechtman
267Schechtman thinks Locke has mistakenly been read this way.
268We might worry that this distinction works for some practical concerns better
than others. While plausible for moral and forensic matters, the proposal to regard
persons as loci of attribution threatens to overgenerate for concern: it cannot be that
I am identical to all those future selves who are plausible addressees for my special
future-directed concern.
269Schechtman 2014, p. 110.
270Ibid., p. 114.
3.2. SELF-CONSTITUTION ACCOUNTS 117
argues that as a consequence, personal identity as understood by the
person life view is a cluster concept.271 Its obtainment is typically a mat-
ter of biological, psychological and social relations obtaining and being
integrated. But none of these relations is individually necessary and/or
sufficient. Any thought experiment in which these relations come apart
“is in fact a degenerate case of the more basic relation that contains all
three.”272
3.2.3 Reflections: Self-Constitution And Psycholog-
ical Continuity
Korsgaard and Schechtman differ in their exact responses to the extreme
claim. For Korsgaard, the question why my present self should have con-
cern for my future self is misguided, given the practical necessity to unify.
In contrast, Schechtman accepts the extreme claim against the complex
view as a reidentification criterion. I think both can agree that the com-
plex view, by mentioning only facts about distinct person stages, isolated
experiences, and continuity relations, cannot provide a rational ground-
ing for concern. Instead of focusing on descriptive pictures, we need to
consider activities we are engaged in. The construction of practical iden-
tities, and/or the narration of our life stories make concern for ourselves
and others reasonable, and underpin further practices like compensation
and moral responsibility. This seems to fit the strategy described earlier
that the extreme claim can be resisted because concern can be justified
without appealing to metaphysics (2.4.2).
271Ibid., ch. 6.
272Ibid., p. 150.
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Moreover, both Korsgaard and Schechtman would deny Whiting’s
claim that our concerns and other practical activities are constitutive
of personal identity in the reidentification sense. What is being consti-
tuted is the unity of an agent or a life story. These need not coincide
with the reidentification of a person. Earlier, I suggested that Brink can
be read in a similar way, as arguing that the separateness of a person is
constituted partly by the individual’s possession of an agent bias (rather
than the other way round), while the relevant kind of separateness is
metaphysically neutral or austere, and merely denotes the existence of
separate practical units in which sacrifices and benefits should be bal-
anced (3.1.3).
Korsgaard claims that it is a practical necessity to have diachronic
attitudes that unify our selves at different times. Just like in Whiting’s
picture, there is a parallel between the relations among person stages
and the relations among persons. For Korsgaard, in both cases there is
a practical imperative to unify and coordinate one’s ends. For Schecht-
man, narratives are what unifies a consciousness over time. The fact
that what counts as a proper narrative partly depends on how others
see the narrator gives a sense in which intrapersonal unity depends on
relatedness with others. But unlike Whiting and Korsgaard, the claim is
that intrapersonal and social relations are interdependent, not necessarily
analogous.
Like Whiting and Brink, Korsgaard thinks that the fact that I am
taking a certain attitude towards my future selves is what generates more
general reasons for future-directed concern. In Korsgaard’s case, it is the
possession of interests and desires whose fulfillment takes up time that
3.2. SELF-CONSTITUTION ACCOUNTS 119
require cooperation with the person stages who occupy my body in the
future. Since it is a practical necessity for person stages to unify, there
can be one and the same agent at different times even if the simple
view is false. Nevertheless, one might be concerned exactly how far
this reasoning can reach. While it might be a practical necessity for
any person stage to identify with certain other person stages, it is not
obvious how a person stage is necessitated to unify with all other person
stages who succeed her in occupying a certain body. Korsgaard maintains
that in isolation, we cannot make sense of the reasons and interests of a
momentary person stage. Suppose, however, that a person stage unifies
with certain other person stages into a person segment with thoroughly
hedonistic preferences. This segment has an incentive to free-ride upon
the well-being of the person stages that will come to occupy the body
she occupies, and to engage in highly enjoyable yet destructive activities.
For her, it is an imperative to be oriented towards the near future, but
not further. Thus, the scope of the practical necessity to unify seems
relative to the substantive reasons and interests of the constituted person
segment. It is a leap to conclude from the diachronic nature of motives,
intentions, and desires that persons, qua being agents, face a practical
necessity to care for their lives as a whole.
Moreover, note that Korsgaard too can allow for a sense in which
special concern for one’s own future is not rationally required. Given the
desires and interests I have, the unification between my person stages
might be relatively loose. In particular, their degree of unification might
pale relative to how tightly I unify in agencies with people who are close
to me. I do not claim that Korsgaard is committed to these results, just
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that they seem compatible with what she says. This deflates the sense
in which it is a necessity to unify with future person stages that occupy
my body.
One potential benefit of self-constitution views is that they can ad-
vance debates between competing criteria of personal identity. Our in-
tuitions notoriously point in different directions, sometimes favouring a
psychological criterion, while other times suggesting a bodily account
(4.2). Some authors thus conclude that there is no fact of the matter
which criterion is right, or that our concept of personal identity is in-
coherent (4.6). By distinguishing personal identity from the identity of
agents and/or narrative self-constitution, these views can offer an expla-
nation of what goes wrong: our seemingly divergent intuitions speak to
different questions. When theorizing and considering puzzle cases about
personal identity, we conflate persons with agents, and reidentification
with characterization. No wonder our intuitions are inconstant.
This suggestion is not only diagnostic, but also therapeutic: the hope
is that if we discuss these questions individually, clearer pictures of which
criterion addresses which question best will emerge. Here, Korsgaard
distinguishes further between what agents are contingently as opposed
to necessarily. She prefers
“a physical criterion of identity, but only a conditional one. Given
the technology we have now, the unit of action is a human body.”273
But if one day, agents could carry out unified plans and projects across
human bodies, the latter would cease to be the basic unit of action.
Schechtman agrees that bodily criteria are appealing, but only for rei-
273Korsgaard 1989, p. 115.
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dentifying persons.274 Psychological relations are clearly more relevant to
the four features275— although they remain insufficient when not used to
address characterization questions. DeGrazia is inspired by Schechtman
and her distinction between personal and narrative identity. He argues
that animalism gives the right account of personal identity, whereas ac-
counts of narrative identity capture how we value psychological conti-
nuity.276 These suggestions sound conciliatory: we can keep both bodily
and psychological criteria, but each for a slightly different topic.277
At the same time, the narrative view offers something to proponents
of the extreme claim who remain convinced that continuity relations are
not enough to ground concern.278 It is narrative interconnectedness that
needs to relate moments of consciousness at different times in order for
them to unify such that actions and features can be attributed to a
subject who comes to care for its life as a whole.
At times, especially Schechtman seems more dismissive of psycholog-
ical continuity theory than necessary. She thinks that a Whiting-style
picture belittles the nature of concern for our own futures.
“[T]hese views do not deny that the present person-stage, who is
worrying about the future of the person, is a distinct experiencing
subject from anybody existing in the future. What this means,
however, is that the concern of the present subject for her future
self can never be a concern based on anticipation.”279
Even complex positions that take lengths to respond to the extreme claim
274Schechtman 1996, p. 67.
275Ibid., pp. 15-6.
276DeGrazia 2005, p. 80.
277These pictures resemble Olson’s distinction between personal identity and being
the same person, to be discussed in (4.5).
278For an argument that narratives are not sufficient either, see Crone 2017.
279Schechtman 1996, p. 65.
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cannot escape the conclusion that anticipatory concern is misguided.
Against this, I argued earlier that special concern can still be taken to
arise from quasi-anticipation (2.5.2). In treating concern for friends and
future selves on par, Whiting’s picture provides a particularly promising
context for quasi-anticipation. This suggests that refined versions of the
complex view of reidentifying persons might deal with concern better
than Schechtman expects.
I mentioned how Korsgaard can be seen as improving psychological
continuity theory rather than rejecting it. A similar suggestion can be
made with regards to Schechtman. One move in the literature is to
make a case that even as a reidentification theory, the complex view can
meet the challenges of Schechtman and the extreme claim.280 But it
has not been remarked that narrative interconnectedness between per-
son stages is plausibly seen as an instance of psychological continuity and
connectedness. If the latter can comprise memories, experiences, beliefs,
anticipations, plans, etc., why can we not add narrative attitudes to the
mix? They seem more complicated and nuanced than the foregoing at-
titudes, but not therefore less psychological in nature. For example, it is
plausible to see narrative structures as structures among psychological
states.281 The suggestion to enrich the notion of psychological continuity
280See my earlier discussion of how continuity relations justify concern (2.5). Ex-
plicitly with regards to Schechtman, Beck (2015, pp. 314-6) defends psychological
continuity theory on the grounds that even if we grant that person stages at different
times are necessarily distinct, stages of one and the same person are connected by
causal dependence. Schechtman overlooks that this might be quite relevant towards
the four features; for example, my future selves deserve compensation for my present
efforts partly because they feel aches as a result of my present efforts.
281Understood this way, narratives reorganize and relate memories, present beliefs
and aspirations, and anticipated future experiences. One worry is that this construc-
tion threatens to operate on a set of interrelated states that need to be somewhat
unified and integrated before they can be subject to narrative reorganization. This is
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in this way leaves intact Schechtman’s claim that characterization rather
than reidentification questions need to be discussed when justifying the
four features. But once care is taken to focus on the right question, it
seems we become less pressed to reject psychological continuity theory.
The central lesson from Schechtman would then be twofold: that char-
acterization differs from reidentification, and that—as pointed out by
Korsgaard as well—psychological continuity and connectedness should
be understood in sufficiently rich terms, encompassing active, agency-
and narration-related states.
3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I described two approaches towards the complex view in
view of the objections that motivate the extreme claim. The first is to
defend and improve the view (3.1). The complex view can understand
personal identity as being constituted by relations that matter. Whit-
ing argues that relations quite similar to those which justify concern for
our friends obtain between us and our future selves. Brink takes rela-
tions which ensure that we are compensated by benefits to a future self
as partly constitutive of the separateness of persons. These positions
operate with the resources of psychological continuity theory. It is not
obvious how similar moves could be available to proponents of bodily
variants of the complex view.
According to the second approach, we need to look beyond personal
identity and what it consists in (3.2). Korsgaard argues that the practical
a parallel to Zahavi’s criticism (2007) that, amongst others, we need to presuppose a
sense of self that precedes narrative constitution.
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necessity of person stages to constitute a unified agent makes the request
of the extreme claim to provide reasons for concern misguided. If seen
as agents, persons are always temporally extended, and the idea of a
momentary person stage with independent interests and reasons does
not make sense.
Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view contributes a distinctive
innovation: it captures a person’s identity in the characterization sense.
The reidentification sense of personal identity is practically unimportant,
at least in terms of giving reasons for the four features : caring about
survival, ascribing moral responsibility, carrying present burdens for the
sake of future compensation, and caring about oneself. In contrast, the
narratives relevant to the characterization questions unify person stages
such that the four features become reasonable.
These positions point at the need to operate with a sufficiently rich
notion of psychological continuity and connectedness that is not limited
to passive states like memories and experiences. In order to be relevant
to what matters, the four features, etc., agency-related continuities and
activities, narrative structures amongst psychological states, and a range
of concerns and biases need to be considered. The plausibility and scope
of psychological continuity theory hinges partly on the extent to which
it can subsume and reflect these different aspects of our mental lives.
As a result, we gain further resources to respond to the numerical
distinctness charge against the complex view: first, it is far from obvi-
ous that numerical identity, e.g., in the reidentification sense, is what
matters and should be expected to give reasons for concern. Second,
not all distinct things are equally unrelated and unintegrated with each
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other. Numerical distinctness amongst person stages is unproblematic if
the stages are related in the right way. A rich notion of psychological
continuity and connectedness can bind distinct person stages together
such that practical concerns stay intact.
Along the way, we also encountered challenges. In different ways, the
authors claimed that personal identity is constituted by particular activ-
ities of ours and/or components of psychological continuity. In Whiting’s
words, we make our future selves. The question arises whether the au-
thors intend—let alone are entitled—to regard the constituted sense of
personal identity as the numerical identity of persons over time, or as
the sameness or identity of a practically relevant unit that could in prin-
ciple come apart from the person that embodies it. Care and clarity are
needed to make precise the claim that personal identity is constituted by
special concern and other practical activities.
We can agree with Parfit that positions like these are, as he says,
liberating. There is a wide range of rationally permissible attitudes we
can adopt when making our future selves, constructing narratives, and
unifying with other person stages that occupy our body. Maybe we can
renounce personal desires entirely, as Parfit seems to have done when
leaving the glass tunnel. But reflection on the different ways in which the
characterized positions understand ourselves as defined through practical
activity brings out that these different attitudes towards our futures were
always available to us. The range of rationally permissible attitudes does
not open up because a deep further fact is absent. Endorsements of the
complex view are not necessary for an entitlement to shape personal
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Consider the following case by S. Shoemaker:
“suppose that medical science has developed a technique whereby
a surgeon can completely remove a person’s brain from his head,
examine or operate on it, and then put it back in his skull (re-
grafting the nerves, bloodvessels, and so forth) without causing
death or permanent injury [...]. One day, to begin our story, a
surgeon discovers that an assistant has made a horrible mistake.
Two men, a Mr. Brown and a Mr. Robinson, had been operated
on for brain tumors, and brain extractions had been performed on
both of them. At the end of the operations, however, the assistant
inadvertently put Brown’s brain in Robinson’s head, and Robin-
son’s brain in Brown’s head. One of these men immediately dies,
but the other, the one with Robinson’s body and Brown’s brain,
eventually regains consciousness. Let us call the latter ‘Brown-
son.’”282
Suppose that by virtue of having Brown’s brain, Brownson has Brown’s
psychology, character, personality, etc. Yet, Brownson has Robinson’s
body. Is Brownson Robinson, Brown, or neither? Following Olson, I call
intuitions on this and similar questions (see 4.1) transplant intuitions.
Transplant intuitions play important dialectical roles in debates on
personal identity. They are typically understood as supporting psycho-
logical continuity theory and opposing animalism.283 Olson even calls the
judgement that one survives as one’s psychological continuer the trans-
plant intuition.284 For some, transplant intuitions lead to a paradox:285
these intuitions are strong and imply the falsity of animalism, a view
which otherwise seems intriguing and superior to psychological continu-
ity theory. Animalists try to show that their view can resist transplant
intuitions.286 Others think transplant intuitions might appear to support
282S. Shoemaker 1963, p. 23.
283Parfit 2012, p. 10. Herdova 2016, pp. 315-6.
284Olson 1997, p. 44.
285Garrett 2003, pp. 41-44.
286Olson 1997, 2015a; Snowdon 2014.
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a psychological criterion, but in fact support a bodily criterion.287
In this chapter, I argue that there is a deep problem with transplant
intuitions that renders them almost useless for choosing between psycho-
logical continuity theory and animalism. I claim that all sides in this
debate have vastly overestimated the value and importance of transplant
intuitions. I accept that transplant intuitions can play a role in getting
our thinking about personal identity started. But for the purpose of
identifying the criterion for personal identity over time, they have severe
limitations.
I begin by describing transplant intuitions (4.1-4.2) before developing
the claim that transplant intuitions are bad candidates to track facts of
personal identity (4.3). I argue that this motivates a debunking argument
against beliefs based on transplant intuitions (4.4). In the final section, I
explain why this does not commit me to objectivism (4.5) or skepticism
(4.6) about personal identity.
4.1 Locke’s Prince And The Cobbler
I speak of ‘transplant intuitions’, but for my purposes, it is not essential
that they concern the literal transplant of an organ, e.g., the brain. The
feature I would like to focus on is the separation of psychological and
bodily continuity. In the Brownson case, this separation is brought about
by the brain transplant: it makes Brownson, who has Robinson’s body
(minus the brain), psychologically continuous with Brown. But there
are other cases which bring about a similar separation of psychological
287Williams 1970, pp. 179-180.
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and bodily continuity without involving literal transplants of organs. For
example, Locke regards the soul as the locus of a person’s consciousness,
and imagines:
“[S]hould the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness
of the princes past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler,
as soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would be
the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince’s
actions”288.
Locke’s quote allows for at least two readings. First, because everyone
sees that the prince is now in the cobbler-body, the person in that body
would be accountable for the prince’s action. Second, because the person
in the cobbler-body would now be accountable for the prince’s action, the
prince is in the cobbler-body.
In order to set the stage for what I think is problematic about in-
tuitions on cases of this kind, let me provide the following preliminary
comments on the two readings. If this case is supposed to inform us
about the right criterion of personal identity, then the first reading begs
the question. Where the prince goes is precisely what is in dispute. While
the reading might illustrate a certain criterion of personal identity and
invite us to consider who will be accountable for what, it goes no way to
answer a question about personal identity. The reading does not advance
our understanding of where the prince goes. In particular, it does not
give reasons to think that the prince will inhabit the cobbler-body.
The second reading does speak to the personal identity question. But
it is not obvious why the connection between the sentence parts should
hold. It presupposes that the norms of accountability track personal
288Locke 1690, Chapter XXVII, 15.
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identity. Apart from the fact that this presupposition might face coun-
terexamples, the reading by itself gives no justification (or no positive
reason) for accepting it. It is certainly not a basic piece of knowledge
that accountability requires personal identity.289 It is thus far from ob-
vious how we could move from the insight that norms of accountability
track a certain relation to the further claim that what is being tracked is
personal identity—not without already knowing the correct criterion of
personal identity.
Either the Prince and the Cobbler is merely an illustration of a theory
and not intended to convince us of what is being illustrated; or it is
supposed to convince us of a theory, but provides insufficient reason for
what it tries to establish.
4.2 Williams’ Cases
Williams describes two further scenarios which, like Locke’s Prince and
the Cobbler and S. Shoemaker’s Brownson, involve the separation of bod-
ily and psychological continuity. I paraphrase them as follows:290
Case 1: A machine transfers person A’s psychology to the body
of person B and vice versa.
Case 2: I will be tortured tomorrow. Before the torture, a doc-
tor will cause me to forget the announcement of torture and
everything I can now remember. I will even receive a differ-
ent set of memories, belonging to another person now living.
After the torture, I regain all my current memories, which
during the torture are stored in a different brain.
289As I will mention later, Locke disagrees and takes the link between personhood
and forensic unity to be analytic.
290Williams 1970, pp. 163, 167-8.
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Williams mentions a number of reasons for why Case 1 is plausibly
described as an instance of body-switching where A and B go with their
respective psychologies, i.e. the B -Body-person is A, and the A-body-
person is B.291 For example, if before the experiment, A decides that
after the experiment, the B -body-person shall receive $100,000, the B -
body-person will, upon receiving the money, remember and approve of
what she regards to be her choice.
Case 2 strikes Williams as terrible despite the psychological discon-
tinuity:
“Fear, surely, would still be the proper reaction: and not because
one did not know what was going to happen, but because in one
vital respect at least one did know what was going to happen—
torture, which one can indeed expect to happen to oneself, and to
be preceded by certain mental derangements as well.”292
Case 2 thus supports the view that I go (or rather stay) with my body.
This, Williams notes,293 is puzzling. He thinks that if A in Case 1
is to make a selfish choice, she will assign the money to the B -body-
person who has her psychology. In Case 2, psychological discontinuity
does nothing to alleviate my prospect of torture, but makes things worse:
“the predictions of the man in charge provide a double ground
of horror: at the prospect of torture, and at the prospect of the
change in character and in impressions of the past that will pre-
cede it.”294
Case 1 suggests a psychological criterion, while Case 2 suggests a bodily
criterion. But of course, Case 2 is just one side of Case 1. Our intuitions
are at odds.




4.2. WILLIAMS’ CASES 133
One might think that this seeming defect in our intuitions has a harm-
less explanation. Maybe the cases actually differ in important respects.
Williams mentions two options. First, only Case 2 is presented in first-
personal terms, while Case 1 is third-personal. Maybe first-personal
presentation causes fear when rational reflection would reveal that there
is no reason to be afraid. But Williams maintains that not the pronouns,
but acceptance of a principle like the following causes our reaction:
“my undergoing physical pain in the future is not excluded by
any psychological state I may be in at the time [...]. In particular,
what impressions I have about the past will not have any effect
on whether I undergo pain or not.”295
Secondly, only Case 1 mentions another individual to whom the relevant
psychology is transferred. Williams thinks this cannot matter either. He
considers a sequence from A becoming amnesiac to A switching psycholo-
gies with another individual B :
“(i) A is subjected to an operation which produces total amnesia;
(ii) amnesia is produced in A, and other interference leads to
certain changes in his character;
(iii) changes in his character are produced, and at the same time
certain illusory ‘memory’ beliefs are induced in him; these are of
a quite fictitious kind and do not fit the life of any actual person;
(iv) the same as (iii), except that both the character traits and the
‘memory’ impressions are designed to be appropriate to another
actual person, B ;
(v) the same as (iv), except that the result is produced by putting
the information into A from the brain of B, by a method which
leaves B the same as he was before;
(vi) the same happens to A as in (v), but B is not left the same,
since a similar operation is conducted in the reverse direction.”296
Williams argues that in (i), the A-body-person clearly remains A. It is A
who becomes and remains amnesiac. Moreover, nowhere in the sequence
295Ibid., p. 169.
296Ibid., p. 172.
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can a line be drawn such that the A-body-person ceases to be A —not
even at the end of the sequence, where A switches psychologies with B.
A is justified in fearing (i), and this fear can extend to (vi). The presence
and explicit mention of B (v) does not alter our judgement that the A-
body-person remains A throughout. If so, why should it matter that in
(vi), B (or rather: the B -body-person) receives A’s psychology?
Williams considers two strategies to resist the diagnosis that A per-
sists from (i) to (iv). First, conventions could settle how long A exists
in the sequence. Specifically, he considers the view that A survives as
the best candidate for being A. If so, (v) and (vi) need not be treated on
par. In (v), A is the A-body-person because this is the best A-candidate,
while in (vi), an even better candidate is around: A is the B -body-person.
Second, we might maintain that A indeed exists in (i) and has ceased to
exist in (vi), but that one or more steps in the sequence are borderline
cases where it is indeterminate whether A still exists.
Williams dismisses the conventionalist solution. Any conventionalist
person boundary between (i) and (vi) will fail to delimit A’s fear. For
example, if through convention we determine that the presence of some-
one else in (iv) makes all the difference, Williams thinks it is implausible
that A’s fear
“can be rationally diverted from the fate of the exactly similar
person in (vi) by his being told that someone would have a reason
in the latter situation which he would not have in the former for
deciding to call another person A.”297
In other words, a convention according to which at one point in the
sequence, A will cease to be the A-body-person will not prevent A’s fear
297Williams 1970, p. 178.
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from extending beyond the conventionalist person boundary.
The indeterminacy line leads to a related complication. A situation
where it is conceptually indeterminate whether I survive has “no com-
prehensible representation in my expectations and the emotions that go
with them.”298 If the situation involves me, I can engage in projective
imagination and determine what the experience would be like for me.
But if it is indeterminate whether the situation involves me,
“fear [...] seems neither appropriate, nor inappropriate, nor ap-
propriately equivocal. Relatedly, the subject has an incurable dif-
ficulty about how he may think about [situation] S. If he engages
in projective imaginative thinking (about how it will be for him),
he implicitly answers the necessarily unanswerable question; if he
thinks that he cannot engage in such thinking, it looks very much
as if he also answers it, though in the opposite direction. Perhaps
he must refrain from such thinking; but is he just refraining from
it, if it is incurably undecidable whether he can or cannot engage
in it?”299
In other words, it seems incredibly puzzling which attitude I should take
towards borderline cases. If I fear them, I regard the experiencer as
determinately me. If I don’t, I regard her as determinately not me. Both
attitudes conflict with the supposition of indeterminacy.
I will come back to these responses. For the moment, I note that
Williams concludes that neither the first-personal pronoun in Case 2
nor the mentioning of another individual in Case 1 explain why our
judgments seem in conflict.
“Thus, to sum up, it looks as though there are two presenta-
tions of the imagined experiment and the choice associated with
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Williams closes with some skepticism about our reactions to Case 1.
While they neatly support a psychological criterion,
“this neatness is basically artificial; it is the product of the will
of the experimenter to produce a situation which would naturally
elicit, with minimum hesitation, that description.”301
In close and equally possible scenarios, such as (v), or a situation where
two persons with A’s psychology are produced, our reactions would be
much different. We should thus take our judgements about Case 1 with
a grain of salt.
4.3 Transplant Intuitions Are Off-Track
I now formulate some worries about Williams’ evidence on the individ-
ual Cases, before articulating broader reservations about transplant in-
tuitions.
4.3.1 Quality Of Evidence: Case 1
On Case 1, Williams comments:
“the B -body-person will not only complain of the unpleasant
treatment as such, but will complain (since he has A’s memo-
ries) that that was not the outcome he chose, since he chose that
the B -body-person should be well treated; and since A made his
choice in selfish spirit, he may add that he precisely chose in that
way because he did not want the unpleasant things to happen
to him. The A-body-person meanwhile will express satisfaction
both at the receipt of the $100,000, and also at the fact that the
experimenter has chosen to act in the way that he, B, so wisely
chose. These facts make a strong case for saying that the exper-
iment has brought it about that B did in the outcome get what
he wanted and A did not. It is therefore a strong case for saying
301Williams 1970, p. 179.
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that the B -body-person really is A, and the A-body-person really
is B ; and therefore for saying that the process of the experiment
really is that of changing bodies. For the same reason it would
seem that A and B in our example really did choose wisely [...].
This seems to show that to care about what happens to me in the
future is not necessarily to care about what happens to this body
(the one I now have); and this in turn might be taken to show
that in some sense of Descartes’s obscure phrase, I and my body
are ‘really distinct’”302.
These comments, I argue, should strike us as puzzling. The A-body-
person will surely approve of the experimenter’s compliance with some-
one’s earlier choice to allocate the money to the A-body-person, who
surely gets what she wants now. And the B -body-person will certainly
complain about the experimenter’s failure to comply with someone’s ear-
lier choice to allocate the money to the B -body-person. But does the A-
body-person get something she chose earlier? And is the B -body-person
deprived of something she chose earlier?
If the A-body-person claims that it was her choice that the money
shall be allocated to the A-body-person, she would know something which
the thought experiment was supposed to establish: whether persons go
with their psychology, and decision-maker B is now the A-body-person.
The A-body-person would assume or presuppose that persons go with
their psychology. But by itself, this would not provide reasons to think
that this view is correct. Thus, it is mysterious how the fact that A but
not B got what she wanted gives a “strong case” that the B -body-person
is A, and the A-body-person is B. The quoted considerations are circular
in presupposing what was supposed to be shown.303
302Ibid., p. 164.
303Analogous remarks apply to Williams’ variants of Case 1. For example, suppose
A chooses money for the A-body-person, and B conversely. If the A-body-person
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Now, Williams mentions that A and B shall choose in a selfish man-
ner. Presumably, good selfish decisions maximize one’s own utility over
time. It is noted that both A and B “chose wisely” (but only B had her
choice implemented). This suggests that the decision-makers really suc-
ceeded in making a selfish choice, one that is good for them respectively.
Since their choices favoured other bodies, it seems that caring selfishly
for oneself is “not necessarily to care about [one’s] body”. Williams
thinks these points support his identity judgements. I am convinced
that we should have serious questions about the informativeness of the
claim that A’s and B ’s choices are both selfish and wise.
One reason for skepticism is described by Noonan. He argues that
the object of selfish concern will depend on the individuals’ views on
personal identity.304 The crucial step in Williams’ discussion is to move
from the A-body-person’s memory of making the choice, to declaring
it a choice “he, B,”305 made. Noonan distinguishes the choice the A-
body-person recalls having expressed from the choice the A-body-person
actually made. The A-body-person might seem to recall having made
B ’s choice. But she will regard B ’s choice as a choice she, the A-body-
receives the money,
“[i]t looks, then, as though the A-body-person had gotten what he
wanted, but not what he chose, while the B -body-person has gotten
what he chose, but not what he wanted. So once more, it looks as
though they are, respectively, B and A” (Williams 1970, p. 165).
But the question arises on what grounds the A-body-person should be entitled to say
that this distribution is not what she chose, and vice versa for the B -body-person?
Granted, the A-body-person has B ’s psychology, and thus memories of choosing dif-
ferently. But for whose choice this was, these memories only matter if a psychological
account is presupposed. And whether a psychological account is true is precisely what
we wanted to find out.
304Noonan 1989, section 10.3.
305Williams 1970, p. 164.
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person, actually made for herself only if she, the A-body-person, believes
in a psychological criterion of personal identity.
In contrast, suppose the B -body-person believes in a bodily rather
than a psychological criterion. Then she will regard it unfortunate that
the experimenter did not bring about the outcome she has a memory of
choosing. But importantly, she will regard this memory as illusory. It
was not her, the B -body-person, who made the choice she is recalling
now. Instead, it was (in her view) someone else: A.
This shows that who benefits from A and B ’s selfish choices depends
on who they think they will be. And which earlier choices the A- and B -
body-persons regard as their own depends on who they think they were.
For example, if B believes in a physical criterion, and the A-body-person
finds herself with B ’s psychology, then upon receiving the money, she will
be delighted, yet report, when confronted with what happened, that her
memory of making this choice is only apparent. In line with her belief in
the physical criterion, she will regard herself as identical to A. She will
say that she cannot remember her actual choice, but that the choice she
seems to remember benefits her now.306
According to an unpublished response by S. Shoemaker, Noonan’s
criticism falsely assumes that the individuals’ intuitions are a function of
their theory of personal identity. Whiting reports that for S. Shoemaker,
this
“‘completely misunderstands the method of cases’, which works
by trying to get one’s opponent first to see that her intuitions
306Maybe regardless of what the A- and B -body-person’s believe about personal
identity, they have a tendency to judge on the basis of thier apparent memories,
and hence in line with the psychological criterion. But if they subscribe to a bodily
criterion, Noonan says, they will suppress this tendency.
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about personal identity in particular cases conflict with her theory
about personal identity and then to modify either her theory or
her judgments about particular cases accordingly.”307
Within the S. Shoemaker picture, intuitions and theory can conflict. It
is up to the reasoning individual to resolve this conflict; she need not
stick to her theory.308 For example, even if A and the B -body-person
who inherits A’s psychology believe in a physical criterion, it is not the
case that the B -body-person necessarily suppresses her belief that her
choice to give A the money was respected. In light of the case, she might
well revise her picture of personal identity in favour of a psychological
criterion. Thus, if S. Shoemaker is right, the individuals’ responses are
informative, because they are not just functions of antecedent beliefs.
They are reflective judgements on how to harmonize antecedent theory
and occurrent intuitions.
Noonan receives support by Whiting, who argues convincingly that
S. Shoemaker’s point does not help. Firstly, when intuitions and theory
conflict, Noonan’s point stands that the individual can consistently dis-
miss intuitions that conflict with her theory. The individual’s judgement
then is contingent on her theory. Secondly, anytime intuitions cohere
with the individual’s theory, this might be so because they are informed
by the theory. The intuition then is merely a symptom of the individual’s
endorsement of the theory, but goes no way to support it. As a result, the
judgements on Case 1 are not neutral. We cannot rule out—in fact it is
likely—that they are merely expressive of an antecedent view of personal
identity. The problem is that
307Whiting 1999, fn. 12.
308Beck 1998, p. 215 makes a similar complaint against Noonan.
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“this tells us primarily what the subject thinks or feels about the
nature of personal identity and only secondarily (if at all) about
the nature of personal identity itself.”309
Indeed, Noonan concludes that the reports of the A- and B -body-persons
do nothing to support a psychological criterion:
“in so far as the A-body-person and the B-body-person are likely
[...] to make statements that appear to provide support for a
psychological criterion of personal identity, this will be so only if
they are themselves believers in such a criterion; any criterion of
personal identity, no matter how bizarre, could be given a similar
appearance of support by imagining what would be said by people
crazy enough to accept it.”310
He concedes that it might be correct to describe Case 1 as body-switching.
The point is that whether the individuals in the Case possess attitudes
that could support a psychological criterion depends on what they them-
selves believe about the topic. When the B -body-person approves of A’s
earlier choice, she is presupposing a psychological criterion. Williams’
discussion does not establish that we should make this presupposition.
I conclude that William’s remarks on who is who are circular in pre-
supposing a criterion rather than providing evidence for one. Moreover,
Noonan’s criticism brings out that without further discussion, these pre-
suppositions are arbitrary and unwarranted.
4.3.2 Quality Of Evidence: Case 2
Williams is not maximally explicit about one difference between the
Cases. Case 2 lacks an analogue to the distinction between A and the
309Whiting 1999, p. 446.
310Noonan 1989, p. 179.
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A-body-person in Case 1. While the first draws a terminological dis-
tinction between the pre-experimental, decision-making subjects A and
B, and the post-experimental individuals A-body-person and B -body-
person, the second case is described in terms of ‘I’ throughout. Not only
is the second case first-personal, it also uses the same pronoun across
the whole case. As mentioned, Williams thinks this does not matter;
regardless of the pronoun used in the presentation, we see that the pain
suffered through amnesia will be ours.
Against this, usage of the same pronoun throughout threatens to be
just as circular as William’s remarks on Case 1. Whether it will be me
who undergoes pain is precisely what is in dispute.311 It is thus unclear
why we should be entitled to think that I persist throughout the loss of
my psychology, and that we should use the same pronoun accordingly.
Case 2 is described in a question-begging way.
The principle referred to by Williams—that future pain is not ex-
cluded by any psychological state at that time—does not establish that
I persist throughout Case 2. Whiting puts the point as follows:312 psy-
chological continuity theorists can simply accept the principle; but they
are free to deny that the psychologically discontinuous pain-sufferer will
be me. This is compatible with the principle that if a future individual
is me, I can fear his pain regardless of his psychology.
This has implications for Williams’ sequence argument. First, we
should already have reservations about the starting point that A survives
in the first step, (i). It plainly begs the question against psychological
311Beck 2014, p. 191.
312Whiting 1999, p. 449.
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continuity theory.313 Second, for psychological continuity theorists, the
sequence is underdescribed. They can maintain that whether a line can
be drawn beyond which A ceases to exist depends on the exact psy-
chological changes under consideration. If (i) features only the loss of
memories of past experiences, then it is indeed plausible that A survives.
If the changes are more drastic and feature no psychological continuity
whatsoever, then we could deny that A survives even (ii) or (iii).314
I conclude that William’s discussion of Case 2 too begs the question,
this time in favour of a bodily criterion. To sum up, I think his remarks
suffer from the same shortcomings as the Prince and the Cobbler. Either
they are illustrations of a criterion of personal identity and not intended
to convince us of one.315 What I have deemed bad evidence then would
not be intended as such, but merely part of the illustration. Or the re-
marks are intended to convince us of a criterion, but do so on insufficient
and circular grounds.
4.3.3 Quasi-Attitudes
In his discussion of borderline cases, Williams mentions something that
might illuminate his comments on the Cases. He concedes that, unless
one is exceptionally egoistic, being concerned about an event does not
presuppose that oneself figures in it.
313Ibid., p. 452.
314Garrett 1998, pp. 54-5. For similar points, see Oyowe 2013, pp. 264-5, Herdova
2016, pp. 327-330, 335-6. Noonan 1989, pp. 185-6 argues for drawing the line no later
than between (iv) and (v).
315Williams then would have illustrated two different criteria—no wonder the pic-
tures diverge.
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“There are some emotions, however, which I will feel only if I will
be involved in [situation] S, and fear is an obvious example”316.
This suggests that the reason why Williams thinks that the individu-
als’ reports in the Cases are informative about personal identity is the
following. In Case 1, A fears that pain could be inflicted upon the B -
body-person. And fear can be felt by A only if she believes that she will
be affected. The same goes for the individual in Case 2 who fears the
pain of the amnesiac getting tortured. Moreover, in Case 1 the B -body-
person, upon receiving the money, will feel compensated for A’s wise
choice. Maybe this feeling of compensation can only be had for one’s
own investments and achievements. Thus, the B -body-person must re-
gard A as her. More generally, the individuals report attitudes that are
essentially egocentric, and this might help us to draw inferences about
personal identity.
Unfortunately, this does not make Williams’ comments on the Cases
more plausible. For one thing, Noonan and Whiting’s point stands: it
depends on the subject’s theory whom she regards as herself. Structur-
ing egocentric concerns around some past and future selves rather than
others indicates what the subject’s theory is, but does not justify it.
Moreover, there is a further problem for taking these attitudes as evi-
dence for personal identity. There could be attitudes that are exactly
like those Williams regards as essentially egocentric, except for that it is
not conceptually required that they are only structured around oneself.
Their possessors can structure them around others as well.
316Williams 1970, p. 175.
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These attitudes would be analogues to S. Shoemaker’s notion of quasi-
memory, i.e. first-personal knowledge of a past experience where the
knowing subject and the earlier, experiencing subject need not be identi-
cal.317 S. Shoemaker argues that in resembling memory, quasi-memories
are causally connected—in his terminology: M-connected, thereby estab-
lishing quasic-memories—to the experience that is being quasi-remember-
ed. M-connections
“create a presumption that he, that same person, experienced the
event or did the action, and therefore a presumption that the
quasic-memory was actually a memory.”
318
The presumption is suspended if the quasic-memory chain branches. S.
Shoemaker defends non-branching quasic-memory as the criterion for per-
sonal identity. If x and y are related in this way, they are related
“in essentially the same ways as people’s memories are generally
connected with their own past experiences and actions”319,
which entitles us to conclude that x is the same person as y, without
falling prey to Butler’s circularity objection (1.2.2).
Now, I am here merely availing myself of quasi-attitudes. I am not en-
dorsing the claim that non-branching quasi-memory constitutes personal
identity. My focus is not on assessing psychological continuity theory
or S. Shoemaker’s version thereof. I am concerned with one important
consideration in this assessment: transplant intuitions.320 And for them,
I am convinced that the availability of quasi-attitudes raises problems.
317S. Shoemaker 1970, p. 271.
318Ibid., p. 279.
319Ibid., p. 282.
320One quick reminder: as I use ‘transplant intuitions’, they need not refer a literal
transplant of an organ (4.1). It suffices that psychological and bodily continuity
become separated, for example as in the Prince and the Cobbler and the Cases.
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Earlier, I suggested that anticipation has a quasi-counterpart (2.5.2).
There is a sense in which I can regard a future self as me, as the object of
reflexive thought, while staying neutral on whether ‘we’ are numerically
identical.321 I also explained Brink’s notion of quasi-prudence, which re-
quires benefactor and beneficiary to be psychologically continuous but
not necessarily identical (3.1.2).
The implications for Williams are the following. Since these quasi-
notions are perfectly like their genuine counterparts—except for not being
necessarily about oneself—they are also phenomenologically alike. But if
the egocentric and the quasi-notions are qualitatively indistinguishable,
then the B -body-person’s seemings of compensation for A’s choice, or
my reported fear of the torture, show nothing. Of course, we could just
stipulate that the Cases involve genuinely egocentric attitudes. But then
the cases would not reveal anything new to us. Without the stipulation
of egocentricity, we are never entitled to believe that the individual in
question has the egocentric rather than the quasi-attitude. Seemings of
anticipation, fear, compensation can never actually license an inference
about numerical identity, because for all we know it could be a quasi-
attitude that is entirely neutral on this matter.
Proponents of either a physical or a bodily criterion can find this plau-
sible. Here are two examples. First, consider Parfit’s Teletransportation.
For an animalist, it is a case of non-identity, given that the biological
organism created on Mars is distinct from the organism destroyed on
Earth. But it is assumed that the operation secures and transfers the
Earthling’s psychology perfectly well. It should be easy for the Earthling
321Velleman 1996, especially sections 4-5.
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to projectively imagine the Martian’s experiences. The animalist will be
perfectly fine with allowing projective imagination to transcend person
boundaries.
Secondly, psychological continuity theorists accept that psychological
connectedness comes in degrees. There is personal identity if psycholog-
ical connections are sufficiently strong, and personal distinctness if the
connections are sufficiently weak. But in between, the degree of con-
nectedness neither suffices for identity nor is low enough for distinctness.
Whiting argues that it is not implausible that a subject quasi-projectively
imagines being in such a state, and comes to quasi-anticipate experi-
encing it.322 Here, the theory need not deny that this imagination is
egocentric: it can understand an egocentric or selfish attitude as being
structured around psychological continuers rather than identical future
selves. Moreover, in such a case the subject need not share Williams’
worries about a lack of “comprehensible representation in her expecta-
tions”323 and an “incurable difficulty about how [s]he may think about
[the situation]”324. Rather than feeling ambivalent concern for the future
self that comes close to regarding her as distinct and thus unsuitable for
egocentric attitudes, she could just attenuate her attitudes in accordance
with the degree of psychological connectedness she expects.
I conclude that setting aside the circularity worries, once we entertain
the possibility that the individuals in the Cases have quasi-attitudes,
their responses’ evidential value is diminished.
322Whiting 1999, pp. 456-7.
323Williams 1970, p. 175.
324Ibid., p. 177.
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4.3.4 Divergence
A further worry arises if we consider the judgements from the Cases taken
together. Suppose we can take the individuals’ attitudes as evidence
in the way Williams suggests. And suppose Williams is right that our
intuitions are not sidetracked by presentational features. The resulting
overall picture is worrisome. Our judgements diverge: Case 1 supports a
psychological criterion, while Case 2 suggests a physical criterion. And it
is mysterious which feature of the Cases could account for the divergence.
This “conundrum”325 suggests that our intuitions are a mess.
This threatens to render the position that transplant intuitions are
evidence for personal identity dubious. Williams believes both that trans-
plant intuitions are evidence and that they result in divergent judge-
ments. But one might think that the conjuncts of this compound propo-
sition undermine each other. If transplant intuitions are evidence for
personal identity, then they would lead to well-behaved judgements that
do not diverge and vary inexplicably. Moreover, if transplant intuitions
lead to divergent, contradictory judgements about the criterion for per-
sonal identity, then they seem to provide poor evidence on this matter.
This shows that acceptance of the compound proposition—transplant
intuitions are evidence for personal identity and quasi-prudential concern
gives rise to divergent judgements on the topic—amounts to an unstable
position. If one conjunct holds, the other cannot hold. One conjunct
needs to go.326
Since it is unclear how the diverging judgements could be explained
325Johnston 1987, p. 65.
326In 4.6, I discuss Sider’s and Eklund’s positions where this wouldn’t follow.
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away, I argue that we should see the diagnosis of divergence as a reductio.
Suppose that transplant intuitions provide evidence on personal identity.
As Williams’ discussion demonstrates, this leads to divergent intuitions,
supporting a psychological criterion in one case but a physical one in
another. Again, we grant Williams that in neither case are intuitions
sidetracked by irrelevant features such as presentation. In other words,
the proposed evidential basis leads to inexplicable, apparently unmoti-
vated divergence in our judgements. The starting assumption must be
false. Transplant intuitions do not provide evidence on personal identity.
I will now examine the implications of these results for the justified-
ness of beliefs that are based on transplant intuitions.
4.4 Debunking Transplant Intuitions
I am convinced that the foregoing sections motivate a debunking argu-
ment against transplant intuitions. Debunking arguments provide un-
dermining defeaters.327 Suppose I believe p on on the basis of being in
state M, e.g., having a belief, percept, or intuition. A defeater is a state
M* that, together with M, does not give me reason to believe p.328 A
defeater is undermining if the reason why M does not give me reason to
believe p is that M* suggests that the connection between M and belief
in p is faulty: p could be false and we would still be in state M.
Debunking arguments have the following components: a causal premise
according to which a belief-forming method causes a subject to believe
p, an epistemic premise according to which the method is not truth-
327Kahane 2011, pp. 104-6.
328For these definitions, see Pollock and Cruz 1986, pp. 195-7.
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tracking, and the conclusion that the subject is not justified in believing
p on the basis of the method. p could be false, but the subject would still
believe it. The undermining defeater here is the second-order belief that
belief in p is the result of a non-truth-tracking belief-forming process.
I am suggesting the following debunking argument (illustrated on the
Prince and the Cobbler):
Causal premise: Our belief that the prince goes where his soul/body
goes is explained by transplant intuitions.
Epistemic premise: Transplant intuitions are off-track, i.e. do
not reliably track truth.
Therefore,
Conclusion: Our belief that the prince goes where his soul/body
goes is unjustified.
Note that this argument applies not just to those transplant intuitions
that seem to support psychological continuity theory, such as in the
Prince and the Cobbler and William’s Case 1. It equally applies to en-
dorsements of bodily criteria on the basis of transplant intuitions, such
as in Case 2.
With the causal premise, I am not assuming that transplant intuitions
are the only possible reason for believing, e.g., that the prince goes where
his soul goes. I am merely assuming that in the context of the case, it is
these intuitions that cause the belief. In the Prince and the Cobbler, the
judgement partly rests on beliefs about who is accountable for what.
Reflections on Locke and Williams revealed that there is something
wrong with transplant intuitions. They fail to provide non-circular rea-
sons for the respective belief. They also support different criteria in
different cases, without there being features in the cases that could plau-
sibly explain this divergence. They take the subject’s future- and past-
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directed attitudes, which feed into her transplant intuitions, as evidence
for personal identity. Once we realize that these attitudes could be of
the quasi-variety and extend to distinct persons without differing phe-
nomenologically, it becomes apparent that they cannot play this evi-
dential role. We could have these attitudes in the absence of personal
identity. A subject’s report of a distinctive set of attitudes towards a
past or future subject thus does not establish that these subjects are nu-
merically identical. The transplant intuitions that are shaped by these
attitudes are not tracking truths about personal identity.
We should thus conclude that our endorsement of a theory of personal
identity on the basis of transplant intuitions is unjustified. Note that this
result is compatible with justified endorsements on other grounds – con-
siderations that do not depend on transplant intuitions. Moreover, the
result is compatible with transplant intuitions introducing positions into
a debate, and thereby setting the stage for further argument and post-
hoc rationalization.329 That is, these intuitions can generate hypotheses
we go on to debate in light of further reasons. But they go no way to
justify these hypotheses.
Transplant intuitions are unhelpful for taking a stance in the debate
between psychological and physical criteria. This does not mean that ei-
ther side has been refuted, only that neither can be supported by means
of transplant intuitions. As a consequence, congruence with transplant
intuitions is not as such a point in favour of a theory of personal identity.
And if a theory of personal identity seems in tension with transplant intu-
itions, this is not as such a reason to discredit the theory. Considerations
329Kahane 2011, p. 106.
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of this kind are neutral with regards to justification.
4.5 Debunking And Objectivism About Per-
sonal Identity
I have to discuss a seeming presupposition of the foregoing. Olson draws
a distinction between personal identity and being the same person. Per-
sonal identity is the numerical identity of persons over time. Being the
same person refers to unity for moral or practical purposes. One example
for spelling out the latter is:
“x is at time t the same person as y is at a later time t* if and
only if x ought to be prudentially concerned, at t, for y ’s well-
being at t* ; and y is responsible, at t*, for what x does at t ; and
it is natural and right at t* to treat y as if she were x.”330
Olson points out that being the same person need not coincide with per-
sonal identity. For one thing, fission shows that the relations differ in for-
mal properties:331 being the same person seems intransitive because each
fission product could stand in this relation to its predecessor. Moreover,
the relation captures a social role an individual occupies. One and the
same role can be occupied by distinct individuals, e.g., replicas could be
related by being the same person but not personal identity. In terms of
Williams’ Case 1, it might well be that the B -body person is the same
person as A. But it is an open question whether they are numerically
identical. A’s social role before the operation could be played by a nu-
merically distinct person afterwards. And Case 2 could be seen as an
330Olson 1997, p. 66.
331Ibid., pp. 68-9.
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example where someone remains numerically identical but fails to be the
same person as the tortured individual.332
Olson’s discussion has at least two important aspects: first, the dis-
tinction between personal identity and sameness for practical purposes;
second, the claim that the former obtains independently of the latter. We
can appreciate Olson’s distinction without endorsing the independence
claim. In fact, Eklund draws a very similar distinction (with different
terminology) and goes on to call it the “na¨ıve (in the sense of simple
and intuitive) view”333 that the two distinguished topics are intimately
connected: personal identity is determined by the nature of the entities
at the centre of the practical concerns figuring in being the same person,
and vice versa.
One direction of this “na¨ıve” dependence relation can be expressed
through the moral relevance assumption about persons:334 it is part of
our conception of personhood that those entities around which we should
structure our prudential and moral concerns are the persons. Dummett
writes:
“We can easily imagine people who use different criteria from
ours [...]. Precisely what would make the criteria they used cri-
teria for personal identity would lie in their attaching the same
consequences, in regard to responsibility, motivation, etc., to their
statements of personal identity as we do to ours.”335
As Eklund explains, if one accepts the moral relevance assumption, being
the same person wouldn’t be independent and irrelevant, but of crucial
332Olson acknowledges that animalism might make personal identity seem less im-
portant for practical purposes; e.g., ibid., ch. 3, sect. VIII; 2013, p. 82; forthcoming,
section 6.
333Eklund 2004, p. 489.
334Ibid., p. 503.
335Dummett 1973, p. 358.
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importance for giving an account of personal identity.336 And it would
be a competitive disadvantage of Olson’s view if the concerns expressed
through transplant intuitions track psychologies rather than human or-
ganisms.337
Now, if we deny Olson’s claim that personal identity is independent
from the practical concerns mentioned in being the same person,338 then it
is not obvious anymore that transplant intuitions are bad truth-trackers.
For example, Locke takes it to be analytic that personhood is a forensic
concept which appropriates actions and their merits.339 The prince is the
same person as the cobbler’s body with the prince’s soul if we can hold
the latter responsible for actions of the former. If this conditional holds,
surely the intuition that the cobbler with the prince’s consciousness would
indeed be responsible for the prince’s actions is high-quality evidence for
the claim that the prince is the cobbler, and thus that persons go where
their consciousness goes.
Whiting suggests that denying the independence thesis would also
significantly improve the informativeness340 of Williams’ cases. If
336Eklund 2004, pp. 504-5. See, e.g, Baker: “it is deeply wrong to divorce identity
from moral responsibility, or from what we care about” (2008, p. 13).
337In defense of Olson, I respond that his view concerns the ontological question
of which person candidates exist, not the semantic question of what ‘person’ is true
of. It might be that moral relevance is built into the semantics of ‘person’. However,
in this picture Olson’s project of settling which potential referents for ‘person’ there
are would come under pressure only if moral considerations (to which psychological
continuity might seem more relevant than sameness of organism) affects what exists.
338For example, D. Shoemaker suggests that being the same person could make
essential reference to personal identity. The plausibility of a theory of the latter could
then “increase or decrease depending on the extent to which it fits with our practical
concerns” (2016, p. 316).
339Pace Eklund 2004, pp. 495-6, I read Locke as an instance of, not a counterex-
ample to, the “na¨ıve” view.
340However, Whiting calls it “William’s dilemma” (1999, p. 460) that the indepen-
dence thesis is essential to other parts of his discussion: when dismissing the idea
that there are borderline cases between (i) and (vi), he seems to suppose that it is a
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“part of what makes some future self his future self is the fact that
he now has certain attitudes toward it, then his attitudes toward
that future self would not be mere evidence that he regards that
self as his own: these attitudes might, in suitable circumstances,
be partly constitutive of its being his future self. In that case,
these attitudes could function directly as evidence about which
future selves are in fact his own.”341
A similar point is often made with regards to evolutionary debunking
arguments in metaethics. According to these arguments, we hold our
current moral beliefs partly because they proved to be adaptive in the
course of evolution. However, evolutionary selection proceeds irrespective
of moral truth. Our moral beliefs thus seem unjustified. Kahane argues
that this worry is pressing only for objectivism about moral values:
“anti-objectivist views claim that our ultimate evaluative concerns
are the source of values; they are not themselves answerable to
any independent evaluative facts. But if there is no attitude-
independent truth for attitudes to track, how could it make sense
to worry whether these attitudes have their distal origins in a
truth-tracking process?”342
If the moral facts depend on us, why should we entertain the epistemic
premise that evolution has selected moral beliefs regardless of their truth?
For our purposes, the analogous point raised by Whiting is: if personal
identity depends on us, why should we suppose that the attitudes cap-
tured in transplant intuitions give rise to beliefs regardless of their truth?
Presumably, attitudes of concern, compensation, and moral responsibil-
ity would be good guides to personal identity.
mistake to have (quasi-)egocentric concern for one’s psychological continuer. Whiting
thinks Williams must hold that such attitudes do not fit independent facts. To make
this claim, Williams needs the independence thesis.
341Ibid., p. 446.
342Kahane 2011, p. 112.
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If debunking arguments would presuppose objectivism about the tar-
get domain, then my debunking argument could only be launched against
transplant intuitions when employed to support objectivist, i.e. response-
independent accounts of personal identity. While there are many such
positions,343 this would still narrow down the scope of the argument.344
I deny that endorsing anti-objectivism suffices to escape the respective
debunking argument. The authors seem to think that
Epistemic premise. X is an off-track process.
is not true if what is being tracked depends on the individual(s) doing the
tracking. But of course, even if anti-objectivism is presupposed, worries
about truth-tracking can arise. If I believe p based on flipping a coin, my
belief can be debunked regardless of whether or not objectivism about
p-matters is presupposed.345
If anti-objectivism about the moral domain is presupposed, truth-
tracking worries about adaptive beliefs can arise. Evolution gives rise
to all kinds of attitudes.346 Presumably, even if moral matters depend
on us, evolution will have selected some attitudes that accord with anti-
objectivist moral facts, and others that conflict with them. It is thus
a fair question whether a particular attitude we possess partly due to
343Objectivism seems to be endorsed, e.g., in S. Shoemaker 1984, esp. p. 101, Olson
1997, 2007, Merricks 2001b, Snowdon 2014.
344For more or less explicitly endorsements of anti-objectivism, cf. Nozick 1981,
p. 69, Unger 1990, p. 66, Parfit 1995, p. 25, Sider 2001a, Braddon-Mitchell and Miller
2004, Miller 2013, Kovacs 2016.
345For reasons like this, Joyce (2016, pp. 145-6) now denies that debunking argu-
ments presuppose objectivism.
346Cf. Street 2006, p. 153: “each of us starts out with a vast and complicated set of
evaluative attitudes”. She is clear that judgements on anti-objectivist matters can be
mistaken, e.g., if they are not made in reflective equilibrium, or would not “withstand
scrutiny from the standpoint of our other evaluative judgments” (ibid., p. 154).
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selective pressures is in line with anti-objectivist norms and values. We
cannot just take mere possession of the attitude as indicative of moral
truths.
Similarly, even if we follow Whiting in taking personal identity to de-
pend on concerns figuring in being the same person, truth-tracking wor-
ries about transplant intuitions can arise.347 Our person-related practices
fail to determinately track either psychological or bodily continuity. D.
Shoemaker points out that a whole range of concerns plausibly figure in
being the same person: prudential concern, moral responsibility, social
treatment, compensation, anticipation, emotional patterns, etc.348 He
argues that they are much less unified than commonly suggested. In par-
ticular, for each of them, different continuities matter in different ways.
In all cases, it’s ownership of an experience, action, or trait that matters
for the practice. But ownership comes apart from identity and depends
on different kinds of continuities.
Social treatment might appear to presuppose psychological continu-
ity.349 Some would surely treat the cobbler with the prince’s soul as the
prince. On the other hand, maybe the cobbler could get arrested for
impersonating a prince! In the spirit of Case 2, D. Shoemaker highlights
contexts in which social treatment tracks not psychological but biological
continuity.350 For example, parental love for one’s child is independent
347For example, Johnston thinks that personal identity is a response-dependent con-
cept (1989; 1993), rejects projectivism, i.e., the view that judgements about personal
identity straightforwardly determine facts about personal identity (1993, p. 108), and
believes that subjects make projectivist errors when thinking about personal identity
(1987, pp. 69-70).
348D. Shoemaker 2016, p. 317.
349For example Johnston 1987, p. 82.
350See also Snowdon 2014, pp. 134-5.
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of its psychology. And when illness leads to psychological discontinuity,
the ill individual retains her property and remains in family relations.
Other examples relate to moral responsibility and compensation. It
is a platitude that I can only be responsible for my own actions, and be
compensated only for a burden I myself carried. It might thus appear
that in order to be responsible for an action, I must be identical with its
agent, and in order to be compensated, I must be identical to the burden-
carrier, presumably by virtue of being psychologically connected to him.
But D. Shoemaker denies this.351 What matters is my ownership of the
action or burden, and my duplicate could own my past actions or burdens
without being identical to me. Although one might think that psycho-
logical continuity extends ownership of actions or burdens across time, it
is not sufficient: severe psychological transformations, e.g., drifting into
a fugue state, are compatible with psychological continuity if they unfold
gradually, yet fall short of securing ownership of action. Neither is psy-
chological continuity necessary: sudden psychological discontinuity, e.g.,
from a head-trauma, can leave ownership of action unaffected.
D. Shoemaker discusses further examples, and in conclusion discards
the claim “our practical concerns constitute a unified set that is grounded
on psychological continuity”352 or some other relation in which personal
identity might consist. When thinking about being the same person,
“identity is the reddest of herrings.”353
According to D. Shoemaker, different attitudes require different con-
tinuity relations to be reasonable. But even worse, we might think that
351D. Shoemaker 2016, pp. 318-9.
352Ibid., p. 317.
353Ibid., p. 323.
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one and the same attitude requires different continuity relations, depend-
ing on its object. Whiting invites us to reflect on a variation of Case 2
in which I, instead of getting tortured, get jilted by my lover.354 Suppose
that while I dread pain in Case 2, I report indifference about my jilting
lover since at the moment of jilting, all my memories and dispositions
are gone.
First, Whiting shows how this report can be given two plausible but
contradictory explanations. One is that I identify with my psychological
continuer and do not care about whether my current lover remains with
my body once my psychology is gone. Or I identify with my physical con-
tinuer while maintaining that whether something, such as the presence
of my lover, is good for me depends on my psychological states at that
time. By itself, the report does not clearly favour either explanation.
Second, the example demonstrates that whether concern goes with a
physical or psychological criterion
“might differ if we were considering different sorts of pains and
rewards. [...] [S]uch attitudes are not brute data but highly con-
tingent phenomena sensitive to a wide range of individual and
cultural factors”355.
Amongst others, the insight that plugging in different pains and rewards
into one and the same case suggests different criteria of personal iden-
tity leaves us wondering which sorts of pains and rewards are the right
indicators for the criterion of personal identity.
What matters for my purposes is that if we had antecedently thought
that these practices inform us about personal identity, for example by
354Whiting 1999, p. 448.
355Ibid.
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sympathizing with the anti-objectivist claim that personal identity de-
pends on us, then the problem arises that these practices point in very
different directions. Even if personal identity depends on us, it is a mis-
take to think that our transplant intuitions which reflect our attitudes
and concerns—accountability in the Prince and the Cobbler, compensa-
tion, self-referential concern, and anticipation of pains and rewards in
Williams’ Cases—could be guides to personal identity. Whiting is mis-
taken to think that rejecting the independence thesis according to which
personal identity obtains independently of subjects’ concerns helps to
address the charges developed in (4.3).
4.6 Debunking And Skepticism About Per-
sonal Identity
One worry about debunking arguments is that a successful local instance
can explode into a global debunking argument that undermines way too
many beliefs. For example, suppose that there is a successful evolutionary
debunking argument against the belief that we are justified in extending
altruistic attitudes only to persons in our vicinity.356 Suppose we grant
the debunker that this belief has its causal origin in a non-truth-tracking
process of evolutionary selection. The problem is that the very same
worry seems to apply to any alternative belief, e.g., that self-interest or
unrestricted altruism are justified. Presumably, these beliefs too would
have the evolutionary history which the intial, local debunking argument
took as off-track. In the worst case, we arrive at global evaluative skepti-
356Greene 2008, p. 76, as quoted by Kahane 2011, p. 113.
4.6. DEBUNKING AND SKEPTICISM 161
cism,357 or even skepticism beyond the evaluative domain.358 Assuming
my local debunking argument against transplant intuitions succeeds, one
might thus wonder whether it affects the justifiedness of all kinds of con-
siderations about personal identity.
This worry can be resisted. Not all considerations about the topic
result from transplant intuitions. Some of them are independent of the
practical concerns that contaminate Locke and Williams’ judgements.
For example, one might prefer one criterion of personal identity over
another on the basis of purely methodological considerations like parsi-
mony, 359 i.e. because it does not postulate the existence of more entities
than we need for pursuing the explanatory aims of our metaphysics. Or
we might take the idea that we trace people quite well in everyday life
as a starting point, and maintain that only those accounts of personal
identity are eligible that describe ourselves as entities whose persistence
we are well-adapted to trace.360 The debunking argument is silent about
the justifiedness of beliefs that result from methods other than transplant
intuitions. This would include beliefs that might be brought to our at-
tention through a transplant case, but subsequently receive justifications
that are independent from practical concerns. The point of my discussion
in (4.3) is that establishing such results requires much more argument by
users of transplant intuitions.
357Ibid., pp. 113-7 It is precisely the prospect of evaluative skepticism that motivates
Street (2006, p. 141) to endorse anti-objectivism. Joyce (2000, p. 730) agrees with
the dialectic, but opts for endorsing scepticism at least about moral beliefs, while also
recommending that we retain moral norms as a useful fiction.
358For an overview, see Wielenberg 2016, section 6.
359For example Olson 2007, p. 36, 2015b, versus Parfit 2012.
360Johnston 1987, pp. 63, 77. My challenge is that we would need to ensure that
it is indeed people, not practical concerns, that we are tracing well in everyday life.
Moreover, I disagree with Johnston that his human beings fit his tracing desideratum.
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My debunking argument actually helps to respond to a form of pes-
simism about criteria of personal identity. First, Sider argues that there
is no fact of the matter whether the criterion is bodily or psychologi-
cal.361 He argues that talk about personal identity is indeterminate in
meaning among the two views. There is no fact of the matter which one
is correct. In a reasonably rich ontology, candidate referents for either
criterion exist, but they are all equally eligible for being referents, e.g.,
by virtue of being equally natural. What Sider takes Williams to show is
that our talk does not determinately pick out one candidate meaning. In
Case 1, psychological persisters seem to be the referents, whereas it’s a
bodily persister in Case 2. The same inconstancy is frequent in ordinary
talk about persons.
“A natural explanation is that ordinary thought contains two con-
cepts of persisting persons, each responsible for a separate set of
intuitions, neither of which is our canonical conception to the
exclusion of the other.”362
Secondly, Eklund argues personal identity is an incoherent concept. He
argues that conceptual competence involves a disposition to accept sen-
tences that are constitutive of meaning of the expression or concept. In
the case of personal identity, the sentences constitutive of meaning are
jointly inconsistent. He motivates this picture by means of fission. Talk
of personal identity has as a meaning presupposition that not more than
one person at a time is continuous with someone at another time. If, as
in fission, this presupposition is not satisfied, talk about personal iden-
tity breaks down by yielding inconsistent verdicts: continuity holds, so
361Sider 2001a.
362Ibid., p. 197.
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there must be personal identity; yet asserting personal identity violates
the transitivity of identity.363 Eklund suggests that Williams’ cases reveal
a further feature of our semantic competence: personal identity consists
in either psychological or physical continuity.364 Eklund is a little un-
clear on what he thinks the relevant meaning presupposition is: that at
most one person at a time bears either of the continuities to someone
at another time, or that these continuities do not come apart, or both.
Either way, Williams’ Cases violate these presuppositions, and thus lead
to perplexity.365
But according to both Sider and Eklund, nothing goes wrong when
we employ transplant intuitions in Williams’ cases. In fact, everything is
going as it should: the intuitions reveal a feature of our talk or concept.
The authors merely differ on the exact feature that is being revealed:
Sider says that the meaning of talk about personal identity is to some
extent indeterminate, whereas Eklund thinks the concept is incoherent.
It is worth highlighting that these claims concern the meaning, not the
truth values of statements.366 It might be that Sider-Eklund-claims can
exist alongside views where the facts to which terms and concepts refer,
apply, or disapply determinately privilege on criterion of there other.
My debunking argument cautions against Sider-Eklund-style pictures.
Transplant intuitions are bad evidence, and thus fail to justify personal
identity judgements. The intuitions give no non-circular reasons to favour
363Eklund 2002, pp. 474-5.
364We might deny this with Sider: “[T]here are certain negative intuitions as well.
[...] [M]y intuitions say not only that [in Case 2] A is the A-body-person, but also
that A is not the B -body-person afterwards” (2001a, p. 200).
365Eklund 2002, pp. 480-1.
366Ibid., p. 481.
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one description over the other, and they are contaminated with practical
concerns whose relevance to the topic is far from obvious or straightfor-
ward. If so, we cannot take features of this data as indicative of features
of our talk or concept. The diagnoses of indeterminacy and inconsis-
tency might be important, surprising, and correct. But we need more
than transplant intuitions to support them.
4.7 Conclusion
Transplant intuitions motivate judgements on where one goes if one’s
psychology and body come apart. The best way of making sense of
Williams-style diagnoses is that in such cases, the judgements take as
evidence the structures of our person-related practices. I pointed at sev-
eral problems with transplant intuitions. As is apparent in the Prince
and the Cobbler, we can understand transplant intuitions either as offer-
ing illustrations of a theory or as attempts to convince us of a theory.
In the former case, their dialectic aspirations are minimal. In the latter,
they are unimpressive as they appear to provide only circular evidence,
seem entirely uninformative if quasi-attitudes are possible, and are bad
truth-trackers by virtue of diverging inexplicably across cases. Beliefs
adopted on the basis of transplant intuitions thus can be debunked. This
diagnosis is not limited to objectivism about personal identity. Neither
does it motivate skepticism, just the demand to look for better evidence.
I close by highlighting three further implications. First, my findings
deflate the relevance of empirical evidence on personal identity judge-
ments when continuities come apart. For example, Nichols and Bruno
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find that
“[i]ntuitions favoring a psychological continuity approach to per-
sonal identity are resilient across significant changes in the cases.
[...] [I]ntuitions [at odds with psychological approaches] don’t
seem to stand to scrutiny when examined in a broader and ag-
gregative context.”367
In one sense, this fits Williams’ claims: presentational features do not
seem causally responsible for our judgements. In another sense, there is
a tension with Williams’ diagnosis of divergence: across the cases, intu-
itions favouring a psychological criterion are more resilient. Transplant
intuitions thus seem less messy than Williams made it seem. However,
if I am right, empirical evidence suggesting that transplant intuitions
favour one theory over the other does not suffice to rescue their eviden-
tial value. Bad evidence does not get better by pointing resiliently in one
direction.368
Second, Williams is the hallmark discussion for the worrisome, para-
doxical content of our intuitions about personal identity. Our judgements
shift frequently, leaning towards physical criteria in one case and psycho-
logical ones in the other—hence the Sider-Eklund diagnoses. Given the
foregoing, we can indeed acknowledge that transplant intuitions as evi-
dence about personal identity are in bad state, but not for the reasons
standardly assumed. What makes them problematic is more than mere
divergence and indecisiveness; it is their circularity and contamination
with practical concerns pertaining to a different topic. Once proper evi-
dence is taken into account, claims about indeterminacy or incoherence
367Nichols and Bruno 2010, p. 307.
368Pace Nichols and Bruno, I myself have found Williams’ divergent intuitions to
be reproducible in seminar rooms with remarkable reliability. But as argued in the
foregoing, this is besides the point.
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might still be substantiated. For example, my points do not speak to
Eklund’s thesis that reflections on fission establish the incoherence of
personal identity. But my discussion highlights the need to separate
good from bad reasons for endorsing Sider-Eklund claims. Pointing at
Williams’ Cases is not enough.
Finally, animalists are right that transplant intuitions do not threaten
their view. But I have provided new reasons for why this is so. It is not
merely because animalism is consistent with transplant intuitions,369 or
intuitions are unclear, and/or that it is not unreasonable to judge that
we actually go with our bodies rather than our psychologies.370 Neither is
there a need to argue that transplant scenarios are impossible.371 Instead,
transplant intuitions fail to support or justify hypotheses about personal
identity, whether animalist or not. Nothing in my dismissal suggests
that animalism is true, and does not face problems of its own. All I have
argued is that transplant intuitions do not bring it or any other position
under pressure. Scrutiny of the epistemic status of intuitions in favour of
a theory can prevent us from endorsing the theory on the wrong grounds,
and from rejecting others for no good reason.
369Olson 1997, ch. 3, Madden 2016.
370Snowdon 2014, pp. 209-10, 223, 236-7.
371Williams 1956, pp. 242-4, Van Inwagen 1997.
Chapter 5
Against The Complex Versus
Simple Distinction
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As observers and disputants, we face choices about the theoretical tools
by means of which we think about a given subject.372 Sometimes, new
concepts or distinctions advance discussion greatly. But there are other
times when utilization of a concept or distinction blurs disputes or con-
fuses us. I will now argue that the distinction between the complex and
the simple view of personal identity is of this kind.
Debates on personal identity are often framed in terms of this dis-
tinction, and the literature acknowledges clear paradigm cases of either
side.373 I examine three proposals on what the difference between the
complex and the simple view is: Parfit’s introduction of the terms (5.1),
Gasser and Stefan’s definition (5.2), and Noonan’s recent proposal (5.3).
I argue that given their shortcomings, the complex versus simple distinc-
tion fails to serve two important purposes of having a given distinction in
our discourse: the facilitation of classification and endorsement of posi-
tions (5.4). We thus should not frame discourses in terms of the complex
versus simple distinction.
The issue of delineation is pressing. One question is whether we
should take the simple view seriously, especially because it is less fre-
quently defended. Presumably, one minimum requirement is that a char-
acterization of the view is available, ideally in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions374. Furthermore, it should be a characterization
that classifies particular positions that are usually seen as paradigmatic
372The following material appears in Hummel 2017. Many thanks to two anonymous
referees for helpful comments.
373Parfit 1982, p. 227. Garrett 2006, p. 122. Noonan 2011, p. 72.
374Compare Sider’s criticism (2001b, pp. 63-8) that the credibility of Three-
Dimensionalism is diminished because it can only be defined in negative terms, as
opposing Four-Dimensionalism.
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instances of the view as instances of the view. However, these are chal-
lenges not only for the simple view. After all, a further question is how
informative the complex view is. If it opposes a view that cannot be
clearly stated, the complex view would run the risk of being trivial or
uninteresting rather than illuminating.
Throughout this text, I use the term ‘view’ as denoting what unites a
family of positions, where a ‘position’ is a particular instance of a view.
For example, S. Shoemaker’s position is an instance of the complex view.
5.1 Parfit’s Definitions
One straightforward way to investigate the difference between the com-
plex and the simple view is to look in the place where the distinction is
drawn for the first time.
5.1.1 Introduction of Complex/Simple And Reductio-
nism/Non-Reductionism
Parfit defines:
“According to the Complex View, the fact of personal identity
over time just consists in the holding of certain other facts. It
consists in various kinds of psychological continuity, of memory,
character, intention, and the like, which in turn rest upon bod-
ily continuity. According to the Simple View, personal identity
does not just consist in these continuities, but is a quite separate
‘further fact.’”375
In subsequent writings, Parfit drops the terms ‘complex’ and ‘simple’
without further announcement, and distinguishes reductionism from non-
375Parfit 1982, p. 227.
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reductionism. Reductionists believe
“(1) that the fact of a person’s identity over time just consists in
the holding of certain more particular facts, and
(2) that these facts can be described without either presupposing
the identity of this person, or explicitly claiming that the experi-
ences in this person’s life are had by this person, or even explicitly
claiming that this person exists. These facts can be described in
an impersonal way.”376
In contrast,
“[o]ur view is Non-Reductionist if we reject both of the two Re-
ductionist claims.”377
This rejection can happen in one of the following ways:378 by claiming
that persons are
• separately existing entities, distinct from brains, bodies and expe-
riences, for example Cartesian egos379;
• not separately existing entities, yet their existence is a further fact
which does not just consist in physical and/or psychological conti-
nuity.
5.1.2 The Relation Between Complex/Simple And
Reductionism/Non-reductionism
The relation between the complex view and reductionism on the one
hand, and between the simple view and non-reductionism on the other,
is not entirely clear. Parfit says that ‘complex’ and ‘simple’ are
376Parfit 1984, p. 210. He goes on to discuss several ways to enrich reductionism.
See his clauses (3)-(9) in ibid., pp. 211-2.
377Ibid., p. 210.
378Ibid.
379One example is the Featureless Cartesian View. Here, the separate entity is
unconnected to any observable facts; ibid., p. 228.
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“shorter labels for the two main views [reductionism and non-
reductionism; P.H.],”380
but also explains:
“The central claims [my emphasis] of the reductionist tradition I
shall call the Complex View, those of the non-reductionist tradi-
tion the Simple View.”
This leads some interpreters to regard the complex view and reduction-
ism as equivalent.381 Others think the complex view is a forerunner to
reductionism.382 Others think reductionism is a more specific doctrine
than the complex view383 because of clause (2)384: the complex view is
neutral on whether the more particular facts can be described without
mentioning persons; Parfit’s reductionism explicitly claims this.
So much seems clear: even though Parfit did not continue to talk in
these terms, acceptance of the complex view is what unites the differ-
ent reductionist positions, and the same goes for the simple view and
non-reductionism. But he is not explicit on how much overlap there is
between the complex view and reductionism and the simple view and non-
reductionism respectively, for example whether they share their opinions
solely on (1) or on (2) as well. For what follows, the answer does not
really matter.
380Parfit 1982, p. 227.
381Wasserman 2012, Fn. 1.
382Zimmerman 2012, p. 206.
383Noonan 1989, Ch. 5.6.
384Henceforth, I use italicized (1) and (2) to refer to Parfit’s two conditions quoted
above (1984, p. 210).
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5.1.3 Parfit And Misclassifications
Parfit mentions paradigm cases of either side:385 Hume, Locke, Lewis
and Parfit himself accept the complex view, Butler, Reid, Chisholm and
Swinburne endorse the simple view.
This, I argue, should strike us as puzzling. The supposed paradigm
cases of simplicity do not satisfy Parfit’s definition. While Butler,386
Reid,387 and Swinburne388 are notoriously dismissive of positive stories
about personal identity, they do operate against the backdrop of a Carte-
sian or Leibnizian metaphysics, and so I agree with Olson389 and dis-
agree with Duncan390 that nothing in their works precludes acceptance
of claims like the following:
• person x at t is the same person as y at t* iff x and y have the
same ego or soul;391
• person x at t is the same person as y at t* iff x is a monad, y is a
monad, and x is the same monad as y.392
If so, they satisfy (1): a person’s identity over time consists in more
particular facts, namely that a certain soul or ego exists at the relevant
times.
In Reid’s case, there are two reasons why one might deny that (1)
is satisfied. Firstly, Reid claims that persons are identical to monads,
385Parfit 1982, p. 227.
386Butler 1736, p. 100.
387Reid 1785b, pp. 108-9.
388Swinburne 1984, pp. 18-20.
389Olson 2012, pp. 49-50.
390Duncan 2014, pp. 284-5.
391Given Swinburne 1984, p. 21.
392Given Reid 1785b, p. 21.
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not just that personal identity consists in monad identity. Secondly,
given that persons are identical to monads, facts about monads are not
more particular than facts about persons. In response, I am prepared
to accept that some simple positions do not satisfy (1). What matters
for my purposes is that there are simple positions which definitely make
consist-in claims and thus satisfy (1). Moreover, I deny that because of
his identity claim, Reid should be seen as rejecting (1). Parfit explicitly
includes positions that make identity claims between persons and other
things under the umbrella of reductionism; he even calls them “hyper-
Reductionist”393. In addition, positions according to which persons are
identical to collections of matter or brains or biological organisms are
certainly instances of the complex view.394 If these positions count as
satisfying (1) by reducing facts about persons to more particular facts,
then I see no reason why Reid could not do the same.
Moreover, authors like Swinburne and Reid can even satisfy (2): they
can accept that the facts mentioned in (1) can be described in an imper-
sonal way, without presupposing the existence or persistence of persons,
for example by referring solely to egos, souls or monads. I claim that
this holds even for Reid and others who think that persons are identical
to these entities. This suspicion is motivated by the observation that no
one takes a philosopher who believes that persons are identical to col-
lections of material particles as being unable to provide an impersonal
description of the world. In support, assume that persons are identical
to collections of human-wise arranged, material particles. Suppose also
393Parfit 1995, p. 16.
394Gasser and Stefan 2012, pp. 4-7.
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that I can describe the world exhaustively in terms of particle distribu-
tion. When describing the world, do I have to presuppose that persons
exist? Of course, I can assume in advance that persons exist, and make
my particle story reflect this. But I could also stay antecedently neutral
on questions regarding persons, and proceed to tell you the exact distri-
bution of each particle in a given universe. From this, it might or might
not then follow that persons exist and persist. But if it does, it will not
have something I have presupposed before making my description. And I
suppose that exactly the same should apply to a philosopher who chooses
to describe the world not in terms of particles, but in terms of monads,
souls or egos. I am not claiming that there are passages in, e.g., Reid’s
writings which clearly suggest this reasoning. I also do not claim that he
must follow this reasoning. But I do maintain that this reasoning is at
least open to him and other simple positions.
Again, I do not claim that all simple positions accept (1) and (2).
What matters for my purposes is that there are paradigm cases of sim-
plicity which leave room for joint satisfaction of (1) and (2) and there-
with satisfy the conditions for being complex. I conclude that Parfit has
introduced a distinction, but not one that captures the paradigm cases.
5.2 Gasser And Stefan
One might hope that our grasp of the distinction has improved in the
meantime. Gasser and Stefan in their 2012 volume on the complex versus
simple distinction offer the following summarizing definitions:
“The complex view analyzes personal identity in terms of simpler
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relations. The fact that a person persists over time is nothing
more than some other facts which are generally spelled out in
either biological or psychological terms, or both. That is, the
complex view takes talk about what personal identity consists in
literally. It aims to provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for personal identity, thereby reducing it to the holding of basic
biological or psychological relations. Whenever these relations
obtain, personal identity obtains.
The simple view of personal identity, by contrast, denies that
a person’s identity through time consists in anything but itself.
Biological and psychological continuity may be regarded as epis-
temic criteria for diachronic identity, but they are neither nec-
essary nor sufficient conditions for personal identity. There are
no non-circular, informative necessary and sufficient conditions
for personal identity: personal identity consists in nothing other
than itself.”395
These definitions shift between different notions that are supposed to
mark the difference: consisting in something other than itself, non-
epistemic criteria for identity, definability, analysability, non-circularity,
informativeness, necessary and sufficient conditions. These notions are
certainly connected, but the connection is not straightforward enough to
shift between them without further explanation. I will discuss them in
turn.
Before I do this, let me add one clarification. By accepting the com-
plex view as just defined, one need not accept that identity as such is
analysable, or consists in other relations which are necessary and suffi-
cient for its obtainment. One can still maintain that identity is a simple
relation in the following sense:
“[i]dentity is utterly simple and unproblematic. Everything is
identical to itself; nothing is ever identical to anything except
itself. There is never any problem about what makes something
identical to itself; nothing can ever fail to be. And there is never
395Gasser and Stefan 2012, p. 3.
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any problem about what makes two things identical; two thing
never can be identical.”396
Here are two ways how: while identity relates one and the same thing
to itself, features like those mentioned by Gasser and Stefan belong to
a relation that connects distinct person stages397 or one person to more
than one time.398 Whether or not one thinks that the latter relation is
analysable in terms of other relations, or reduces to other relations, etc.,
the former can still be perfectly primitive, unanalysable, or ungrounded.
The complex view can accept Lewis’ remarks on the simplicity of identity.
5.2.1 Analysability
As I understand analysability, it denotes a feature of either the meaning
of a term or the content of a concept. In the first case, application of
the term entails application of one or more further terms. In the second
case, one or more constitutive principles of the concept are available. The
meaning of ‘triangle’ entails, for example, ‘having three sides’. And the
content of triangle is such that it has ‘applies to x if x has three sides’ as
one of its constitutive principles. I see two reasons why rejection of an
analysis of personal identity is not the mark of simplicity.
First, there is a sense in which paradigm cases of the simple view can
be open to there being a term ‘personal identity’ or a concept personal
identity that is analysable: they can accept an analysis of either in terms
of, e.g., soul or monad identity.
396Lewis 1986, pp. 192-3.
397Lewis 1976, p. 20.
398Noonan 1989, p. 88.
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Secondly, I do not have the impression that the disputants disagree
on the status of a term or a concept. They are talking about what is the
case at the object level, or the level of facts. The disagreement concerns
the status of the things to which terms and concepts can refer, apply or
disapply. If so, it is more promising to turn to metaphysical candidate
claims.
5.2.2 Consist-In Claims
To understand the simple view as a denial of consist-in claims about per-
sonal identity leads to the problems described in (5.1.3): some paradigm
cases of simplicity are not simple in this sense. If they accept (1), then
they do defend consist-in claims about personal identity, although the
more basic facts do not concern psychologies or bodies. I take it that
analogous remarks apply to attempts to capture the difference in terms
of idioms like ‘is nothing more’ or ‘reduces to’.
5.2.3 Necessary And Sufficient Conditions
Gasser and Stefan suggest that simple positions deny necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for personal identity. But again, as described in (5.1.3),
some simple positions do provide conditions for personal identity. And as
I will describe in (5.3.2), I see no reason why simple positions should not
be able to think of these conditions as necessary, sufficient or both. If so,
they are not in disagreement with the complex view about the existence
of such conditions.
178 CHAPTER 5. AGAINST COMPLEX VS. SIMPLE DIST.
5.2.4 Circularity/Informativeness
Are these conditions circular or informative? Of course paradigm cases
of simplicity deem some paradigmatically complex positions circular. For
example, Butler399 thinks this way about Locke’s account. A more con-
temporary circularity charge is levelled by Lowe:400 he paraphrases Neo-
Lockeanism as requiring that for person p to be identical to person q, any
conscious experience had by p at any earlier time is quasi-remembered at
least ancestrally by q at any later time, and vice versa. Lowe supposes
it is important for Neo-Lockeanism that it is one and the same conscious
experience which p and q share. He also supposes that any criterion for
experiences will make reference to their subjects: e and f are the same
experience if and only if e and f are qualitatively indistinguishable and
had by the same person at the same time. If so, identity of experiences
presupposes personal identity. Neo-Lockeanism is thus circular.
I am not concerned with whether Lowe’s criticism is just. It is not
obvious to me that Neo-Lockeans require that one and the same expe-
rience is shared by p and q. Two distinct mental states that stand in
appropriate causal relations could be deemed sufficient, too. I would also
like to remain non-committal on whether or not a given experience has
its subject essentially.
What I would like to note is that although Butler and Lowe level
circularity charges against Lockeanism, neither they nor simple positions
in general need to deem any account of personal identity circular. For
example, Lowe401 explicitly denies that brain-based complex positions
399Butler 1736, p. 100.
400Lowe 2012, pp. 149-151.
401Ibid., pp. 151-2.
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are circular (he rejects them for different reasons402): they take personal
identity to consist in brain identity, and brain identity does not presup-
pose personal identity. Lowe seems to think that Swinburne’s position is
non-circular for analogous reasons.403 Thus, he deems only some but not
all complex positions circular because their proposed criterion of personal
identity in fact presupposes personal identity. And at least some simple
positions are deemed non-circular because personal identity is defined
in terms of entities of a different kind whose identity does not presup-
pose personal identity. If so, the existence of non-circular conditions of
personal identity is not what the complex and the simple view disagree
about.
Given (5.1.3), this is hardly surprising. We have seen that some
simple positions can accept Parfit’s condition (2), the possibility of a
description of all relevant facts without presupposing the existence or
persistence of persons. Such a description would contain non-circular
conditions whose obtainment establishes personal identity. Moreover, I
certainly would find it informative that personal identity consists in soul
identity, and that I go where my soul goes. How I could have epistemic
access to where my soul goes is a difficult question, but it concerns a
different topic.
I conclude that Gasser and Stefan’s account lacks precision and just
like Parfit’s account fails to capture the paradigm cases.
402Ibid., pp. 142, 152.
403Ibid., pp. 151-2.
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5.3 Noonan
Noonan has recently provided a new proposal.
5.3.1 The Proposal
Noonan’s proposal presupposes that problems of identity over time can
be reduced to problems about kind-membership.404 For example,
“what makes a person P1 at a time t1 identical with a person P2
at a time t2?”405
can be rephrased as
“What conditions C satisfy the following schema: (P) If x is a
person then if x exists at t and t*, Cxtt* ?”406
The latter question does not mention identity. Instead, it concerns di-
achronic conditions on membership in the person-kind. Noonan prefers
this reformulation since it avoids the impression that there are different
identity relations for different kinds, or that identity can be reduced to
other relations.
He suggests:
“the complex view is the view that there are non-trivial, non-
redundant, non-identity-involving diachronic constraints on per-
sonhood. The simple view is that there are not, that the only
404Noonan 1989, section 5.3, crediting Quine 1976. For a denial that persistence
conditions can be reduced to kind-membership, see Merricks 1998, section 4. If I
understand correctly, Noonan and Merricks can agree that some candidate criteria
for kind-membership do not contain diachronic constraints on the possible history
of a member of the kind, and thus do not deliver persistence conditions. Merricks’
discussion does not convince me that criteria for kind-membership never contain




non-trivial, non-redundant diachronic constraints on personhood
are identity involving.”407
A diachronic constraint on personhood has the form:
“If x is a person, then if x exists at t and t*, Rxtt*.”408
Such a constraint is non-trivial if Rxtt* does not logically follow from the
antecedent. And it is non-redundant if it is not entailed by the totality
of synchronic constraints on personhood, each of which has the form:
“If x is a person, then if x exists at t, Fxt”409
where F is a property of x that says nothing about any other times than
t. Finally, a diachronic constraint on personhood is identity-involving if
“its satisfaction requires that something other than a person exists
at times t and t* ”410.
Requiring the existence of one and the same soul at the relevant times
would be an identity-involving constraint on personhood, provided per-
sons are not souls. However, Noonan411 notes that Swinburne’s posi-
tion fits this description and provides a criterion for soul identity over
time:412 identity of form and continuity of immaterial stuff. Continuity
of immaterial stuff does not require identity of immaterial stuff, and so
Swinburne’s position includes a non-identity-involving constraint on per-
sonhood. Noonan’s proposal therefore makes Swinburne’s position count
as complex. This classification is revisionary, but it is not what I will
object to in the following.





412Swinburne 1984, p. 27.
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5.3.2 Refinement
Olson413 argues that pace Noonan, simple positions accept non-trivial,
non-redundant and non-identity-involving diachronic constraints on per-
sonhood. Assume with Noonan that any person is essentially a person,
and consider the diachronic constraint
No Transformation (NT): if x is a person, then if x exists at t
and t*, it is not the case that x is wholly material at t and wholly
immaterial at t*.
This constraint is obviously not trivial or identity-involving. And in order
to count as redundant, the diachronic constraint would have to follow
from synchronic constraints on personhood. Olson thinks this need not
be the case here. We can be neutral on whether
If x is a person, then if x exists at t, x is wholly material,
yet be convinced that (NT) is true. (NT) then would be a non-redundant
constraint.
Now, since Noonan defines the simple view as the thesis that the
only non-trivial, non-redundant diachronic constraints on personhood are
identity-involving, a position that accepts (NT) is not simple. The trou-
ble is, Olson says, that no philosopher denies (NT). No one thinks that
if you are now wholly material, you can become wholly immaterial.414
Thus,
“Noonan’s proposal makes the simple view so strong that no one
actually holds it”415.
413Olson 2012, pp. 56-7.
414See also Duncan 2014, p. 286.
415Olson 2012, p. 57.
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This would be a bad result. The goal was to explain what unites pro-
ponents of the simple view, not to declare the simple view unendorsed.
However, I see two reasons why Olson’s criticism can be resisted.
First reason: Some proponents of the simple view are not neutral on
whether persons are material. Reid thinks that persons are monads, and
monads are immaterial. He thus accepts (NT), but only as a redundant
constraint, i.e., one that follows from synchronic constraints on person-
hood.416 Depending on the particular position, similar remarks can apply
if persons are taken to be egos or souls. Moreover, it is worth repeating
that given (5.1.3) and (5.2.4), I deny that redundancy of this kind makes
a position uninformative.
Second reason: Let us grant that (NT)-style constraints are not re-
dundant. Olson is still exaggerating when he says that everyone accepts
them. For example, Madell, a proponent of the simple view, writes:
“[W]hat unites the experiences in any of these biographies [of one
and the same person across possible worlds] is that they belong,
unanalysably, to the one mind, and that their doing so is compat-
ible with the absence of objective connection between them.”417
His suggestion seems to be that with respect to the possible history and
life of a person, anything goes. The only restriction is that it needs to
be her history and life, and this is a brute matter. Thus, Madell will
reject (NT). And he is not alone: Chisholm418 and Swinburne419 offer
similar considerations. These positions might seem bold, but it is not my
intention to assess whether they are true. What matters for my purposes
416A very similar point is made by Bottani 2013, p. 612.
417Madell 1981, p. 107.
418Chisholm 1969, p. 138.
419Swinburne 1984, p. 25.
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is that there are simple positions who reject, as Noonan420 recognizes,
even the sparsest non-redundant constraints.
Olson can still complain that Noonan overgeneralizes from the fact
that some or many proponents of the simple view reject (NT)-style con-
straints to the claim that all simple positions do so. If Olson shows
that some accept non-redundant (NT)-style constraints without being
subject to the First reason described above, Noonan’s definition of the
simple view would be too narrow.
But even then, I think we can improve Noonan’s proposal accordingly.
A natural thought is that if complex and simple views need not disagree
on the features of available diachronic constraints on personhood, maybe
they will differ on sufficient diachronic conditions
If x exists at t and x exists at t* then Rxtt*, then x is a person.421
Presumably, we could define
Simple* : If there are non-trivial, non-redundant, non-identity-
involving diachronic constraints on personhood, Rxtt*, then joint
satisfaction of them does not guarantee that x is a person.
Complex* : There are non-trivial, non-redundant, non-identity-
involving diachronic constraints on personhood, joint satisfaction
of which guarantees that x is a person.
Simple* is compatible with there being
(I) no constraints at all;
(II) only constraints that are trivial, redundant and/or identity-involving
(Noonan’s definition of simplicity)
420Noonan 1989, p. 94.
421Cf. ibid., p. 89.
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as the conditional will be true if its antecedent is false. If (II), simple
positions might even accept that these conditions are sufficient for per-
sonal identity. For example, if they think that only persons have souls,
they could say:
if x exists at t and x exists at t*, then if x at t and x at t* have
the same soul, then x is a person.
Of course, one difference in the sufficient conditions specified by the com-
plex and simple view remains:
Simple*continued: ...If there are sufficient diachronic conditions
of personhood, these conditions are trivial, redundant, and/or
identity-involving.
These modifications meet Olson’s objection. I have granted Olson that
simple positions can accept non-redundant constraints. But Simple* ac-
commodates Olson’s supposition and constitutes only a slight tweak to
Noonan’s proposal.
5.3.3 Being Identity-Involving
The problem for Noonan’s proposal is that being identity-involving is
an unsuitable feature to focus on when defining complexity and simplic-
ity. Consider a position according to which persons are not identical to
biological lives, yet
Same Biological Life (SBL): if x is a person, then if x exists at t
and t*, x has at t the same biological life that x has at t*.
Let us assume that the position accepts no other non-identity-involving
constraints. Consider the judgements of Noonan’s proposal if the position
is extended to include one of the following further assumptions:
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There are no necessary and sufficient conditions for life identity
over time.422 (SBL) requires the existence of something other
than the person at both t and t* : one and the same biological
life. Given the assumption, nothing more can be said about when
this condition is satisfied. Unlike in the Swinburne case, we cannot
unpack a non-identity-involving constraint from (SBL). Noonan’s
proposal thus classifies the position as simple.
Mereological Essentialism. x at t can have the same biological
life as x at t* only if the life x has at t is composed of exactly
the same parts as the life of x at t*. Again, (SBL) requires the
existence of something other than the person at both t and t* :
all of the parts that make up the biological life. No non-identity-
involving constraint can be unpacked. Noonan’s proposal classifies
the position as simple.
However, without these further assumptions, the position presumably is
complex: in order for x to exist at both t and t*, likely some kind of
continuity of parts rather than their identity is needed between the life
x has at t and the life x has at t*.
First of all, acceptance of (SBL) brings a position so close to paradig-
matically complex positions423 that it is unclear why it should be labelled
simple even in the wildest circumstances. It would be a stretch to accept
this simply as a surprising feature of the proposal.
Secondly, whether or not a constraint is identity-involving turns on a
relational property of the constraint: its being accompanied by certain
other, external commitments. If extra theory tells an identity-involving
story about the entities figuring in Rxtt*, the position that accepts the
422Olson (2012, p. 57) also mentions this possibility. Why would anyone think
this? One example: shrinkage cases like the brain transplants discussed in (chapter
4) are typically seen as causing problems for animalism. Supposedly, persons but
not animals can be shrunk to brain or head size, so persons cannot be identical to
animals. One amongst many potential responses considered by Snowdon is that the
animal can survive being shrunk to the head. This, he claims, cannot be ruled out
because “the unfortunate truth is that there is no agreed and established account of
animal persistence” (2014, p. 237).
423For example Olson 1997, pp. 16-7.
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constraint is simple (provided no other non-identity-involving constraints
have been accepted); if not, it is complex (provided Rxtt* is neither
trivial nor redundant). But no one has ever thought of the simplicity or
complexity of a position as turning on a relational matter in this way.
Neither does anyone think that a position turns from complex to simple
or vice versa if it extends, contracts, or if its background theory changes.
A nice anecdote from Olson424 is telling here: Swinburne nowadays thinks
that contrary to what he used to believe, there is no criterion for soul
identity over time. But no one, including Swinburne himself, thinks that
his position turned from complex to simple. To be fair, no one except
Noonan would have classified Swinburne complex in the first place. But
suppose we accept (SBL), and later become convinced that, e.g., one of
the two further assumptions above holds. According to Noonan, we first
held a complex position and ended up with a simple one. Neither this
diagnosis nor its grounds are anticipated in the literature.
5.4 Two Purposes Of A Distinction
We could stipulate to use terms in this way, but it is another question
whether and why this is advisable. When we reflect on the problems of
the examined proposals, it seems warranted to take a step back and ask:
why are we interested in whether a view is complex or simple?
I see two minimal purposes of having a given distinction in our dis-
courses: Classification and Endorsement. I will now explain them in
turn.
424Olson 2012, Fn. 9.
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Classification . A distinction can help us to classify positions
with respect to shared features and to organize them into families
of positions. This helps us to get an overview on their similar-
ities and differences, and therewith facilitates navigation in the
landscape of positions.
(i) We can define a distinction and go through existing positions
in order to determine whether or not they fall on one side of
the distinction. Asserting that a position falls on one side
of the distinction describes the position as satisfying certain
conditions.
(ii) Alternatively, we start out with a number of positions whom
we suspect to share important features, group them provi-
sionally, and then think further about what unites them.
Given the clear picture of which positions are paradigm
cases, this seems to be what we are doing in the case of
the complex versus simple distinction.
Regarding Classification, Parfit’s and Gasser and Stefan’s definitions do
not do a good job. Their conditions for complexity are jointly satisfied by
paradigm cases of simplicity. There is a mismatch between the positions
we antecedently group together and what follows from the definitions.
Moreover, the definitions include imprecisions and shifts in key notions.
Whether a given position lands on one side of the distinction depends
on which notion the definition picks out. And we have seen that no
specification gives us the right results (5.2).
Setting Swinburne aside, Noonan’s account classifies extant paradigm
cases reasonably well. However, its sensitivity to arguably irrelevant
external commitments due to the relational nature of being identity-
involving raises doubts about the grounds for these classifications. For
the purpose of (ii)-style Classification, not just any feature shared by
the positions will interest us. We are looking for features that are both
shared by the positions and constitutive for each of them. Here is an
analogy. Suppose we live in a world where all and only round things
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happen to be red. It would be too quick to conclude that the difference
between round and non-round things has something to do with redness.
We should come to see that round things could be blue, transparent, etc.,
and so that facts about roundness can float free of facts about colours.The
positions discussed in 5.3.3 are the analogues to these counterexamples.
They show that even if most paradigm cases of complexity and simplic-
ity respectively share the features Noonan’s proposal mentions, serious
worries remain whether possession of these features is distinctive of the
respective view. Amongst others, we can thus remain sceptical whether
the proposal can deal with the classification of new positions, and how
it behaves once interpretation proceeds and gradually uncovers further
commitments of a given author.
The difficulties encountered in the previous sections show that it is
hard to see which features paradigmatic instances of complexity or sim-
plicity share in the sense just described. The most charitable thing to
say is that ‘complex’ and ‘simple’ try to stand in for more specific fea-
tures. The problem is that it is not clear which ones these are. Given the
failure of the examined proposals, there should be a significant amount
of pessimism and no optimism about the availability of an account.
Classification of positions is not the only purpose of having a distinc-
tion:
Endorsement. A distinction can help us to express our thoughts
through endorsement of one of the sides. Distinguishing one kind
of view from another provides us with targets for affirmation and
criticism. Again, there are at least two possible directions:
(iii) We may find a number of positions independently plausible
(or implausible). If we learn from Classification that they all
fall on one side of a relevant distinction, and if we know of
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no implausible (or plausible) position that falls on the same
side, our affirmation (or criticism) can extend beyond the
individual cases and to the side of the distinction as such.
(iv) Alternatively, upon reection on the distinction in abstraction
from particular instances of either side, we become convinced
that one side is correct, and therefore become sympathetic
to its instances.
Suppose we endorse the complex view as in (iv). Because of the diffi-
culties in Classification, this endorsement should strike us as odd. Com-
plexity is due to the possession of features as specified in Classification.
Given that this specification was unsuccessful, it is not clear what we
have endorsed now. It is thus unclear on what grounds we made the
endorsement and whether these grounds are reasonable. After all, we
can hardly give reasons for the affirmation of a view if we cannot explain
what the view is. Instead, (iv)-style Endorsement will only be plausible
derivatively upon plausible affirmation of features we ascribe to the view.
Nothing seems wrong with (iii)-style Endorsement of the complex
or the simple view. Indeed (iii)-style rejections of the simple view are
common: it is often dismissed on the grounds that simple positions’
stances on marks of complexity as defined by Parfit, Gasser and Stefan,
and others are coherent but implausible.425 However, if what I argued is
right, then these dismissals proceed on the wrong grounds. As shown in
(5.1) and (5.2), simple positions can accept conditions which many take
to be constitutive of the complex view. If so, further explanation and
interpretation are needed to bring out what, if anything, is wrong with
the simple view.
Further explanation is also needed on how supposed theoretical or
425S. Shoemaker 1985, p. 449. Duncan 2014, pp. 291, 293-4.
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practical consequences follow from endorsement of either side of the com-
plex versus simple distinction. For example, Parfit endorses the complex
view and thinks it follows that identity is not what matters. Of course,
he defends this latter claim not merely because he endorses the complex
view (whatever that means), but because he thinks conditions like (1)
and (2) obtain.426 He happens to think that acceptance of these condi-
tions is what unites proponents of complexity. But this classification is
not only unimportant, as the practical conclusions are thought to follow
from conditions like (1) and (2) already; it is also mistaken. (1) and
(2) can be accepted by simple positions. If there really is a difference
in practical judgements between the complex and the simple view, more
needs to be said on why this should be the case. (1) and (2) as well as the
other conditions mentioned by the proposals cannot ground the asym-
metry, because the complex and the simple view are not in disagreement
about them.
Analogous remarks apply to the claim that the complex view cannot
justify future-directed self-concern, or cannot justify it to the extent that
the simple view can.427 Some take this as a reductio of the complex view
and a reason to endorse the simple view,428 others as a reason for revision
of ordinary patterns of concern that presuppose the simple view.429 But
we have not yet seen a satisfying account of the difference between the
complex and the simple view, let alone one that licenses these claims.
426Parfit 1984, pp. 260-3.
427Ibid., pp. 307-12.
428Butler 1736, p. 102. Madell 1981, pp. 109-112. Swinburne 1974, p. 246.
429Parfit 1984, p. 280.
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5.5 Conclusion
In spite of the elusiveness of what makes the difference, many philoso-
phers are convinced that the distinction is an important one. Proponents
of the complex view think that simple views are clearly wrong and that
there are good reasons to endorse the complex view (1.1.2), while propo-
nents of the simple view are convinced of the opposite (1.1.1). From the
assumption that there is an important difference between complex and
simple positions, authors have drawn conclusions about what matters,
whether special concern for future selves can be justified, whether per-
sons can undergo fission, and which theory of personal identity is true.430
But if I am right, taking sides in the complex versus simple distinction
cannot play a role in these disagreements. This is because as shown,
authors largely agree on the conditions discussed in the present chapter,
yet disagree on the topics just mentioned.
Specifically, we get a new, straightforward reason for why we can dis-
card claims according to which taking sides in the complex versus simple
distinction should commit one to a certain stance about what matters:
conditions like Parfit’s (1) and (2) supposedly establish that contrary to
what simple positions and common sense suggest, identity is not what
matters. In response, not only can we mention authors who think that
metaphysical insights, including insights on the nature of personal iden-
tity, concern the fundamental structure of reality and are thus neutral
on ordinary facts of practical relevance431 or that the relation between
metaphysics and practical concerns is at least much less straightforward
430Parfit 1984. Swinburne 1984. S. Shoemaker 2012. Madell 1981; Madell 2015.
431Sider 2013. Olson 2013.
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than Parfit’s revisionism suggests432. And not only can we highlight fa-
miliar considerations of authors like Lewis433 who describe how a position
can accept the conditions taken to be constitutive of the complex view
and still be in perfect agreement with the proponents of the simple view
regarding what matters and whether a person can divide. Given the
present discussion, we can make a new point: conditions like (1) and
(2) are satisfied by paradigmatically simple positions all along. Stances
on these conditions alone thus cannot be what grounds differences in
practical judgements.
In particular, we get another reason—besides (2.4)—for rejecting the
idea that there is an asymmetry between the complex and the simple
view in terms of how well they justify future-directed concern. As long
as it is unclear what divides the complex and the simple view, and simple
positions appear to be able to accept conditions thought to be constitu-
tive of the complex view, we should be wary of the claim that complex
but not simple positions can provide such justification. If the complex
versus simple distinction is confused, we should also dismiss the idea that
it marks a difference in reason-giving power.
Finally, the complex versus simple distinction turned out to be un-
helpful with respect to Classification, and Endorsement should take place
on the basis of more specific features anyways. If not in terms of complex-
ity and simplicity, how should we frame debates about personal identity?
I recommend speaking in terms of the specific conditions and related
concepts for which the terms ‘complex’ and ‘simple’ try to stand in.
432D. Shoemaker 2007.
433Lewis 1976.
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Promising candidate conditions presumably make positive or negative
claims regarding the groundedness, criteriality, materiality, fundamen-
tality, and/or the mereological status of persons and their persistence. It
has been argued in this paper that the prospects for providing an account
of the complex versus simple distinction are bad, and so we will likely
arrive at a more fragmented landscape of views. But this fragmentation
will be outweighed by benefits in clarity and precision. I will develop




196 CHAPTER 6. REPLACING THE DISTINCTION
Although many authors think that the complex versus simple distinction
is important (chapter 1), I have argued that these labels are unhelpful
(chapter 5). Most accounts of the distinction do not even get the most
obvious paradigm cases right. Whatever unites the simple view is, as
Olson puts it, “elusive”434. And I add that this also obscures what is
distinctive of the complex view.
The question arises how else we should frame the debate. I will now
sketch some positive, revisionary suggestions on this matter. My working
hypothesis is that there is more than one issue at the heart of the complex
versus simple distinction. I propose that if we want to compare, classify,
and endorse theories of personal identity, we should employ notions that
are more fine-grained and well-defined. Some fruitful questions include:
does personal identity consist in something else? What does ‘consist in’
mean here? Are persons dependent on other things? If so, on what?
Can we provide criteria for the persistence of persons? Are these criteria
metaphysical or epistemic? Are persons fundamental constituents of the
world? If personal identity consists in other facts, can we work out facts
of personal identity from the fundamental facts?
My claim is not that stances on these questions exhaust the disagree-
ment between complex and simple positions, and capture what actually
is at the heart of the debate. The complex versus simple distinction
turned out to be unclear. I thus demand that we should leave it behind.
Instead, we should disambiguate and debate more refined questions and
proposals. I will nevertheless continue to refer to the complex versus
simple distinction in order to support my recommendations about what
434Olson 2012, p. 62.
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should replace it. As I will make clear, I am not thereby offering analy-
ses of, or proposals on, the distinction. Instead, I am merely illustrating
that my suggestions for replacing the complex versus simple distinction
fit some of the data from the paradigm cases. None of my suggestions for
replacement capture the complex versus simple distinction neatly, which
is exactly why I see them as replacements rather than analyses.
6.1 Ontological Dependence
It is often supposed that some things depend at all times of their existence
on other things. This dependence is not merely causal, but ontological.
It is not like the dependence of a football’s flight trajectory on the par-
ticular kick it received. It is the kind of dependence that holds between
the football and its atoms, the existence of a smile and the existence
of a mouth that smiles, an event and its participants, non-empty sets
and their members, tropes and their bearers, wholes and their parts,
boundaries and extended objects, holes and their hosts,435 etc.
I will remain agnostic on the details of this relation of ontological
dependence. Understood as existential dependence,436 x depends for its
existence on the existence of a specific object y if (with ‘E ’ for existence,
and → for material implication)
Rigid existential dependence: (Ex→ Ey),
or on the existence F -type objects if
Generic existential dependence: (Ex→ ∃yFy).
435Correia 2008, p. 1015.
436Ibid. Tahko and Lowe 2016, section 2.
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However, existential dependence can be seen as falling short of capturing
ontological dependence. If x ontologically depends on y, it appears that
x ’s existence is somewhat derivative on, or less fundamental than, y ’s
existence. Here, existential dependence overgenerates derivativeness.437
For example, Socrates’s existence necessitates the existence of the empty
set: necessarily, if Socrates exists, the empty set does, too. But we hardly
want to say that Socrates’ existence is derivative upon the existence of
the empty set. This is one motivation to consider further notions of
dependence.
In some cases, we might speak of essential dependence:438 x would
not be the object it is, had certain conditions not be met. For example,
part of the essence of x (written as x) might be that a particular relation
R obtains between x and y
xRxy;
or x might be essentially such that it exists only if y does.
x(Ex→ Ey).
Moreover, following Fine439 we could deny that essential dependence
can be fully captured in modal terms. Consider necessity and essen-
tiality claims about Socrates and the singleton {Socrates}. Necessarily,
if Socrates exists, then he is a member of the singleton {Socrates}. And
necessarily, if {Socrates} exists, then it has Socrates as its member. But
there is an asymmetry in the corresponding essentiality claims. It seems
plausible that {Socrates} is essentially such that it has Socrates as a
437Correia 2008, p. 1023.
438Ibid., pp. 1016-7. Tahko and Lowe 2016, section 4.
439Fine 1994.
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member, whereas it does not seem part of Socrates’ essence to belong to
{Socrates}. This suggests that essential dependence does not reduce to
modal dependence.
Besides existential and essential dependence, authors distinguish ex-
planatory dependence. Correia formulates:440
(Ex → Ex in virtue if the fact that/because/is explained by
Ey);
(Necessarily, if x exists, then this is in virtue of/because/is ex-
plained by the existence of y);
or for some feature G,
(Ex → ∃G(Ex in virtue of the fact that/because/is explained
by Ey))
(Necessarily, if x exists, then this is in virtue of/because/is ex-
plained by some feature of y);
Here, one might further distinguish different types of explanation by
analogy with different types of modality, e.g., logical, conceptual, meta-
physical, or nomological explanation, and consider some more salient
than others for distinctively ontological dependence. For my purposes,
the exact sense of ontological dependence will not matter.441
Another issue on which I stay neutral is how ontological dependence
relates to metaphysical grounding. They seem connected, but commen-
tators point at differences.442 In a sense, grounding is more demanding
than ontological dependence. The former is typically seen as a strict
partial order, and therewith as irreflexive, transitive, and asymmetric.443
In contrast, ontological dependence need not be asymmetric and can
440Correia 2008, pp. 1020-1.
441For further variants of ontological dependence, see Koslicki 2012.
442Tahko and Lowe 2016, section 5.
443Raven 2013.
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be reflexive, e.g., in its rigid existential variant.444 Moreover, ontolog-
ical dependence need not be explanatory, whereas grounding typically
is. And as just described, ontological dependence need not capture pri-
ority and fundamentality, while grounding typically does. At least for
those varieties of ontological dependence that capture priority, Schnieder
and Correia propose the following equivalences, depending on whether a
predicational account of grounding (a relational predicate that connects
facts) or an operational approach (a sentential connective that relates
propositions) is preferred:445
Pred x ontologically depends on y iff some fact about y grounds
the fact that x exists
Op x ontologically depends on y iff ∃F (x exists because y is F ).
If one accepts equivalences of this kind, then the following can easily be
rephrased in terms of grounding.
In contrast to the examples above, some things do not depend for
their existence on other things. Since Aristotle, a substance is often
taken to be an entity that can exist on its own and depends on nothing
else.446 For example, Descartes writes:
“[b]y substance we can understand nothing else than a thing which
exists in such a way that it needs no other thing in order to ex-
ist”447.
The existence of mereological atoms can be seen as independent of other
things. According to some notions of God, she would, if existing, not
444Correia 2008, p. 1023.
445Correia and Schnieder 2012, p. 25. For further discussion, see Schnieder forth-
coming.
446Correia 2008, pp. 1025-6 and Tahko and Lowe 2016, section 6.3 argue that mere
existential dependence is unsuitable for characterizing substances, and thus recom-
mend to focus on essential dependence.
447Descartes 1647, p. 210.
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depend on any other things. According to Schaffer, the world depends
on nothing, not even on its parts, for they depend on the world.448 This
is an instance of holism understood as “the doctrine that the parts of a
whole can depend upon the whole itself.”449
Are persons ontologically dependent? Such claims do seem to play
a role in the simple view. Here are three examples. First, in response
to Locke’s suggestion that personal persistence consists in sameness of
consciousness, Butler objects that Locke confuses the phenomenon with
its evidence. The fact that a series of conscious moments belongs to the
same person cannot constitute a person’s persistence; it presupposes it.
As quoted earlier (1.2.2):
“one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of per-
sonal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, per-
sonal identity, any more than knowledge, in any other case, can
constitute truth, which it presupposes.”450
We can interpret Butler as accusing Locke of a mistake about explanatory
ontological dependence. There is one and the same consciousness over
time because the person persists. Moreover, he comes close to claiming
the ontological independence of persons: a person is either a substance
or the property of a substance.451 In the latter case, the person might not
be ontologically independent, yet she would be the property of something
else that is.
Second, Reid claims that “a person is something indivisible, and is
what Leibniz calls a monad”452, i.e. an indivisible, ontologically inde-
448Schaffer 2010.
449Fine 1995, p. 270.
450Butler 1736, p. 100.
451Ibid., p. 104.
452Reid 1785b, p. 109.
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pendent, fundamental constituent of the world. In particular, attempts
to characterize persons in terms of other notions are mistaken:
“I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am some-
thing that thinks, and acts, and suffers.”453
Again, part of the complaint is that others have reversed the relation
between personal identity and what it supposedly depends on.
Third, Lowe claims that persons, or selves as he calls them, are simple
substances.454 He has in mind a distinctive kind of simplicity: selves
might posses spatial parts, but possess no substantial parts,455 i.e. parts
that are themselves substances. Since Lowe is convinced that reference to
substantial parts is necessary for the formulation of persistence criteria,
and denies that selves have substantial parts, he concludes that there are
no persistence criteria for selves. He goes on to deny that this makes
selves mysterious or uncaused. Continuous brain functioning can be
accepted as a necessary condition for the existence of embodied selves,
natural laws can set further constraints on possible histories, and inner
lives of selves need to be at least minimally coherent.
“But it would not follow from this that the identity of the self
over time is grounded in continuity of brain-function, or indeed
anything else.”456
No definite conditions for the coming- or ceasing-to-be of selves can be
given. Evidence about brain functioning or lack thereof is inconclusive
about whether a self exists. One way to understand Lowe’s view is that
453Reid 1785b, p. 109.
454Lowe 1996, pp. 39-44. Like the authors above, he roughly means an Aristotelian
primary substance, i.e. a concrete individual thing, or continuant ; cf. ibid., pp. 2-3.
455Ibid., p. 36.
456Ibid., p. 41.
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as a matter of contingent fact, selves causally depend on things like brain
functioning, yet remain ontologically independent and ungrounded.
I suspect that in the end, we will not find that all complex positions
are committed to the ontological dependence of persons, while their op-
ponents claim the contrary. Many complex positions are not sufficiently
characterized by claims of ontological dependence. They do not only
think that persons are dependent, but also that metaphysical criterialism
is true, i.e. that there are conditions individually necessary and jointly
sufficient for a person to persist. It is not obvious how this additional
claim can be captured in terms of dependence.457
Ontological dependence is also broader than Parfit’s condition (1) and
(2)—the availability of consist-in claims and complete impersonal des-
criptions—which he thinks are constitutive of the complex view (5.1.2). If
x -entities are reducible to y-entities, then x -entities depend on y-entities.
I cannot think of a case of reduction where the reduced entity is inde-
pendent of the reducing entity/entities. The converse does not hold;
if x -entities depend on y-entities, x -entities need not be reducible to
y-entities. Moreover, if x -entities are not reducible to y-entities, this
does not mean that x -entities do not depend on y-entities. Because of
these differences, we should avoid distorting positions and be clear about
whether they speak of reduction, dependence, or both.
While the complex view is not fully captured by means of dependence
claims, I argued earlier that the simple view need not deny the consist-in
claims about persons and their persistence, not even the availability of
informative criteria (5.1.3, 5.2.2, 5.2.3). Amongst others, I noted that
457See also Olson 2012, p. 49.
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some simple theorists take persons to depend on souls or egos, or even
identify persons with monads. I argued that this need not amount to
a denial of consist-in claims. We can now point at another possibility
for how consist-in claims could be made alongside identity claims about
persons and, e.g., monads. If the consist-in claim takes the form of a
claim of ontological dependence, it can be reflexive, e.g., when it comes
in the existential variant. Here, we would have the expressive resources
to say both that persons are identified with monads and that persons de-
pend for their existence and/or identity on the monads they are identified
with. This gives another way of articulating how the simple view can ac-
cept conditions normally thought to be constitutive of the complex view.
Simple positions can accept the ontological dependence of persons.458
I thus conclude that ontological dependence is useful towards under-
standing the commitments of complex and simple positions. This is true
even though it is not the case that the simple view denies the ontological
dependence of persons, and the complex view accepts it.
One challenge to phrasing complex and simple positions in terms of
their stance on ontological dependence is sometimes raised against meta-
physical grounding.459 Apart from controversies about, e.g., the logic of
ground or particular instances of grounding, more general worries con-
cern the intelligibility, unity, instantiation, and/or epistemic status of
grounding claims. Some authors report that they do not understand
what grounding means.460 Others think that the phenomena subsumed
458Earlier, I also noted that for more extreme variants of the simple view (such as
Madell 1981), anything goes. In the following (6.3), I provide further suggestions on
how to capture these views.
459Correia and Schnieder 2012, pp. 29-30.
460Daly 2012.
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under the notion of grounding are way too diverse to be seen and sys-
tematically explored as instances of one and the same relation.461 More-
over, we already have a battery of metaphysical and logical notions, e.g.,
supervenience, possible worlds, entailment, and it is not obvious what
grounding adds.462 Similar worries could be formulated about ontologi-
cal dependence.
If grounding and dependence are confused notions, then it might be
misleading or uncharitable to express complex and simple positions in
terms of it. But my suggestion also offers an opportunity. Personal
identity could turn out to be a discourse in which these notions achieve
what the complex versus simple distinction could not: clarifying their
commitments and thereby facilitating comparisons, classifications and
endorsements of positions (5.4). In this case, it would not be neces-
sary that meta-metaphysics approves ex ante of ontological dependence
or grounding in order for them to become eligible to figure in debates.
Usefulness in the first-order discourse could motivate a presumption of
legitimacy for these notions.
We need not endorse full-blown skepticism about dependence and
grounding to note that if they play a role in the complex versus simple
distinction, the debate could turn out to be more intricate and puzzling
than participants assume. There is more than one sense of ontological
dependence, and it is difficult to pin down the most salient and straight-
forward meaning, let alone to provide an analysis or reductive definition
of the notion. In tension with the emphatic endorsements and rejections
461Hofweber 2009.
462Rosen demands “ideological toleration” (2010, p. 109), whereas Wilson (2014)
argues that there is no need for grounding.
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of the complex and the simple view (chapter 1), at least one central meta-
physical notion at issue is potentially primitive and less straightforward
than authors might have expected. For example, part of the appeal of the
complex view is that it offers an analysis of personal identity, improves
our understanding of persons, and refutes “‘Identity Mystics’”463. But if
ontological dependence plays a role in these projects, then they build on
a notion that could be less transparent than proponents of the complex
view take their own positions to be. Further questions about the exact
sense and nature of the relevant dependence relation arise. Such compli-
cations can be seen as a reason to refrain from introducing ontological
dependence in the complex versus simple debate. But alternatively, they
might make us realize that certain aspects of the supposed opposition
and the disputants’ self-understanding need to be revisited.
6.2 Fundamentalism About Persons
Some metaphysicians distinguish fundamental from derivative entities.
Fundamental are those things from which the world is made up, i.e.
whose creation would suffice to make a world perfectly like ours. Deriva-
tive things are those which are made up from the fundamental ones.
Although derivative things exist, fundamental things exist in reality.464
Barnes provides the following glosses:465
God’s creation metaphor: Fundamental are those things that
God needs to create in order to make the world how it is.466
463Zimmerman 1998, p. 281.
464Fine 2001.
465Barnes 2012, pp. 875-8.
466This picture comes from Kripke 1972, pp. 153-4.
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Non-fundamental (i.e. derivative) things are somewhat su-
perfluous in a description of a world.
Truthmaking: Fundamental are those things which truthmake
their own existence, and which are capable of serving as
truthmakers for the existence of other, derivative entities.
Non-redundant causal roles: Fundamental are those things that
cause events and sustain other things, and do so non-redundantly.
Some authors accept only two levels, the fundamental and the derivative,
whereas others are convinced that there needs to be more: a lowest level
of facts and a plurality of further, hierarchically ordered levels, with the
fundamental at one end.
According to one understanding of fundamentality, it relates to on-
tological independence and grounding.467 The most fundamental level is
comprised of ontologically independent or ungrounded entities. Deriva-
tive entities depend on, or are grounded in, other entities that are either
fundamental simpliciter, or more fundamental and/or less derivative.
However, in the preceding section, I mentioned some differences in the
formal properties of ontological dependence and grounding: the former
can be reflexive and need not be asymmetric, the latter is typically seen
as a strict partial order. For similar reasons, it can be disputed that
ontological dependence and the less-fundamental relation go together, as
the latter is irreflexive and asymmetric.468
In fact, Barnes suggests that the fundamental versus derivative dis-
tinction and the independent versus dependent distinction cut across
each other. For ontological dependence, she suggests the following lit-
mus test:469
467Tahko and Lowe 2016, section 6.4.
468Correia 2008, p. 1023.
469Barnes 2012, p. 880.
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(OD) An entity x is dependent iff for all possible world w and
times t at which a duplicate of x exists, that duplicate is
accompanied by other concrete, contingent objects in w at
t.
Barnes also assumes that anything which does not satisfy (OD) counts
as ontologically independent. For example, mereological atoms can exist
without being accompanied by other things, and are thus independent.470
Most independent things are fundamental. For example, mereological
atoms do need to be set in place when creating the world, and the same
goes for other examples for ontological independence from the previous
section. Moreover, most things that satisfy (OD), such as mereologically
complex entities,471 are derivative—they do not require extra steps in
the making of the world; their existence is secured once the fundamental
things are in place.
But Barnes argues that there is conceptual room for more: first,
some entities are independent but non-fundamental. On some accounts
of mathematical truths,472 they do not impose constraints on what the
world is like, and thus do not require additional truthmakers or steps in
the creation of the world. Thus, they could count as non-fundamental.
At the same time, they satisfy (OD), and thus combine derivativeness
with ontological independence. Second, some entities are fundamental
but dependent; Barnes calls them emergent.473 For example, some think
that minds and mental properties depend on physical properties, but
470For the sake of presentation, I will presuppose that there are mereological atoms,
i.e. that the world is not gunky. If the world was gunky, we would have even more
reason to accept Barnes’ claims about emergence; see Barnes 2012, pp. 888-9.
471Unless one endorses the Schaffer picture.
472Barnes is thinking of Rayo 2009.
473Barnes 2012, p. 884.
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have distinctive causal powers. Something needs to be added to the
microphysical arrangement of the world in order for there to be minds,
even though minds satisfy (OD) as they are caused and sustained by
the physical. Barnes is not defending these pictures, but argues that if
they are accepted, they would provide instances where dependence and
derivativeness on the one hand, and independence and fundamentality
on the other hand come apart.
One example for emergent entities in Barnes’ sense are persons in the
ontologies of Van Inwagen and Merricks.474 They claim that mereolog-
ical composition occurs only for living organisms and persons. Barnes
paraphrases:
“Simples (arranged object-wise) can do all the work we need for
ordinary macroscopic objects. But they cannot do all the work,
the thought goes, for living beings (van Inwagen) or more specif-
ically for persons (Merricks). These entities have special prop-
erties, causal powers, etc., that simply cannot be accounted for
solely with reference to simples.”475
Merricks’ motivations are as follows:476 contrary to folk ontology, events
in the macrophysical world are caused by mereological atoms acting in
concert. Moreover, events are not overdetermined; they do not have
more than one independent cause. Thus, if there were macrophysical
objects, they would be causally irrelevant or epiphenomenal to what
their constituent atoms are causing. Merricks goes on to argue that
causally inert, epiphenomenal material objects should be eliminated from
one’s ontology, given that there remains no good reason for believing in
their existence. However, human persons are capable of causing more
474Ibid., pp. 887-8.
475Ibid.
476Merricks 2001a, Ch. 3.
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than what their constituent parts are causing. They possess conscious
mental properties that do not supervene on what their parts are like.477
And human persons cause events partly by having such non-supervenient
mental properties. There is thus no redundancy in the composite person’s
causing events in the macrophysical world. Eliminativism about persons
is unmotivated.478 Persons are full-fledged ontological constituents of the
world, possess special causal powers and have properties that cannot be
accounted for in terms of the mereological atoms that compose them.
It is tempting to read participants in the complex versus simple de-
bate as making claims about fundamentality. For example, Chisholm
argues against the suggestion that persons are entia per alio, or “onto-
logical parasites”479, which possess properties only derivatively, in virtue
of being related to other, fundamental entities that possess properties
non-derivatively. Reid claims that persons are identical to monads and
therewith fundamental constituents of the world. In Barnes’ terms, they
must be put in place to make the world how it is. Moreover, remember
Madell’s extreme, simple position according to which a person’s survival
is compatible with any kind of discontinuity. This is plausibly under-
stood as a fundamentality claim: once all the physical, psychological,
and other continuities are in place, it is not settled yet whether a person
survives. An extra truthmaker or step in the creation of the world is
needed.
In contrast, Parfit’s clauses (1) and (2)—the availability of consist-in
claims and complete impersonal descriptions—suggest that for him, only
477Merricks 2001a, pp. 88-9.
478Ibid., p. 113.
479Chisholm 1976, p. 104.
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the more particular facts are fundamental. Once facts about brains,
bodies, and psychologies are settled, we know all there is to personal
identity.480 They are the truthmakers for personal identity. No extra
steps are needed. Person facts are merely derivative. This also fits
Parfit’s comments that the simple view believes in deep further facts
of personal identity, whereas the complex view denies their special meta-
phyiscal depth.481
Fundamentality claims do seem to play a role in the disagreements.
It is thus useful to rephrase their positions in these terms. At the same
time, I deny that the fundamentality of personal identity marks the di-
vide between the complex and the simple view. The latter can deny that
personal identity is fundamental—for analogous reasons why they can
accept consist-in claims like Parfit’s (1). For example, consider Swin-
burne’s position that persons have a soul and a body, but go with their
souls if body and soul come apart. Assume further that there is no crite-
rion for soul identity over time, just in case Noonan (5.3) has convinced
you that this matters. Swinburne can agree that body and soul facts are
fundamental; they are needed to make the world the way it is. But note
that once these fundamental facts are given, person facts derive. Nothing
more is needed for them to obtain.
As I argued earlier, even in Reid’s case there is a question about how
to understand the identity between persons and monads. I suggested that
Reid could give a full description of the world in terms of monads, and as
480There are conceivable cases in which it is indeterminate whether our person
concept still applies, but “[s]uch questions are, in the belittling sense, merely verbal”
(Parfit 1995, p. 25).
481Parfit 1984, pp. 262, 279-82, 309.
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a consequence settle the person facts without having presupposed them—
just like a materialist can give a material description of the world without
presupposing person facts and at the same time accept that person facts
just are facts about material wholes (or whole-wise arranged atoms).
Within Reid’s picture, we can say that once we have put the monads in
place, the person facts are settled. But note that this gives a sense in
which person facts are not fundamental. No extra truthmakers beyond
monad facts are needed.
Not only can the simple view accept that personal identity is deriva-
tive; the complex view can see personal identity as fundamental. Sup-
pose Reid clarifies that my suggested reading is not what he has in mind.
Persons are monads, and monads are fundamental building blocks of the
world. A complete description of the world in terms of its fundamental
facts must mention persons. Now, compare Reid’s position with animal-
ism according to which persons are identical to human animals. Suppose
we take human animals, if not themselves fundamental constituents of
the world, as identical to collections and arrangements of mereological
atoms. For the same reason that Reid makes a fundamentality claim
about persons by identifying them with some of the world’s fundamen-
tal building blocks, this version of animalism would, pace Parfit, make a
fundamentality claim about persons by virtue of identifying them with
collections and arrangements of fundamental constituents of the world.
The fact that paradigmatically complex positions can accept fundamen-
tality claims gives another reason for doubt that they are the mark of
simple view.
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Nevertheless, phrasing positions in terms of fundamentality can be
illuminating. First, just like ontological dependence, the notion is more
informative than the ambiguous and unclear labels ‘complex’ and ‘sim-
ple’. It would improve our understanding of a position’s commitments.
Second, it cautions against erroneous endorsements of either the com-
plex or the simple view. A prior commitment to the fundamentality of
personal identity might appear to be a good reason to endorse the simple
view. But we have just seen that fundamentality can be had within the
complex view, too. The commitment thus should not be a knock-down
argument against the complex view. At the same time, a prior commit-
ment to the idea that personal identity depends on other relations, and
maybe can be fully explained in terms of them, suggests it is derivative
rather than fundamental, and this might appear to be a good reason to
endorse the complex view. But we saw that fundamental entities too can
depend on other entities, namely if they are emergent in Barnes’ sense.
The prior commitment to the idea that personal identity is derivative
upon other relations thus does not decisively favour the complex view.
It can also be captured by the simple view.
6.3 Essentialism And Haecceitism
According to essentialism, at least some of an object’s properties are
essential. Roughly, a property is essential if the object could not exist
without it, and/or if the property contributes to making the object what
it is.482 If not, the property is accidental. The object could have failed
482Roca-Royes 2011, pp. 65-7.
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to have it and yet exist and/or be the object it is. Essentialism puts
constraints on an object’s de re possibilities, i.e. the properties it could
possibly have.
Some alleged essential properties are trivial483 in that every object has
them. Examples include being self-identical or being F-or-not-F. Others
are substantive, or non-trivial. For example, Kripke defends the idea
that a person’s biological origins are essential to her, i.e. she could not
exist without stemming from the particular sperm-egg pair from which
she results in the actual world.
Haecceitism is, roughly,484 the view that two worlds can be qualita-
tively indiscernible but differ non-qualitatively. The qualitative versus
non-qualitative distinction has its own complications.485 Roughly, non-
qualitative properties make reference to particular individuals (such as
being Napoleon), whereas qualitative properties (such as mass or charge)
do not. While essentialism constrains de re possibility, haecceitism ex-
tends it486 by allowing that non-qualitative matters can float free from
qualitative matters.
Haecceities, or individual essences, are necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for being a certain individual. If Kripke’s essentiality of origins
is accepted not only as a necessary but also as a sufficient condition,
it would offer one account of persons’ haecceities. Extreme haecceitism
holds that the only essential properties are the trivial ones, such as being
483Roca-Royes 2011, p. 66.
484As Cowling (2016, section 1) explains, it is challenging to state haecceitism in a
theory-neutral way.
485Diekemper 2009 and Cowling 2015 argue that the distinction must remain prim-
itive.
486Cowling 2016, section 3.
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self-identical. In other words, this view is extremely permissive on the
ways an object could be.
Note that acceptance of haecceities does not entail acceptance of haec-
ceitism. This is because the notion of a haecceity is neutral on the ex-
tent to which qualitative properties figure in it. If one takes haecceities
to supervene on qualitative properties, one denies haecceitism; worlds
could not differ non-qualitatively without differing qualitatively. How-
ever, many proponents of individual essences characterize them in impure
or hybrid terms, i.e. in terms of both qualitative and non-qualitative as-
pects. If an individual figures irreducibly in another individual’s haecceity
or individual essence, a relation of essential ontological dependence as
described earlier (6.1) results.487
Cowling suggests that haecceitism is useful towards characterizing
the simple view.488 He understands the simple view as suggesting that
personal identity is not reducible to non-qualitative properties. This
amounts to a form of haecceitism.489 One observation in support of Cowl-
ing’s reading is the simple view’s stance towards fission. Chisholm490 and
Swinburne491 believe that the physical and psychological continuity rela-
tions in fission are not more than fallible evidence for personal identity.
Strictly speaking, the authors deny that there are genuine fission cases.
Persons never divide. In what appears to be fission, they go with only
487Roca-Royes 2011, p. 72.
488Cowling 2016, section 7.2.
489In line with the suggestion discussed in the preceding section, Cowling (Ibid.,
section 2) clarifies that this haecceitist presupposition connects with a fundamentality
claim: qualitative properties do not suffice to fix all the facts; some non-qualitative
properties must be fundamental.
490Chisholm 1976, pp. 111-2.
491Swinburne 1984, pp. 18-21.
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one of the fission products. Facts about continuities fall short of deter-
mining which one it is. Two fission cases that are exactly alike in terms
of continuity relations can differ in personal identity facts, in particular
which fission product is identical with the fissioning individual. In other
words, there can be qualitatively indiscernible fission scenarios that dif-
fer in personal identity facts. One explanation Swinburne gives is that a
simple theorist can regard persons as mereologically simple, and thus as
incapable of dividing.492
Similarly, Parfit’s Featureless Cartesian View and Madell’s position
are easily read as endorsements of haecceitism. Parfit writes:
“[o]n [the Featureless Cartesian] view, history might have gone
just as it did, except that I was Napoleon and he was me. This is
not the claim that Derek Parfit might have been Napoleon. The
claim is rather that I am one Cartesian Ego, and that Napoleon
was another, and that these two Egos might have occupied each
other’s place.”493
Another way to put these positions is that they accept only a minimal
conception of which properties are essential to an individual: only non-
qualitative ones that make specific reference to the identity of their pos-
sessor, such as being Parfit or being Napoleon. And instantiation of these
properties is a brute matter, or as Madell puts it, “compatible with the
492Swinburne 1984, p. 21 However, it is not obvious that mereological simplicity
precludes division. For example, Hawley (2004, p. 393) suggests that a mereologically
simple entity could gain parts by developing sufficient internal structure. Consider
also J.R.G. William’s proposal of higher-level universals, e.g., being a proton*, which
can hold of a particular without necessarily instantiating the particular’s actual parts,
e.g., quarks in the actual world. This allows simple instantiators in some worlds, e.g.,
in “a world qualitatively like our own ‘from the protons up’ but where there are no
correlates of our quarks, but where the things which play the proton-role are mereolog-
ically simple” (2007, p. 199). These examples show that the move from mereological
simplicity to necessary indivisibility is less straightforward than Swinburne and others
realize.
493Parfit 1984, p. 228.
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absence of objective connection.”494 In one sense, these positions are ex-
tremely permissive: a person can be anything. In another sense, they are
extremely demanding: for any particular qualitative—e.g., psychological
or bodily—makeup, it is an open question who this person is.
Parfit deems the Featureless Cartesian View “unintelligible”495. Now,
these positions certainly provide only a very limited basis to ascertain and
settle disputes about personal identity, given that observable or qualita-
tive facts are deemed irrelevant. And they provide a curious combination
of permissiveness and demandingness. But Parfit’s charge of unintelligi-
bility is nevertheless misguided. These positions are perfectly intelligi-
ble. As with ontological dependence and fundamentalism about persons,
phrasing them in terms of essentialism and haecceitism is illuminating
and makes their commitments precise. It is just that the positions’ con-
tents might strike some as surprising and worth rejecting.
It is also tempting to read Butler’s circularity objection as making
a point about non-qualitativeness. Butler argues that sameness of con-
sciousness cannot be what personal identity consists in. Instead, same-
ness of consciousness presupposes personal identity. We might rephrase:
the sameness of consciousness requires something more than qualitative
sameness. In order to be sure that a consciousness at one time is the same
as a consciousness at another time, something non-qualitative needs to be
known, such as whose consciousness it is. And this knowledge or entitle-
ment is unavailable while trying to give an account of personal identity.
Otherwise, the account would lapse into circularity. And in response, S.
494Madell 1981, p. 107.
495Parfit 1984, p. 228.
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Shoemaker’s quasi-memory can be understood as a kind of psychological
sameness that eschews these non-qualitative features.
However, it is not the case that the simple view per se endorses haec-
ceitism, and the complex view denies it. Things are more complicated.
Consider once again Swinburne’s position. Cowling phrased its stance
towards fission as allowing that two scenarios can differ in terms of who
is who while being qualitative exactly alike. It all depends on where the
soul goes. But note that Swinburne need not believe that where the soul
goes is a non-qualitative matter. It is at least open to him and other
simple theorist to believe that soul facts or properties can be character-
ized without referring to individuals, e.g., without making claims about
whose soul goes where. They could treat soul properties on par with other
paradigmatically qualitative properties like mass and charge. If so, the
theory’s stance on the two fission scenarios would not be an instance of
haecceitism; the scenarios would be qualitatively discernible. While Fea-
tureless Cartesianism and Madell are properly described as haecceitist,
this version of Swinburne’s position brings out that the simple view need
not commit to haecceitism.
A related suggestion is that through clauses like Parfit’s (1) and (2),
the complex view is committed to the availability of qualitative analyses
of non-qualitative properties like being identical to Napoleon. This prop-
erty is paradigmatically non-qualitative by making reference to a particu-
lar individual. But Parfit’s (1) and (2) state, and Featureless Cartesian-
ism and Madell deny, that qualitative conditions can be specified which
guarantee that the non-qualitative property is instantiated. Given the
foregoing, simple positions that are less extreme and instead compat-
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ible with the Swinburne-style picture could agree that non-qualitative
properties can be described in this way.
I conclude that just as with ontological dependence and fundamen-
talism, haecceitism and essentialism help to clarify claims at issue in the
debate between the complex and the simple view. But it is not the case
that the simply view endorses, and the complex view denies, haecceitism
and/or a minimal conception of persons’ essential properties.
6.4 Conclusion
I have provided suggestions on how, if not in terms of the unhelpful
labels ‘complex’ and ‘simple’, we should think about personal identity.
My earlier suspicion was that a number of notions and distinctions are
conflated under these rough labels. I now made this suspicion more
precise. My examples include ontological dependence, fundamentality,
essentialism, and haecceitism. As described, none of these concepts is free
of difficulties or ambiguities. But all of them are better understood than
the complex versus simple distinction. And as suggested by the exegetical
evidence I gave along the way, all of these notions seem to play a role in
the respective positions. In fact, reflecting on their details and variants,
and the fact none of them neatly aligns with either the complex or the
simple view, brought out how problematic it is to slide over these notions
under the heading of one single distinction. My suggestions enable us to
make the charge of conflation and confusion more precise.
My claim is not that understanding positions in terms of ontological
dependence, fundamentality, essentialism, and haecceitism resolves ques-
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tions or reservations we might have about their content. Even if these
notions do not capture everything that is at issue in the cloudy complex
versus simple distinction, they allow us to focus on specific differences
between the positions that become apparent when being stated in these
ways. My hope is that this leads to improvements in understanding, pre-
cision, and accessibility of the positions and their relations to each other.
In this way, the notions could be seen as reference points for clearer and
less ambiguous characterizations.
One advantage of replacing the complex versus simple distinction
with the suggested notions is that it helps us to identify misguided com-
mitments. For example, thinking that personal identity is fundamental
might have led some to endorse the simple view. But as demonstrated,
fundamentality is compatible with paradigmatically complex positions,
and not an entailment of simple positions. Moreover, thinking that per-
sonal identity depends on other relations might have led some to call their
position complex. But as demonstrated, paradigmatically simple posi-
tions too can understand personal identity as ontologically dependent.
In other words, partly because of the opacity of ‘complex’ and ‘simple’,
the views have sometimes been endorsed on grounds that properly un-
derstood must be deemed mistaken.
Given these insights and rephrasals, we can defend the simple view
against charges of elusiveness and unintelligibility. Simple positions are
not charitably understood as being dubious or vague, but as endorsing
pictures that feature well-establish metaphysical notions and their appli-
cation to personal identity. It is a further question whether these pictures
are true, and how could find out about this. What matters is that they
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are not defective besides potentially being false, a feature which they
share with their competitors.
Finally, let me return to future-directed concern. The suggestion to
understand positions in terms of more precise notions can be fruitful to-
wards evaluating the extreme claim according to which the complex view
fails to give reasons for future-directed concern. One of the lessons from
reflections on the complex versus simple distinction (chapter 5) was that
given its confusions, it is unlikely to mark a difference in reason-giving
power. It remains unclear which features of the complex view are ac-
countable for the shortcomings in justifying special concern. In contrast,
we are in a better position to evaluate the reasonableness of concern if
personal identity is grounded in other relations, derivative rather than
fundamental, and/or describable in purely qualitative terms. The con-
tents of these versions are more precise than the extreme claim because
reference to the complex view is replaced by better defined notions. We
can thus discuss the extreme claim more fruitfully. However, while these
versions of the extreme claim are easier to evaluate, our judgment should
remain critical: it is not obvious at all how groundedness, derivativeness,
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So far, I have been primarily concerned with the numerical identity of
persons over time. But there are important kinds of qualitative changes
which we all undergo in the course of our lives. They do not put an end
to our existence or make us two rather than one and the same. Yet, they
deeply change who we are, in the sense that they affect how we see the
world and what matters to us. Paul describes the example of becoming
a parent:
“[h]aving a child often results in the transformative experience of
gestating, producing, and becoming attached to your own child.
At least in the ordinary case, if you are a woman who has a child,
you go through a distinctive and unique experience when grow-
ing, carrying and giving birth to the child, and in the process you
form a particular, distinctive and unique attachment to the actual
newborn you produce. Men can go through a partly similar expe-
rience, one without the physical part of gestating and giving birth.
For both parents, in the usual case, the attachment is then deep-
ened and developed as they raise their child. [...] When a newborn
is produced, both parents experience dramatic hormonal changes
and enter other new physiological states, all of which help to create
the physical realizer for the intensely emotional phenomenology
associated with the birth. These experiences contribute to the
forming and strengthening of the attachment relation [...]. All of
this generates the unique experience associated with having ones
first child. Raising a child is then a temporally extended process
that extends, deepens, and complicates this relationship. This
unique type of experience often transforms people in the personal
sense, and in the process, changes ones preferences.”496
Paul calls these transformative experiences. Because of the far-reaching
changes they bring about in us, it is difficult if not impossible to know
antecedently what it would be like to live the post-transformative life.
This raises the question how we can ever rationally choose to undergo
a transformative experience and become our post-transformative self.
Paul’s answer is the revelation approach: choose based on how much
496Paul 2015, pp. 764-5.
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value you assign to the revelation of making the novel experience.
In the following, I will briefly summarize Paul’s discussion and the
revelation approach, before turning to objections. Shupe is convinced
that considerations about the numerical identity and distinctness of per-
sons play a crucial role for the reasonableness of transformative choice:
she grants that Paul’s revelation approach can make sense of transforma-
tive choices for ourselves. But Shupe argues that when decision-maker
and transforming individual are distinct, e.g., when parents consider an
option that will be transformative for their child, the revelation approach
is inappropriate. I will provide five strategies for responding to Shupe’s
objections. Moreover, I will show how Shupe’s worries rest on a partic-
ular reading of the approach. I offer a more charitable interpretation of
what Paul’s approach demands.
7.1 Transformative Experience And Reve-
lation
Paul argues that standard decision theory is in trouble.497 The the-
ory holds that a rational decision-maker attempts to maximize expected
utility, i.e. the product of the outcome’s probability, given the decision-
maker’s action, and the utility it provides to the decision-maker. Paul
objects that for an important class of decision problems, assessing and
comparing expected utility is impossible.
Paul phrases her discussion in terms of a distinctive notion of value
497My overview of Paul’s account will be rather brief. For more complete summaries,
I recommend Ibid.; Barnes 2015, section 2; Pettigrew 2016; Shupe 2016, sections 2-6;
Talbott 2016.
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that shall be maximized: subjective values measure the value of an ex-
perience for an individual. They are
“grounded by more than merely qualitative or sensory characters,
as they may also arise from nonsensory phenomenological fea-
tures of experiences, especially rich, developed experiences that
embed a range of mental states, including beliefs, emotions, and
desires.”498
What it’s like to have a certain experience is an important (although not
the only) determinant of subjective value. Two kinds of experiences raise
challenges for the assessment of subjective value.
First, epistemically transformative experiences are such that prior to
having them, one cannot know what they are like.
“When a person has a new and different kind of experience, a
kind of experience that teaches her something she could not have
learned without having that kind of experience, she has an epis-
temic transformation. Her knowledge of what something is like,
and thus her subjective point of view, changes. With this new
experience, she gains new abilities to cognitively entertain certain
contents, she learns to understand things in a new way, and she
may even gain new information.”499
As a result, if you never had an experience of this kind, you cannot
determine the subjective value it would provide.
Secondly, a personally transformative experience changes the experi-
encer.
“If an experience changes you enough to substantially change your
point of view, thus substantially revising your core preferences
or revising how you experience being yourself, it is a personally
transformative experience. [...] [I]f a personally transformative
experience is a radically new experience for you, it means that
important features of your future self, the self that results from
498Paul 2014, p. 12.
499Ibid., pp. 10-11.
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the personal transformation, are epistemically inaccessible to your
current, inexperienced self.”500
Not only are you unable to assign subjective value to a transformative
experience; sometimes having the experience changes the preferences.
Any values one ascribes before the experience would differ (maybe even
radically) from the values assigned after the experience.501 One does not
know in advance how they will differ.502
We could just rely on statistical data about how individuals tend
to respond to certain experiences, and assume that we will respond in
similar ways. Paul dismisses this suggestion on two grounds.
First, data is not informative enough. The shortcoming is related to
the reference class problem:503 psychological, sociological, and economical
data pertains to the level of populations or groups.504 From this, we
cannot read off
“the kind of fine-grained information about how a person who is
just like us, a person with just our particular blend of personal
500Ibid., pp. 16-7.
501Ibid., p. 32.
502Consider the implications for Brink’s claim that the gold standard of compensa-
tion is its intrapersonal instance because it is automatic (3.1.2). I rephrased his claim
as: when incurring present burdens and efforts, intrapersonal benefit will compen-
sate you with maximal reliability. You work hard while being justified in believing
that it will be you who will reap the rewards. What if it was you who will reap the
rewards, but a future you who has changed in significant respects? The prospect of
transformation gives a sense in which intrapersonal compensation is not automatic:
you cannot know in advance how you will respond, in particular whether what you
formerly considered a benefit will compensate you for past burdens.
503Paul 2014, p. 127.
504This character of the data is necessitated by the fundamental identification prob-
lem: one cannot observe one and the same individual simultaneously in a treatment
and a non-treatment state. If the individual is treated, the effects cannot be compared
with the effects of non-treatment of the very same individual at the very same time.
Such comparison would rely on the evaluation of a counterfactual which presupposes
knowledge about other, epistemically inaccessible possible worlds. The solution is to
formulate research questions at the level of groups rather than individuals; cf. Paul
and Healy forthcoming, section 2.
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abilities and personality traits, our likes and dislikes, our work
ethic and neuroses, and so forth, is most likely to respond to a
particular experience.”505
That is, such data does not tell you how you in particular will respond.
Second, even if data could provide such information, it would do so in
an unsuitable way. Decision-making about important life choices should
be authentic. Paul’s sense of authenticity requires that the decision-
maker imagines each decision option and its consequences from her first-
person perspective in order to determine whether she identifies with these
outcomes and wants them to be a part of the continuation of her life story.
Imaginative empathy is important for authentic self-realization.
“When you consider what might happen in your future, your
consideration involves an imaginative reflection on what it will
be like, from your point of view, to experience the series of fu-
ture events that are the mostly likely outcomes of whatever it is
that you choose to do. You use this reflection on what you think
these events will be like, that is, what you think your lived ex-
perience will be like, to authentically determine your preferences
about your future, and thus to decide how to rationally act in the
present.”506
Considering third-personal data falls short of imaginative projection, and
thus cannot ground authentic decision-making.
Expected utility theory presupposes that one can evaluate and com-
pare different outcomes in order to maximize expected utilities. But
post-transformative outcomes are inaccessible to us. Thus, no subjective
values can be assigned, and no comparison can be made.
Paul thus argues that we have to rethink our decision theory. Sup-
pose you are considering whether or not to undergo the epistemically
505Paul 2014, p. 132.
506Ibid., pp. 106-7.
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transformative experience of eating durian fruit for the first time. Paul
proposes the following rephrasal of the decision problem:
“[t]he relevant outcomes, then, of the decision to have a durian are
discovering the taste of durian versus avoiding the discovery of the
taste of durian, and the values attached reflect the subjective value
of making (or avoiding) this discovery, not whether the experience
is enjoyable or unpleasant.”507
That is, Paul suggests to address the reformulated decision-problem by
means of the revelation approach:
“you decide to try a durian for the sake of the revelation the
experience of tasting a new kind of fruit brings.”508
Transformative choices can be rational if based on how one values the
discovery, independently of whether or not it leads to pleasant experi-
ences.509 If this value exceeds the value of leaving things as they are, it
can be rational to make the transformative choice, independently of what
it will be like.
“[Y]ou decide whether you want to discover how your life will un-
fold given the new type of experience. If you choose to undergo
a transformative experience and its outcomes, you choose the ex-
perience for the sake of discovery itself, even if the experience,
like having a child or enduring some sort of extended privation,
involves stress, suffering, or pain.”510
The best available way to make important transformative life choices is
not based on projective imagination of what the outcomes are like, but
on how one values the novelty of the experience independently of what
it will be like. This motivates
507Ibid., p. 113.
508Ibid.
509Ibid., pp. 38-39, 114.
510Ibid., p. 120.
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“epistemic humility: life is more about discovery, and coming to
terms with who we’ve made ourselves into via our choices, than
about carefully executing a plan for self-realization.”511
7.2 Paul and Shupe On Cochlear Implants
Transformative choices do not only arise for our own lives. Sometimes we
need to make life-changing decisions for others. Paul considers parents of
a deaf child who are faced with the choice whether to provide their child
with a cochlear implant.512 It is assumed that the child has been deaf
from birth, and that the decision must be made within the first year of
its life, given that the implant won’t be as effective later. Implantation
can be irreversible, and may reduce or even eliminate any remaining
capacity to hear naturally.
If all goes well, the child will get access to sounds and language. But
there are also reasons against choosing the implant. The child would
miss out on being a member of the Deaf community with its distinctive
social structure—a culture that would be obliterated if everyone chooses
the implant. Neither would the child enjoy the unique and rich expe-
rience that come with being deaf. Implants are getting better, but the
hearing they provide is still not at the level of those who were never
deaf. There is a risk that the child would feel or be perceived as “second-
class, ’disabled’, or once-disabled”513. If the parents are themselves deaf,
they might reasonably prefer to forego the implant to foster a deep and
intimate parent-child relation.
511Paul 2015, p. 765.
512Paul 2014, pp. 57-70.
513Ibid., p. 59.
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This looks like an impasse about which option is most beneficial. But
as Paul points out, it is even more tricky. One unrecognized difficulty
is the transformative character of the decision problem. Hearing parents
cannot know what it would be like to remain deaf and a member of
the Deaf community. Deaf parents of a deaf child cannot know what
it would be like to become able to hear. Neither do they know how an
implant would shape their child’s core preferences. They cannot evaluate
the child’s lived experiences in the outcomes. One reason is that different
sense impressions at a time combine into one experience in a holistic way,
and over time shape the individual’s cognitive architecture. It is not
the case that hearing individuals can just abstract away their hearing
ability, and thereby arrive at what it’s like to be deaf.514 Just like in
the vampire, parenthood, and durian cases, the normative standard for
rational decision-making on the cochlear implant is unattainable.515
On the one hand, this should make us doubt that “the parents can be
expected to rationally evaluate these arguments”516. On the other hand,
the revelation approach has been introduced as a normative standard for
“[w]hatever transformative decision we are considering”517.
Shupe points at a difference between Paul’s paradigm cases of trans-
formative experience and the cochlear implant case. In the latter,
“the decision one is called to make is one that primarily affects






518Shupe 2016, p. 3124.
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The decision-maker behind the transformative choice is not identical to
the individual affected by the choice. Paul is not discussing this structural
dissimilarity among the cases.
Shupe thinks that it matters. Paul presents the revelation approach
as an “all-purpose strategy”519 for making transformative choices. But
according to Shupe, the cochlear implant case shows that this under-
standing is false. When decision-maker and transforming individual are
distinct, the revelation approach is implausible. She writes:
“in order for the revelation approach to be appropriate, it would
have to be the case that discoveries occasioned by the agent’s
choice really were the kinds of thing the agent might legitimately
value independently of her choice’s consequences. And, in the
cochlear implant case, I do not take this to be plausibly the case.
[...] [C]onsider the possibility that the parents do decide to give
their child the cochlear implant and she grows up to be deeply
unhappy as a result of their choice. Would it be rational for the
parents to discount these possible harms when making their deci-
sion, and to make their choice only on the basis of the revelatory
value of experiencing the consequences of their decision and the
value of discovering how their own preferences will evolve as a
result of their choice?”520
I read two worries from this quotation. First, it is possible that the child
receives the implant521 and grows up unhappily. It would seem odd to
ignore such consequences and choose on the basis of revelation. Shupe
grants that agents can legitimately choose on the basis of relevation, i.e.
for the sake of discovery itself, and screen off consequences—e.g., priva-
tion, stress, pain—when making transformative choices for themselves.
519Shupe 2016, p. 3132.
520Ibid., p. 3125.
521For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the example of hearing parents choosing
a cochlear implant for their deaf child. However, Paul, Shupe and I agree that the
same difficulties arise in cases where deaf parents choose such an implant, or where
either deaf or hearing parents choose to forgo an implant for their child.
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But as quoted, she thinks this is different when making such choices for
others. I call this the consequences objection.
Secondly, a literal application of the revelation approach would re-
quire the parents to make the decision in view of the revelation which
choosing the implant for their child would provide to them. This is an odd
demand. It is a significant change to have one’s child turn from deaf to
hearing, but the much more important transformation—intuitively and
according to Paul herself522—is experienced by the child. I call this the
parent-focus objection.
Shupe describes and dismisses two alternative applications of the reve-
lation approach. Both suggest a form of surrogate decision-making where
the parents would assess the revelatory values on behalf of the child.
However, she argues that the readings face serious obstacles. If one at-
tempts a substitute judgement on the basis of the child’s preferences and
values, the problem arises that
“the infant does not yet have a preference for either of the reve-
latory outcomes in question; furthermore, [...] the infant’s future
preferences [...] will largely be shaped by what her parents decide
to do.”523
Alternatively, if one attempts to focus on the child’s best interests, the
problem arises that it is very difficult to predict which option is best for
the child.
Shupe524 shows that in real life, many transformative experiences are
more like the cochlear implant rather than the parenthood case. Doc-
tors make transformative choices on behalf of patients who lack decision-
522Paul 2014, pp. 59-60.
523Shupe 2016, p. 3126.
524Ibid., sect. 9.
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making capacities, for example when they weigh treatment options with
different risk-benefit ratios and one or more possible transformative out-
comes, such as death or disability. Parents make transformative choices
on behalf of children, for example in interfaith marriages when they de-
cide about the faith in which their child shall be raised. Leaders and
representatives make transformative decisions on behalf of their fellow
group members, for example when they decide about whether or not to
participate in an uprising. Thus, if Shupe’s criticism is right, there are
many situations in which the revelation approach seems insufficient to
guide our decisions. Shupe demands that Paul should be clearer about
the limitations of the approach.
Before I comment on Shupe’s objections, I note how they are in ten-
sion with some claims I defended so far. Personal identity and distinct-
ness are less relevant to practical concerns than many think. Distinct-
ness amongst persons and their stages does not preclude justified concern
(chapter 2). And identity by itself is not enough unless we explain how
it relates to practically important relations (chapter 3). Shupe now gives
a sense in which personal identity is central to the reasonableness of
transformative choices. When making them by means of the revelation
approach, it matters that the decision-maker and the individual under-
going the transformation and experiencing the revelation are one and
the same person. If not, then the revelation approach is unsuitable. In
other words, the right way to make transformative choices for myself is
deeply inadequate for making transformative choices for someone else.
First, this suggests that for transformative choices, the key claim of this
dissertation is false, and personal identity is central to their rationality.
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Secondly, transformative choices for others remain rationally intractable.
However, most of Shupe’s criticism can be resisted. I shall now discuss
her parent-focus and consequences objections, before addressing difficul-
ties of transformative surrogate decision-making. In the process, I will
suggest five strategies for responding to Shupe.
7.3 Parent-Focus
Shupe thinks the revelation approach asks the parents to choose the
option that provides most value to them. According to the parent-focus
objection, this is inadequate. I will now sketch two strategies for arguing
that even if the revelation approach is parent-focused in this way, this is
no reason to reject it.
Both strategies share the following starting point. Campbell objects
that the kind of imagination which Paul thinks is distinctive of authentic
decision-making overstates the importance of the decision-maker’s future
lived experiences. One of Campbell’s examples is a high-school teacher
who plans to work in “a bad part of town.”525 Her own anticipated subjec-
tive experiences, the teacher says, are irrelevant to her authentic choice.
What matters to her is that the kids are better off. That is, we can make
perfectly authentic choices without considering our lived experiences.
In response, Paul clarifies that we should not understand subjective
values too narrowly. They can reflect more than our own lived experi-
ences, for example the experiences of others. For example,
“[i]f I make a medical decision for my child, my decision is heavily
525Campbell 2015, p. 791.
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influenced by my assessment of the quality of her future lived
experience”526.
The parents’ subjective assessment of the options can be a function of
how they judge the quality of their child’s respective lived experiences.
Typically, if a child enjoys valuable lived experiences, the subjective val-
ues the parents enjoy will be increased.
7.3.1 Strategy 1: Parent-Focus Is Not Implausible
This clarification allows us to see that the parent-focus objection need
not be problematic. When the parents evaluate options like those in the
cochlear implant case, it is not like the child’s lived experiences do not
matter or should come second. The approach is perfectly compatible
with a dependence of the parents’ assessment on the child enjoying valu-
able lived experiences. The approach is also perfectly compatible with
norms prescribing that the parents shall take the child’s lived experiences
into account when making the decision, or make the child’s experiences
the sole ground of their choice. In other words, even if we frame the
decision about the implant as one that focuses on the parents’ revelatory
values, we need not exclude or mitigate the importance of the child in
the parents’ deliberation.
Paul’s novel diagnosis is that the case is complicated by the decision-
makers’ ignorance of what at least one of the options is like. For this
reason, the parents face deep obstacles when evaluating the child’s lived
experiences. One might worry that this stands in the way of a proper,
reliable dependence of the parental decision-making on how the child will
526Paul 2015, p. 810.
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be doing. This is Paul’s worry. The parents are radically ignorant of the
facts that should influence their judgement. A sound decision-making
process would proceed “by relying on their own subjective evaluation of
the situation”527 and “by projecting forward into the imagined future
lived experience of the child under each possibility”528. For at least one
of the options, this is impossible.
But it is another question whether this leads to an implausible parent-
focus or -bias. As just stated, Paul agrees that the parents’ decision is,
and should be, influenced by their assessment of the child’s lived experi-
ences. And we might just deny that the parents’ shortcomings in projec-
tive imagination preclude that their assessments track the child’s lived
experiences. Maybe something less than projective imagination suffices
to track the child’s lived experiences well enough to make a rational de-
cision in which parent-focus and concern for the child’s subjective values
go hand in hand.
According to one plausible understanding of this influence, the par-
ents’ revelatory values are a function of how their child is doing. For
example, we saw how Brink compares the relation between parent and
child to the relation between fissioner and fission products (3.1.2). He
agrees that fissioner and fission products are distinct, but because they
share experiences, beliefs, values, desires and actions, they are justified
in seeing their individual interest as extended across the person bound-
aries, by the interests of the other.529 Through such extensions, even
rational egoists who focus primarily on their own good—which I suggest
527Paul 2014, p. 67.
528Ibid., p. 65.
529Brink 1997b, p. 126; ibid., p. 141.
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as the analogue to parents who focus on their own revelatory values—can
come to have a “derivative but non-instrumental reason to be concerned
about others.”530 What Brink means is that an agent’s consideration of
the good of other, psychologically continuous beings is not just a useful
means, but valuable for its own sake in virtue of being constitutive of the
agent’s own good.531
This provides one way to see parental values as dependent on the lived
experiences of the child. It need not require that the parents know exactly
what the child’s future lived experiences are like, as if they themselves
once had a similar experience. In order to secure the needed influence, it
would suffice if they know that their child’s future experiences are valu-
able. Let me give an analogy. If I am happy only if you are happy,
then for evaluating a possible future, it suffices that I know that you are
happy; I do not need to know what it is like for you to be happy. In
the implant case, too, if my subjective values depend on the value of the
child’s lived experiences, it is plausible that I do not need to know the
exact nature of these lived experiences from the inside or through projec-
tive imagination to determine whether or not a given possible future is
subjectively valuable to me. For the parents to evaluate a given option,
it would suffice to know that the child will be contented if the option is
chosen.
This suggestion is not intended to address or remove uncertainties
about how the child will be doing in a given scenario. Shupe mentions
three issues that seem almost insurmountable.532 For example, one could
530Brink 1997a, p. 127.
531Brink 1997b, p. 147.
532In light of these difficulties, Shupe argues that postponing the decision until the
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attempt to compare the likelihood of a happy life with an implant ver-
sus a happy life without an implant.533 Unfortunately, these likelihoods
are difficult to determine. Moreover, satisfaction and happiness might
be incommensurable across the two scenarios. And even if they were
comparable, it is unclear by which measure of happiness they should be
compared. As a result,
“the parent cannot reliably discern the appropriate attitude to-
wards revelation to take up on behalf of their infant”534.
I agree with these worries. But I deny that they are unique to trans-
formative choice and the revelation approach. Quite similar difficulties
complicate my deliberation about whether to go to the cinema tonight
or rather read a book at home, and the subsequent decision to pursue
one of the options on the basis of maximizing my subjective rather than
revelatory value. Transformative choices can be incredibly difficult, but
if anything makes them more difficult than non-transformative choices,
and if anything makes the revelation approach less eligible to address
them, certain other characteristics than these uncertainties would have
to be responsible. The revelation approach’s parent-focus is neither im-
plausible per se nor makes it more susceptible to difficulties related to
uncertainty.
child can make it herself looks like the most reasonable option, but unfortunately it
is unavailable for time-sensitive interventions.
533See also Pettigrew 2016.
534Shupe 2016, p. 3127.
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7.3.2 Strategy 2: The Revelation Approach Does
Not Apply
Shupe notes that there might be some sense in which the parents would
make a discovery when providing their child with the implant. But
“these are not the epistemically inaccessible features of the choice
that seem most important to us.”535
The salient and important change is experienced by the child.
This thought, I argue, can be pushed one step further: it is not
obvious that the parents will have a transformative experience in either
scenario. If so, their decision problem is not one of transformative choice.
This seems at odds with Paul’s characterization of the case, but let me
explain why she could be sympathetic to this suggestion.
The child is doubtlessly facing a transformative experience. Receiving
the implant and becoming able to hear would provide it with radically
new sensory abilities. Foregoing the implant would be transformative,
too. It will enable a distinctive cognitive development and membership
in the Deaf community and thus provide experiences whose nature the
child currently cannot imagine. So the child will definitely transform.
This is not obviously the case for the parents. Having their child
turn from deaf to hearing certainly affects them profoundly. But is it
a change that provides them with radically new epistemic perspectives
or changed core preferences? I think it need not. Although there will
be change, we need not count it as transformative. Of course, we said
that they cannot know what it’s like to receive a cochlear implant, and
535Shupe 2016, p. 3125.
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so their representation of their child’s lived experiences in the possible
futures will be radically incomplete. But according to Shupe’s reading,
the revelation approach asks them to focus on their own lived experiences
anyways, not the ones of the child.
Here is one way to make sense of the suggestion that parents’ expe-
riences will not be transformative. If they were facing a transformative
choice, they would be unable to assign subjective values to at least one
of the outcomes. And I claim that we can defensibly deny this for the
cochlear implant case. Suppose that, as suggested earlier, their own sub-
jective values in the outcomes depend on the lived experiences of the
child. Then even if the parents cannot projectively imagine what the
child’s experiences will be like, their subjective values could still be per-
fectly determinate. If I want to make you happy, and have exactly two
options, both of which I know make you happy, then I can perfectly well
assess my subjective values while being completely ignorant of what it’s
like for you to be happy. Similarly, if the parents had third-personal
data on how likely the child will be contented in either scenario, it seems
their subjective values could be determinate. If the parents can assign
subjective values, why should they refer to the revelation approach?
Shupe points out that these probabilities are hard to get. However,
we should expect this to be everybody’s problem, not one that is unique
to transformative experience or the revelation approach. It wouldn’t be
a reason to think the revelation approach fares worse than other ap-
proaches.
Again, the suggestion that the parents’ decision is not transformative
for them does not make their task easier. They remain confronted with
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risks and uncertainties about whether or not their child will be contented.
And the child’s transformative experience certainly makes it harder to
predict how the child will respond. But the present suggestion locates
the difficulty for the parents’ decision problem not in any transformative
character of their decision-problem, but in the fact that it is quite unclear
which option will be better for the child.
Strategy 1 denies that the parent-focus is implausible. Strategy 2
argues that even if the revelation approach’s parent-focus would be im-
plausible, this is not a problem. The revelation approach is designed to
deal with transformative choices, not choices tout court. Shupe’s reading
brings into view the possibility that the parents do not face a transfor-
mative choice. If so, they need not refer to the revelation approach in
the first place.
In what follows, I will not insist on this suggestion, and proceed under
the assumption that the parents do in fact face a transformative choice
of some sort, and that they are thus in need of the revelation approach.
7.4 Harms And Other Consequences
Shupe helpfully points out that not all transformative experiences are
the same. If I eat durian for the first time, only I am affected. If I decide
to become a parent, not only do I change fundamentally; I also affect
another life in the most fundamental way: by bringing it into existence.
Choosing the cochlear implant might affect the parents, but it is a much
more significant change for the child. According to Shupe’s consequences
objection, the revelation approach requires that these effects shall be
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ignored or discounted by the decision-maker.
I see two strategies for resisting the objection. Again, both have
a common starting point. Barnes writes that some decision problems
contain options where the decision-maker does not know what it’s like to
experience the outcome, yet knows enough about this option to determine
that she does not want to experience its outcome. The decision-maker
can arrive at this conclusion without thinking about revelation.
“When I choose not to have children, it isn’t simply a choice
to avoid ‘revelation’ or a choice made ‘for the sake [or lack of]
discovery itself’. It is, quite simply, a choice not to have children
because I know I don’t want them. And so it’s a choice based on
projected outcomes. I can project, given my current desires and
presences [sic], that having kids is a less good outcome than not
having them, even though I’m ignorant of some of the relevant
subjective values.”536
Paul accepts that we are entitled to avoid experiences like getting eaten
by a shark even if we cannot know antecedently what it is like to have
them,537 but she denies that this shows that the revelation approach is
not at work.538
7.4.1 Strategy 3: Enrich Revelatory Values
Some revelatory values are assigned to transformative options indepen-
dently of what the resulting experiences will be like. In particular, they
can ignore whether or not the resulting experiences will be pleasant or
not—information which due to the transformative character of the ex-
perience is not accessible. Instead, some revelatory values turn solely
536Barnes 2015, p. 785.
537Paul 2014, pp. 27-8.
538Paul 2015, p. 805.
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on how much the decision-maker values discovering the novel kind of
experience.
To some degree, the value which a decision-maker assigns to a given
novel experience can certainly reflect expectations about how one will
respond. Barnes and Paul agree that for some transformative experi-
ences, although the decision-maker cannot know what it will be like to
undergo them and how the experience will change her, the decision-maker
knows enough. In contrast to the vampire, parenthood, and durian cases,
when contemplating to swim with sharks, it is clear that the—in Barnes’
terminology—‘projected outcome’ will not be a good one. Even without
projectively imagining the experience and its consequences, avoiding it
is better than choosing to undergo it.
But Paul shows how this is compatible with the revelation approach.
Expectations of this kind can feed into revelatory values which we as-
sign to making the novel experience. In other words, Barnes’ ‘projected
outcomes’, which need not involve the first-personal imagination of ex-
periencing the outcome, can factor into how much we value the novelty.
Because swimming with sharks is likely to be unpleasant, the revelatory
value of doing it is low, and exceeded by the value of the status quo.
Besides these somewhat inarticulate but clear enough subjective fea-
tures of experiences like the shark encounter, we may be inclined to
avoid other transformative experience because they conflict with our val-
ues. For example, Winston in Orwell’s 1984 takes an interest in avoiding
getting brainwashed by the Thought Police539 not only because it may
be unpleasant, but because it conflicts with the way he and us value
539Barnes 2015, p. 781.
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autonomy and self-determination.540
For the cochlear implant case, this means that the consequence ob-
jection against the revelation approach can be addressed. Expectations
about harms and other consequences can feed into how much the parents’
value the revelatory decision options. If the parents were perfectly clear
that choosing the implant has bad ‘projected outcomes’, then this can
affect their revelatory values.
A second point to mention is that the approach does not make the
substantive requirement that parental discovery matters more than the
consequences for the child. Just like standard decision theory, there is
a sense in which the revelation approach is agnostic on how the parents
shall rationally prioritize between their own discoveries and the well-being
of the child. It depends on their preferences, values, and expectations. Of
course, these can be constrained by moral, epistemic, and societal norms.
The point is that the approach by itself does not require the parents to
discount possible harms for the child in view of their own discoveries.
7.4.2 Strategy 4: The Revelation Approach Does
Not Apply
A slightly different strategy to address the consequences objection accord-
ing to which the revelation approach implausibly requires the parents to
discount harms to their child is the following. Recall that the revela-
tion approach covers decisions in which rational and authentic decision-
making is impossible because the lived experiences in at least one of
540Paul 2015, pp. 803-4.
246 CHAPTER 7. IDENTITY AND TRANSF. EXP.
the outcomes are inaccessible. As outlined, Barnes and Paul agree that
sometimes, we know enough about the features of a transformative ex-
perience to determine our revelatory values and to make a decision on
this basis. But alternatively, we could come to think that sometimes, we
know enough about a transformative experience that we are not in need
of the revelation approach.
One way to understand Shupe is that revelation is entirely inadequate
to evaluate cochlear implants. We want the child to lead a happier life,
not just to enjoy the more intriguing revelation. Here, one factor might
be that the child will be unable to experience its development with or
without the implant as a revelation. Not only might the very young child
be unaware of being in the process of having either auditory stimuli or
inclusion into the Deaf community revealed to it. The child is also nec-
essarily unfamiliar with the respective alternative, given our assumption
that either revelatory option requires a decision at the early stages of the
child’s development and will be irreversible. These difficulties might sup-
port the intuition that not revelatory values, but evidence about which
option would provide the child with superior—e.g., happier—lived expe-
riences would give us what matters. In that case, the benefits of that
option and the corresponding harms in the non-ideal scenario should not
be discounted in view of revelation.
However, I suggest that if we know which option leads to superior
lived experiences, maybe we should not be thinking about revelation in
the first place. We would be able to identify the option we want without
thinking about revelatory values, which can indeed seem rather unimpor-
tant in comparison. This kind of reasoning seems to be behind Barnes’
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suggestion that Winston is not thinking about discovery or revelation
when avoiding the Thought Police: he knows that getting brainwashed
will have worse consequences for him. Because of this, he has no need
to think about revelation. According to this reading, discounting conse-
quences does not bring the revelation approach under pressure, because
the revelation approach is silent on how we should choose if we do know
the consequences of each option in sufficient detail.
Paul would probably not take this stance. Instead, she would put
forward Strategy 3, i.e. apply the revelation approach, but highlight how
rich the notion of a revelatory value can be.541 After all, the revelation
approach is intended to apply to transformative choice in general, not
just to a subclass of transformative choices where it is unknown which
option has better consequences. Nevertheless, I think it would not be a
costly concession to accept Barnes’ idea that the case for or against some
transformative options is so clear that we do not need the revelation ap-
proach in these instances. The approach would still apply in many cases,
especially the ones that are not straightforward and where considerations
about consequences do not help.
The cochlear implant case is of the latter kind. What makes it so
difficult is the lack of straightforward ‘projected outcomes’, current de-
sires and preferences, or other expectations about the future that clearly
favour one of the options and could inform our choice. This means that
proceeding without considering these aspects further is not a shortcom-
ing. The intractability of the ‘projected outcomes’ is what makes the
541Then again, Paul also assumes “that cases like the shark-eating case are oustide
the scope of [her] discussion” (2014, p. 32). Maybe if the consequences of the transfor-
mative experience are obvious, she can live with bracketing the revelation appraoch.
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revelation approach necessary in the first place. If we had a clue about
the consequences, we would be entitled to proceed without considering
revelation. In other words, whenever the problem described by Shupe
arises, the revelation approach does not apply.
Given the availability of these two strategies, i.e. building expecta-
tions about consequences into revelatory values, and denying that the
revelation approach applies if expectations about consequences clearly
favour one of the options, we can conclude that there are ways to re-
tain the revelation approach without ignoring or discounting harms and
consequences.
7.5 Surrogate Decision-Making
Let us assume that the strategies considered so far are unsuccessful,
and that the difficulties point at a different interpretation according
to which the parents should attempt some form of surrogate decision-
making for the child. Shupe thinks that such judgments are impossible
in the cochlear implant case: the parents cannot apply the revelation
approach for the child because the child does not yet have preferences
about the outcomes, and her future preferences will be shaped by what
the parents choose.
I will later disagree with Shupe’s assessment that the revelation ap-
proach cannot be applied in the cochlear implant case (7.6). But first,
I explain why Shupe is correct in pointing at challenges of surrogate
decision-making in these contexts.
In order to decide on medical treatment for patients who are incompe-
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tent, i.e. unable to decide for themselves, legal and ethical codes require
doctors and researchers to seek the judgement of a surrogate decision-
maker. The validity and moral authority of the surrogate judgement
is typically thought to derive from satisfaction of one of the following
standards. First, the surrogate decision-maker is in a good position to
judge what is in the patient’s best interest, and shall decide accordingly.
Secondly, the surrogate decision-maker is the best source of knowledge
about the preferences of the patient while she was competent, and shall
decide according to these preferences. I will discuss these standards in
turn.
7.5.1 Best Interests
The best interest standard requires the surrogate decision-maker to choose
the option that provides the highest net benefit towards the patient’s
quality of life.542 The surrogate shall decide on behalf of the patient,
and, in contrast to the substituted judgement standard, not necessarily
in the way the patient would decide herself.
The notion of quality of life is not without difficulties.543 First of
all, due to the patient’s incompetence, the assessment of her quality
of life is external and might well deviate from the patient’s subjective
well-being. Secondly, quality of life has more than one dimension, e.g.,
freedom from pain, independence, mobility. It is not obvious how to
weigh these dimensions against each other. Third, there is more than
one standard of what constitutes quality of life: the pleasantness of the
542Beauchamp and Childress 2013, p. 228.
543Brock 1993.
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individual’s experiences, the satisfaction of her preferences,544 or a list of
objective goods.
Presumably, what well-being means for children differs slightly from
what it means for adults:
“children’s well-being depends less on their current individual
preferences and more on the objective conditions necessary to fos-
ter their development and opportunities than does the well-being
of adults.”545
Buchanan and Brock argue that childrens’ manifest and rather transient
goals and preferences should not be taken as determinants of their well-
being, given that children lack aims, values, and commitments. Instead,
fostering their well-being means enabling them to develop capacities for
reflective and independent judgements that allow them to exercise self-
determination, to develop and implement life plans, and to choose and
pursue aims and values.
There might be a tension between the best interest standard and the
revelation approach. The latter asks us to consider the options inde-
pendently of how their consequences feel and affect our happiness and
well-being, whereas these things are what matters according to the for-
mer. However, Strategy 3 can resolve this tension: expectations about
whether a revelation is in our best interest can factor into our assessments
of the revelatory values.
Unfortunately, it is not clear what this means for the cochlear im-
plant case. We cannot tell how the revelatory options will impact the
544If her preferences are not known, we can appeal to “what most informed and
reasonable people would choose in the circumstances” (Brock 1993, p. 112).
545Buchanan and Brock 1990, p. 228.
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child’s well-being. Shupe cites Savulescu546 who thinks that providing
the implant is almost always in the child’s best interest. I will not eval-
uate his arguments; instead, I note that in light of the disagreement and
controversies described by Paul, it seems hard to deem one of the options
clearly superior. As it stands, we might have to suspend judgment. If so,
the best interest standard is not very helpful for advancing our surrogate
decision-making in the cochlear implant case.
7.5.2 Substitute Judgement
According to a different standard, proxy consent is valid if it is a decision
the competent patient would have made.547 The proxy is expected to
evaluate the decision from the perspective of the patient when she was
healthy and competent. In the ideal case, the proxy judgment is the best
approximation available of what mattered to the patient. However, it
can be challenging to evaluate whether a proxy judgement achieves this
goal. For example, a proxy might
“selectively choose from the patient’s life history those values that
accord with the surrogate’s own values, and then use only those
selected values in reaching decisions. The surrogate might also
base his or her findings on values of the patient that are only
distantly relevant to the immediate decision.”548
There is empirical evidence that surrogate decision-makers are indeed
much worse than we would hope at anticipating the preferences of the
individuals who nominated them.549 Especially when the patient did not
546Savulescu 2009.
547See for example Brock 1999, p. 521.
548Beauchamp and Childress 2013, p. 228.
549Seckler et al. 1991.
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previously articulate her relevant preferences or values, the substituted
judgment standard runs the risk of being “highly reconstructive, even
speculative”550, and “contrived”551.
One difficulty is the following. A substitute judgement to do X is
valid if
in the closest possible world where the patient is able to offer
consent, she would choose X in the actual world.552
Unfortunately, this counterfactual is difficult to evaluate, especially if
the patient has never articulated relevant preferences before becoming
incompetent that could now be respected by the surrogate.
In the case of young children and other patients who have never been
competent before, there is a severe extra complication. As Nagasawa ar-
gues, the counterfactual is not only difficult but impossible to evaluate.553
Firstly, we have no way to tell what the closest world would be like in
which such a patient is competent, e.g., whether it would differ in its
laws of nature from the actual world, or whether only certain contingent
facts are different. Secondly, we have no evidence whatsoever from which
to infer which judgement the patient would make in that possible world,
given that in the actual world she has never been competent. Thirdly,
closeness is determined by a similarity relation whose exact nature is a
550Buchanan and Brock 1990, p. 119.
551Harris 2003, p. 11.
552The need to distinguish the world in which X is being carried out from the
world in which the subject chooses is recognized by Barnbaum (1999, pp. 170-2),
and Nagasawa (2008, p. 20). They react to Wierenga (1983) who argues that if
counterfactual competence and the considered treatment are thought to obtain in
the same world, the substitute judgement gives inadequate results. For example,
the counterfactual ‘If the patient was competent, she would choose withdrawal of life
support’ would almost never license withdrawal of life support. This is because almost
no competent patient would want her life-support to be removed.
553Nagasawa 2008, pp. 21-2.
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contextual matter. More than one world can count as closest in a given
context. It might well be that two worlds are both closest to the actual
world, yet differ with regards to the patient’s judgement.554
Another way to put the point is provided by Buchanan and Brock.
They argue that the purpose of substitute judgements is to exercise and
extend the patient’s capacity for self-determination. But if the individual
was never competent and has never been in a position to live a self-
determined life, to form and to deliberate on preferences, then it is a
mistake to think that such a substitute judgment is sensible. There
simply is nothing it could approximate or emulate.555
In principle, substitute judgments could be made about transforma-
tive experiences. The surrogate decision-maker would have to be in a
position to imagine the revelatory values of the now incompetent pa-
tient. But in the cochlear implant case, the standard is unhelpful. It is
hard if not impossible to determine the child’s counterfactual judgements
on the intervention, given that it has never been competent before.
7.5.3 Strategy 5: The Revelation Approach Is In-
nocent
It is unclear whether the revelation to receive a cochlear implant is in the
child’s best interests, and making a substitute judgement is not possible.
Does this put the revelation approach under pressure as a candidate
554See also Wrigley 2011, pp. 179-80, 182-3. His chief worry is that there are many
contexts where the validity of the substitute judgement will be underdetermined,
given that there are many plausible similarity relations for evaluating the respective
counterfactual.
555Buchanan and Brock 1990, pp. 113-7. This worry is echoed by Beauchamp and
Childress 2013, p. 227 and Wrigley 2011, p. 180.
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criterion for making transformative decisions for others? I think not.
I see standards like the best interest and substitute judgement stan-
dards as potential complements to the revelation approach. While the
substantive demand of the approach is to focus on revelation, the stan-
dards determine which revelations have the most desirable features and
should thus be chosen. In the cochlear implant case, the standards are not
too helpful towards answering this question. But we can hardly fault the
revelation approach for failing to answer questions which the standards
struggle to address independently of which approach they are compli-
menting. Indeed, the standards are uninformative regardless of whether
they evaluate revelations or something else. The fact that we sometimes
encounter outcomes for which it is very difficult to assess their revelatory
value does not establish that revelation is the wrong thing to focus on
in transformative choice. We can admit that the cochlear implant case
shows how the revelation approach is not an all-purpose solution in the
sense that for each transformative decision-problem, it will resolve all our
questions about what to do. But difficulties like the complications when
applying the revelation approach in surrogate decision-making demon-
strate that we are dealing with an incredibly difficult decision problem,
not that the revelation approach is defective or fares worse than other
approaches.
In short, the present strategy admits the difficulty, but maintains that
it arises independently of the revelation approach. The latter does not
struggle with the difficulty more than competing approaches.
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7.6 A Proposal On Cochlear Implants
We saw that surrogate decision-making for individuals like young children
who have never been competent is complicated, but that any decision-
making approach faces these complications. I implicitly conceded that
the revelation approach does not help us to make a surrogate judgement
in the cochlear implant case. This might be too modest.
I discussed Shupe’s parent-focused reading (7.3) according to which
the approach requires the parents to reflect on how they would value
having their child transform. But there is an ambiguity in the revelation
approach. It asks the decision-maker to decide based on how she assesses
the revelatory options. This allows for a different understanding of what
is required. The revelation approach can be read as asking the parents
to decide based on the revelatory values of the child. This suggestion
is sensible. If, as the revelation approach suggests, the “value of some
experiences comes from what they teach us,”556 then why should the
value of my child’s transformative experience not come from what it
teaches my child?
Shupe’s and my reading agree that the parents assess the options, and
the child is the transforming individual. But the readings differ in whose
utility matters. Shupe focuses on the parents, whereas I argue that the
child’s revelatory values are what matters. Thus, my present suggestion
is not equivalent to Strategy 1, which makes the parental assessments a
function of the child’s values. Instead, the parents are asked to try to
discern the child’s values, and choose the best option on this basis.
556Paul 2014, p. 91.
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As with any transformative experience, there is a sense in which the
parents’ judgement on this question will be poorly informed. The options
will be epistemically inaccessible to them. If they are able to hear, they
do not know what it is like to be a member of the deaf community. If they
are deaf or hearing, they do not know what it’s like to turn from deaf
to hearing. However, this need not make decision-making impossible.
It is precisely the suggestion of the revelation approach that, while in-
accessibility should motivate epistemic humility, something can be said.
In the parenthood, vampire, and durian cases, the decision-maker too
cannot know what the revelation will be like, yet the approach assumes
that judgements are possible on whether the decision-maker prefers ex-
periencing the novel and unknown over leaving things as they are. This
shows how the fact that the parents cannot know what one of the revela-
tory outcomes is like is not what makes the cochlear implant case special
or harder than other transformative choices. According to the approach,
the decision shall be made based on whether a particular novel experience
is preferred independently of what it’s like to live through the experience
and its consequences.
What kind of surrogate decision-making is being suggested here? It
is certainly not a substitute judgement, given that for patients who have
never been competent, the notion of a substitute judgements is difficult to
make sense of. But it is not a clear-cut case of a best interest assessment
either. We assumed that the evidence on which option is best in terms of
the child’s quality of life is not decisive. In the proposed application of
the revelation approach, the parents are thus not deciding on the basis
of such considerations. It would arguably be ideal to choose what is in
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the child’s best interest, but it is hard to imagine which option this is.
For this reason, the revelation approach recommends choosing one of the
options for its own sake. It thus fits neither of the two common standards
for surrogate decision-making. Given their unhelpfulness in the present
case, this should be seen as a feature rather than a shortcoming of the
revelation approach.
If this judgment is made by the parents, it will be made against
the backdrop of their own views and values. For example, given that
the parents are able to hear, presumably do not find hearing deeply
dissatisfying, are not acquainted with what it’s like to be a member of
the Deaf community, and can be expected to value having a child with
the same sensory abilities as them to foster intimate connections,557 they
might lean towards choosing the implant. But note that this need not be
the case. Other hearing parents might well be convinced that growing
up as a member of the Deaf community is the better revelation for their
child.
The approaches and standards fail to clearly favour one decision op-
tion over the other in the cochlear implant case. I think there are two
ways to make sense of the resulting impasse. We could see it as pos-
ing a dilemma. Regardless of whether or not we choose the implant for
the child, we deprive it of rich and invaluable experiences. But alter-
natively, we could see these insights as liberating. Neither option seems
clearly better than the other in light of the child’s interests and prefer-
ences. Thus, regardless how we choose, we are not foregoing a superior
557Paul 2014, p. 61.
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option.558 I am not suggesting that it does not matter which option we
choose, but that there are good motivations for either option, and that
the decision is up to us in the sense that the considered approaches and
standards do not clearly constrain our decision-making.
In either case, the question arises whether it is legitimate for the
parents to make a transformative decision in the light of their own values
when deciding about the transformative experience of their child. Here,
I would like to point at a brief discussion by Buchanan and Brock.559
First, parents are the best guides to their child’s welfare. They care
about and know it as well as anyone. The parents are thus in a unique
position to discern the child’s needs. Secondly, parents bear some of the
consequences of the treatment decision, including financial costs. It is
thus appropriate to grant them some authority on which treatment the
child shall receive. The child’s interests and the importance of gaining
abilities for self-determination are not the only things that matter. The
parents’ interest in what happens to their child need to be considered,
too. Thirdly, within limits, parents arguably enjoy the right to raise
children in accordance with their own values. Children lack values and
decision-making abilities of their own, before acquiring them through
socialization and development.
“Someone must inevitably shape children’s goals and values, how-
ever, and since we assign child-rearing responsibilities in our so-
ciety largely to the family, it seems reasonable to accord to the
family as well some significant discretion in imparting its values
558Further considerations besides the particular child’s interests and preferences,
such as the intrinsic value of the Deaf community and a corresponding imperative to
preserve it, might well move the needle towards one option rather than another.
559Buchanan and Brock 1990, pp. 232-4.
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to the children within it.”560
I see at least the following implications for the cochlear implant case.
Parents too bring important interests into the context of the decision-
problem. It is thus not unreasonable to take these interests into account
and consider how they would be affected by the child’s transformative
experience, even if these are only some alongside further important in-
terests and considerations. Moreover, the fact that within limits, parents
may raise their child in accordance with their own values entitles them
to project their own evaluations into the decision-problem when making
a decision on behalf of the child.
I note that if we believe that children do not yet exercise self-deter-
mination, there are no values and decision-making capacities which the
parental judgment would override. It is thus not the case that parental
decision-making interferes with the deliberation of the individual whose
treatment is under discussion.
According to the reasoning described by Buchanan and Brock, the
child starts out as a “tabula rasa”561, and through raising her, the par-
ents are entitled to transmit their values to the child. I suspect that at
some point, we might be concerned that the child has ceased to be a tab-
ula rasa, and seems to adopt preferences and to subscribe to views and
values. I suggest that at least as long as these fall short of constituting
proper decision-making capacity and authority, we need not see parental
surrogate decision-making as overriding or interfering. We can recog-
nize apparent values of the child as causally continuous and connected
560Ibid., p. 233.
561Ibid., p. 234.
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with parental values, and this could license a presumption of overlap in
core values and preferences. Parental decision-making could be seen as
expressing and extending, rather than interfering with, the still weak
capacities and values of the child. Acceptance of this presumption is
compatible with the concession that it should be suspended or treated
cautiously if the apparent wishes of the child diverge from the parental
judgment.
Any values, preferences and life plans we can ascribe to the child are
closely continuous and connected with, if not identical to, the parents’
vision of their child’s life. As described earlier, Whiting (3.1.1) and Brink
(3.1.2) would say that there is interpersonal psychological continuity, or
something close to it.562 When making decisions for the child, such as
decisions based on revelatory values, the parents are not deciding on be-
half of someone else with whom they do not share a close and intimate
connection. In this respect, the child shares features with the parents’
own future selves: the parents shape the lives, preferences and views of
these selves in a privileged way and in light of their current conception of
their life stories. The same relations are plausibly understood as justify-
ing parental decision-making authority, including revelatory assessments,
on behalf of their child.
I conclude that there is a better application of the revelation approach
than the one discussed by Shupe. It is reasonable for parents to evaluate
the revelatory options on behalf of the child in light of their own values.
I have left open which outcome this favors in a given case, but defended
the revelation approach as one eligible tool for guiding decisions.
562See also D. Shoemaker 2007, p. 347.
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7.7 Conclusion
Shupe argues that the revelation approach is unsuitable for making trans-
formative choices for others. When deciding for ourselves, we are entitled
to choose based on the value we assign to the revelation of novel expe-
riences and perspectives. When deciding for others this seems far less
appropriate. If anything, we should attempt to bring about beneficial
consequences for the individual on whose behalf we are deciding. Focus-
ing on revelation is inappropriate.
I have argued that Paul’s revelation approach can counter these ob-
jections. The alleged parent-focus of the revelation approach need not
be problematic (Strategy 1). And expected consequences can be fac-
tored into the revelatory values one assigns to the options (Strategy 3).
Alternatively, one can deny that the revelation approach applies in a
given instance of transformative choice for others, e.g., because the par-
ents do not face a decision-problem that will be transformative for them
(Strategy 2), or—if the evidence on the options’ consequences is clear
enough—because reflections about revelation are unnecessary to make a
choice (Strategy 4). Moreover, it is true that applying the revelation ap-
proach in the course of surrogate decision-making is incredibly difficult.
But this difficulty stems from more general challenges with surrogate
decision-making, not from issues with the revelation approach in partic-
ular (Strategy 5). Uncertainty about the consequences, and the fact that
the child has never been competent, are aspects that make the surrogate’s
decision-problem particularly hard.
Shupe raises her objections against a particular reading of the reve-
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lation approach: that the parents shall focus on their revelatory values.
I suggested and defended a different interpretation of what the approach
requires (7.6): the parents shall evaluate the revelatory values for their
child. When deliberating on behalf of the child, they are entitled to
evaluate the options relative to their own values and views. Given their
parental role and their intimate relation to their child, it is reasonable to
presume that this does not interfere with a capacity for self-determination
on the side of the child, insofar as it can be ascribed reflective capacities
at all. Until then, parents have an entitlement, interest and right to raise
their child in accordance with their values.
What remains is a question about consent not just in surrogate decision-
making, but also in intrapersonal transformative choice. When being
asked to choose amongst transformative treatments and treatments of
transformative disease, the decision-maker is faced with options for which
she cannot determine a subjective value, at least not through projective
imagination the outcomes. If so, how can we make sense of seeking
informed consent from individuals, and why do we not leave these in-
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The characteristic feature of transformative choices is that at least one of
the options is epistemically and/or personally transformative. We thus
cannot assign subjective values and identify the best option.
One example is the cochlear implant case. It is impossible for the
parents to imagine the transformative experience, i.e. receiving an im-
plant that turns them from deaf to hearing. Hearing parents and deaf
child have very different perspectives on the world. As such, the parents
are radically ignorant of what the options of the decision problem will be
like for their child. One worry is that the parents are in no position to
make more than an uninformed guess about which revelation they would
value most if they were in their child’s situation.
The same problem arises with transformative choices for oneself. Paul
thus points out that independently of the difficulties of surrogate decision-
making, there is something odd about seeking informed consent. We
cannot imagine what transformative experiences and their consequences
are like. This means that a range of medical interventions and treatment
regimes that are transformative or influence a disease with transformative
consequences563 cannot be properly evaluated. We cannot know what
experiencing them will be like, and are thus unable to make a rational
decision. This raises the question why we are seeking informed consent
for such interventions. For example, consider a treatment option that
563Carel et al. (2016, pp. 1152-3) argue that serious illness is transformative in
Paul’s terms. Illness yields a range of experiences for which we antecedently do not
know what it is like to have them: receiving diagnoses, feeling symptoms, undergoing
procedures, and coping with their effects. Moreover, the authors see the fact that
patients with serious conditions most often undergo a process of adaptation such that
they rank their well-being higher than healthy control subjects when asked to imag-
ine living with that particular condition as evidence that they underwent personally
transformative experiences.
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might leave you disabled, and compare it with a different option that is
less risky but also promises to be less effective. Paul writes:
“The basic idea is that you, as the patient, are supposed to evalu-
ate the different outcomes, determine their values along with the
level of risk you can tolerate as a result, and control the decision-
making on that basis. But, crucially, then you need to know
how you think you’ll respond to different possible experiential
outcomes. And in this context, you are unable to get the infor-
mation youd need. [...] If you cannot determine your values and
considered preferences for the outcomes, you cannot rationally de-
termine the act with the highest expected value. The point [...]
raises the question: what are we doing when we give our informed
consent? [...] [W]hy think that an ‘informed’ consent is doing
what it is supposed to do, that is, why think that the agent is
really being given the opportunity to make a choice while being
informed in the relevant way? [...] If the justification of informed
consent is rooted in a person’s ability to understand her values
and preferences concerning different possible outcomes, transfor-
mative choices pose a serious challenge.”564
It is not entirely clear whether Paul is merely making an observation or
also suggesting changes. The observation is that problems of transforma-
tive choice can arise when informed consent is needed. If a transforma-
tion is looming, one cannot know how one will respond to the outcome.
The informedness of the consent is thus inevitably limited. However, it
sounds as if Paul is suggesting something more: that because of these is-
sues, the importance and value of informed consent is deflated. Patients
do not know what the outcomes of transformative experiences will be
like, let alone have the medical expertise to evaluate treatment options.
We should thus take their inputs less seriously.565
What are we doing when we seek informed consent? Does transfor-
564Paul 2014, p. 138.
565In line with this reading, Paul quotes Levy (2014), who argues that because of
several biases and limitations in our ability to reason, constraining informed consent
procedures would promote the good that informed consent is supposed to protect.
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mation preclude being informed in the relevant way? Is the point of
informed consent undermined by transformative experiences? I will now
discuss three purposes of informed consent, and argue that transforma-
tive experience does not stand in the way of informed consent playing its
role. We should thus disagree with Paul insofar as she is suggesting that
transformative experience deflates the importance of informed consent.
8.1 Protection
One purpose of seeking informed consent is the protection of the patient
or research subject.566 It is intended to prevent interference with an in-
dividual’s liberty and freedom. J.S. Mill claims that individual liberties
should be protected, that individuals know best what is good for them,
and that interference with their pursuit of the good is acceptable only to
prevent harm to others.567 Liberties provide the freedom of action to live
in accordance with one’s own personal views, taste and character.
Informed consent can further be seen as designed to prevent harm.
Physicians’ and researchers’ interactions with patients are sometimes
guided by interests of their own. A consent requirement is first stated in
the Nuremberg Code which was formulated in view of experiments car-
ried out on concentration camp inmates.568 Understood in this way, the
function of consent is to prevent assault, coercion, and exploitation.
Moreover, consent procedures are valuable towards maintaining trust
between patients and healthcare providers, which sustains numerous ben-
566Eyal 2012, sections 2.1, 2.3-4, 2.6.
567Mill 1859.
568See for example Manson and O’Neill 2007, ch. 1
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eficial practices and institutions that would otherwise be in danger.569
I think it is relatively obvious that the protective functions of informed
consent are not endangered by transformative experience. Part of what
we are doing with informed consent procedures is protecting patients and
subjects. They deserve information about available evidence, and are
free to refuse treatment and participation. In order to be able to exercise
one’s liberty and decline harmful and exploitative measures, it is not
necessary to know in detail how one would respond. Consent procedures
can prevent interferences and harms even if the options presented in the
consent process concern transformative options.
8.2 Autonomy
Informed consent is, ideally, a means to exercise autonomy.570 Taking
autonomous choices seriously is necessary for respecting the person who
defines and creates her life through them. For example, Harris writes:
“By shaping our lives for ourselves we assert our own values and
our individuality. Our own choices, decisions, and preferences help
to make us what we are, for each helps us to confirm and modify
our own character and enables us to develop and to understand
ourselves. So autonomy, as the ability and the freedom to make
the choices that shape our lives, is quite crucial in giving to each
life its own special and peculiar value. It is because we accept that
the meaning, purpose, and indeed the distinctive uniqueness of an
individual’s life is given largely by acts of self definition and self
creation that we are concerned to protect those attempts at self
creation even where we are convinced that they are misguided or
even self harming. [...] Informed consent is a dimension of respect
for persons in that it is through consenting to things that affect
us that we make those things consistent with our own values.
When we consent to what others propose we make their ends and
569O’Neill 2002, p. 145.
570Eyal 2012, sect. 2.2.
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objectives part of our own plans; so far from being merely the
instruments of others we incorporate their plans and objectives
into our own scheme of things and make them in that sense our
own.”571
Whether transformative experiences pose obstacles to informed consent
understood as a means for exercising autonomy depends on what ex-
actly one means by autonomy. There are many different accounts in the
literature. I shall now discuss the following selection.572
8.2.1 Dworkin
G. Dworkin proposes that autonomous persons are both independent and
authentic.573 Independence requires freedom from force, while authentic-
ity in Dworkin’s sense is determined by the attitude one takes towards
one’s first-order desires. Authentic persons act on desires which they
adopt on the basis of higher-order preferences.574
Whether transformative choices can be authentic in this sense de-
pends on what kind of second-order preferences are required. It seems I
can form such preferences perfectly well by reflection that does not in-
volve projective imagination of experiencing the considered option. Un-
less autonomy requires a specific kind of second-order preference that es-
sentially depends on imaginative projection, transformative choices can
be autonomous in this sense.
571Harris 2003, p. 11.
572Authors differ on whether persons or actions are bearers of the property au-
tonomous. For the sake of simplicity, my phrasings will assume that an action is
autonomous iff it is carried out by an autonomous person.
573Dworkin 1976.
574Dworkin here refers to Frankfurt 1971. This is often perceived as a relatively
demanding condition for autonomy. It seems we autonomously stop at red traffic
lights without reflecting about our higher-order desires; see for example Faden and
Beauchamp 1986, p. 264.
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8.2.2 Faden And Beauchamp
Faden and Beauchamp understand informed consent as an autonomous
authorization.575 They define:
“X acts autonomously only if X acts
1. intentionally,
2. with understanding, and
3. without controlling influences.”576
Rough glosses of the conditions include the following. An act is in-
tentional if it “correspond[s] to the actor’s conception [...] of the act
in question”577. Acting with understanding requires appropriate beliefs
about “(1) the nature of the action, and (2) the foreseeable consequences
and possible outcomes”578. Controlling influences are absent if nothing
“deprive[s] the actor in any way of willing what he or she wishes to do
or to believe.”579
As Faden and Beauchamp mention, acting intentionally seems to in-
volve a form of cognitive engagement with the act and its consequences
whose precise nature is difficult to spell out. I merely note that failure
to imagine projectively and other features of transformative experience
are unlikely to stand in the way of choosing intentionally. For one thing,
imaginative projection would be a surprisingly strong condition for inten-
tional action. Moreover, Paul never says that transformation precludes
acting intentionally; becoming a parent might be transformative, but it
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Similar remarks apply to the other conditions. Presumably, act-
ing with understanding can be achieved by recognition of merely third-
personal data, and need not involve imaginative projection into the out-
comes. And whether controlling influences are present seems entirely
independent from whether or not one faces transformation.
I conclude that given Faden’s and Beuachamp’s definition, transfor-
mative choices can be autonomous.
8.2.3 Savulescu
Savulescu maintains that only rational desires are expressive of auton-
omy. Subject P rationally desires A over B if the desire is based on
“(1) knowledge of relevant, available information concerning each
of the states of affairs A and B, (2) no relevant, correctable errors
of logic in evaluating that information, and (3) vivid imagination
by P of what each state of affairs would be like for P.”580
Very much in Paul’s spirit, Savulescu stresses the importance of vivid
imagination for self-realization:
“[s]elf-determination is an active process of actually determining
the path of ones life. In order to judge what is best for himself, P
must think and imagine what it would be like for her if A and B
obtained, and what the consequences, at least in the short term,
of each of these would be for her. Thus, not only must P know
what A and B are like, but she must also imagine what A and B
would be like for her. I call this vivid imagination.”581
He admits that P could be seen as choosing A even without vividly
imagining alternative B. But without vivid imagination, the choice would
fall short of self-realization.
580Savulescu 1994, p. 194.
581Ibid., p. 196.
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Savulescu anticipates the objection that (3) is too strong. Captain
Cook and Columbus could not imagine the outcomes of their explo-
rations, yet embarked on them autonomously. In response, Savulescu
clarifies that he only requires decision-makers to imagine outcomes
“as far as possible. [...] One can autonomously choose to ex-
plore the unknown. However, one must gather as many facts as
possible about the unknown, if one is to choose to explore it au-
tonomously.”582
If Paul is right about transformative experiences, thinking as far as pos-
sible means thinking not far at all. Our ways to vividly imagine trans-
formative outcomes are severely limited. Savulescu is aware of a related
challenge:
“people may have a good idea about treatment decisions relating
to familiar problems, like having a cold, a sprained or broken limb.
But, as treatment decisions pertain to more unfamiliar states,
people will have more difficulty in imagining what these states
will be like. The evidence is that, prior to experiencing them, they
will systematically underrepresent their utility. [...] In conclusion,
the process of vivid imagination so necessary for evaluation is no
easy or straightforward process to engage in. It involves not only
the provision of much information, but the overcoming of several
innate psychological hurdles.”583
The hurdles Savulescu has in mind concern cognitive biases, such as loss
aversion, discounting of the far future, and the fact that the quality of
experiental states is determined by how they contrast with preceding
states. The point here is slightly different from Paul’s: people make mis-
takes when assigning subjective values to outcomes. In contrast, Paul’s
point was that people facing transformative experiences are unable to
assign any subjective values whatsoever.
582Ibid., p. 197.
583Ibid., pp. 207-8.
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To me, it seems slightly ad hoc on Savulescu’s side to require imag-
ining as far as possible for autonomy, but also to accept third-personal
evidence as a surrogate if the outcome is unimaginable. However, I am
not concerned with whether Savulescu’s view is appropriate. What mat-
ters is that in his view, considering third-personal evidence can suffice for
choosing autonomously and thereby exercising self-determination. Trans-
formative choices can be autonomous in this sense if the decision-maker
reflects on the outcomes by means of such data.
8.2.4 DeGrazia
DeGrazia defines autonomous action as follows:
“[subject] A autonomously performs intentional action X if and
only if (1) A does X because she prefers to do X, (2) A has this
preference because she (at least dispositionally) identifies with
and prefers to have it, and (3) this identification has not resulted
primarily from influences that A would, on careful reflection, con-
sider alienating.”584
While the first two conditions overlap with Dworkin-style accounts, (3) is
worth a separate discussion. With alienating influences, DeGrazia means
things like coercion, force, or chance. Such influences might already stand
in the way of satisfying (2), but supposing that (2) is satisfied somehow,
they certainly conflict with (3): the decision-maker identifies in some
sense with the preference as required by (2), but the way she does so is
defective, or at least precludes autonomy.
Although beyond DeGrazia’s intentions, we could see transformative
experience as potentially conflicting with (3). For example, suppose prior
584DeGrazia 2005, p. 102. Italics removed.
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to becoming a vampire, I identified with my preference to become one on
the grounds of imagining how exciting and fulfilling vampire life would be.
After reading Paul’s work, I realize that I was ill-advised in identifying
with the first-order preference on such grounds: I had no idea what
vampire life would be like. In a sense, my identification was subject to
an alienating influence, and my action not autonomous in DeGrazia’s
sense.
I am convinced that considerations along these lines do not establish
that a transformative choice must be non-autonomous. At best, they
demonstrate that if I have thoughts about what it’s going to be like to
transform, these can turn out to be mistaken or unfounded, and thus
could be considered alienating. What this does not establish is that if
I follow Paul’s recommendation to refrain from attempts to base my
decision on what I think the transformation will be like, I am subject to
an alienating influence. In fact, Paul’s very own revelation approach ties
my choice closely to my core values and preferences without requiring
imaginative projection into the outcomes. Even if a genuinely new kind
of experience is looming, my choice to undergo it need not be subject to
alienating influences.
Another of DeGrazia’s points deserves attention. While discussing
advance directives, he notes that their authority rests on some idealising
assumptions about the individual who formulates them. She should be
fully competent when she formulates the directive, and foresee the cir-
cumstances for which she forms and articulates her preferences.585 It can
turn out that these conditions were not satisfied in a given case, which
585Ibid., pp. 163-4 Fur further literature, see ibid., fn. 9.
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would negatively affect the authority of the directive in question. Specif-
ically, an individual’s ignorance or confusion about potential outcomes
can affect the authority of her advance directives. For example, it is dif-
ficult to know or imagine what it will be like to be in a demented state
and have a drastically different mental life.586 If a person had false ideas
about what it would be like, and formulated its directive on the basis of
these ideas, we should treat her directive with caution.
DeGrazia thinks that the force of this challenge is limited. The re-
alization that an individual consented while being severely misinformed
does undermine the moral authority or value of her consent, but this
would merely be a local suspension of the general presumption that con-
sent, even if expressed through directives, succeeds in articulating the
preferences of the consenting individual.587 The risk I see for this response
is that Paul sees the imaginative shortcomings she describes as princi-
pled and deep obstacles for the individual’s consent being expressive of
her preferences. Individuals’ ideas about transformative treatments and
diseases are always off the mark. At least for transformative experience,
DeGrazia’s ‘general presumption’ would never be justified.
My response parallels the remarks on Faden and Beauchamp’s un-
derstanding condition. In order for consent to be expressive of one’s
preferences, it is not necessary that one succeeds in imagining the pos-
sible outcomes from the inside. If considering third-personal data is the
best I can do for determining what I would prefer to happen to me in
post-transformative states, then this is an appropriate basis for my de-
586DeGrazia 2005, p. 186.
587Ibid., pp. 188-9.
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liberation. The decision cannot be authentic in Paul’s sense, given that
I cannot now know what it’s like to be severely demented, but it need
not be authentic in order to be expressive of my autonomy.
This concludes my discussion of whether transformative choices com-
plicate the exercise autonomy and hence one of the primary aims of
informed consent. The surveyed accounts differ in their details. Charac-
teristic features of transformative experiences could be seen as conflicting
with authenticity in Dworkin’s sense, intentionality, understanding, ra-
tional desires which require vivid imagination, or count as alienating
influences. However, even for the more demanding accounts of auton-
omy, there is good reason to think that the transformative character of
a choice does not in fact preclude its autonomy. When deciding for our-
selves, autonomy can be exercised despite the imaginative limitations
that constrain thinking about transformative options.
The insight that transformative choices and autonomy are compatible
does not yet establish that informed consent plays its role. It remains a
possibility that in order for informed consent to fulfil its purpose, a special
kind of autonomous decision-making is needed for which the ability to
imagine projectively is indispensable.
8.3 Self-Realization
Maybe informed consent in connection with transformative experience
can be autonomous, but nevertheless fail to advance a related aim. Re-
call Harris’ emphasis on how through autonomous choice, we assert our
values, define our individuality, and steer our lives. Here, an obvious
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connection can be drawn to self-constitution accounts of personal iden-
tity (3.2). Through consenting, we make the plans of others consistent
with our own. The meaning, purpose and uniqueness of a life arises to
an important extent from acts of self-definition and self-creation. It is
plausible that one important point of informed consent is enabling such
self-creative acts, and that the inability to projectively imagine transfor-
mative outcomes precludes that consent plays this role.
In order to respond to this worry, I repeat two insights: first, even
the best transformative choices cannot rely on assignments of subjective
values to the outcomes based on what it would be like for us to experience
them from our first-person perspective. Secondly, this does not prevent
transformative choices from playing a crucial role in shaping our lives:
“[y]our own choices involving transformative experiences, that is,
your transformative choices, allow you to causally form what it
will be like to be you in your future. In this sense, you own
your future, because it is you who made the choice to bring this
future—your very own future self—into being.”588
Paul points out that we need to make a concession. This process of self-
creation is much less informed than we think. We do not know what it
will be like to transform, and there is no way to assess in advance and
first-personally how much pleasure, satisfaction, etc. a transformative
outcome brings. This is why epistemic humility about our choices is
required.
However, this does not mean that we cannot make well-motivated
transformative choices. I understand the revelation approach as one way
in which we can evaluate transformative options in light of our current
588Paul 2014, p. 18.
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values and preferences, despite our inability to imagine what they will
be like. It gives a sense in which we can make choices that change the
shape and direction of our lives if not authentically (in Paul’s sense, as
being based on projective imagination), then still in light of who we are
and what matters to us.
Enabling self-realization might be one of the purposes of informed
consent procedures. Transformative choices are important means for
steering our lives. The prospect of transformative treatments and dis-
eases thus does not undermine the point of informed consent—especially
if the decision-maker imagines the options first-personally as far as pos-
sible, considers third-personal evidence, weighs risks in accordance with
her values, and most importantly decides based on how she now wishes
to direct her life.
8.4 Conclusion
Paul worries that when illness and/or treatments are transformative, and
transformative experience is understood properly, it is not clear what
we are doing when we ask for informed consent. The decision-maker is
radically ignorant of what is at stake and what the options are like, and
thus seems to be bound to rely on a defective decision-making process
which informed consent procedures declare authoritative.
I considered three purposes of informed consent procedures: protec-
tion against harms, enabling the individual to exercise autonomy, and
facilitating self-realization. Although substantive accounts of the notions
vary, I argued that the transformative character of a choice is not a prin-
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cipled obstacle to informed consent advancing these aims. Whether an
individual makes a transformative choice for herself or on behalf of some-
one else; limitations in the ability to imagine what it is like to undergo
the experience do not deflate the importance of her judgement.
This gives us a prima facie reason to leave the status and significance
of informed consent unchanged. But I admit that this conclusion remains
provisional. Further purposes of informed consent might become salient,
and it is possible that the transformative character of some experiences
and treatments stand in their way. Moreover, for the purposes I consid-
ered, alternative accounts, e.g., of autonomy, might become salient and
raise similar problems. Until then, we should not take the transformative
character of a patient’s or research subject’s decision as indication that
informed consent is less likely to be “doing what it is supposed to do”589.
589Paul 2014, p. 138.
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I described the complex versus simple distinction as it is drawn in the
literature (chapter 1). I focused on what proponents of either side take
to be advantages of their view, and what they think is wrong with its
competitor.
According to objections primarily from simple theorists, the complex
view must see person stages at different times as distinct, and reduces
personal identity to relations of continuity and connectedness which by
themselves are unimportant. Objections like these motivate the extreme
claim: the complex view fails to give reasons for future-directed concern
(chapter 2). I argued that the extreme claim is not a reason to discredit
the complex view. The difficulty it highlights is not addressed more
convincingly by the simple view. And the relations of continuity and
connectedness to which the complex view refers are appropriate objects
of concern. In particular, absence of a deep further fact does not diminish
the value of ordinary survival as understood by the complex view.
I then characterized two positive accounts of how concern is justified
(chapter 3). According to the first, relations of continuity and connect-
edness provide reasons for concern. According to the second, acts of
self-constitution, either of ourselves as agents, or of our narrative identi-
ties, are what relates us to future selves such that their experiences and
well-being matter to us now.
Once we realize that personal identity and relations of practical im-
portance need not go together, several problems with transplant intu-
itions emerge (chapter 4). These intuitions are supposed to help us to
choose between psychological and bodily criteria of personal identity, the
leading instances of the complex view. I did not deny that transplant
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intuitions reflect what we care about when psychological and bodily con-
tinuities come apart. But I argued that regarding personal identity, they
provide only circular evidence, seem uninformative if quasi-attitudes are
possible, and diverge inexplicably across cases. Transplant intuitions
thus do not bring animalism or any other theory under pressures.
It then became apparent that I had made a concession: I took for
granted that there is a substantive complex versus simple distinction.
Until here, I argued that even if we buy into the distinction, it does not
have the practical significance which many attribute to it. But in (chap-
ter 5), I argued that the complex versus simple distinction is actually
confused. Paradigm cases of the simple view can satisfy the conditions
thought to be distinctive of the complex view. And Noonan makes com-
plexity and simplicity turn on features whose relevance for the distinction
is questionable. As a result, the distinction proved to be unhelpful for
the classification and endorsement of positions.
After having provided this diagnosis, I owed suggestions on how, if
not in terms of the complex versus simple distinction, we should we
frame theories and debates about personal identity. I characterized three
examples for notions that could replace the distinction (chapter 6): on-
tological dependence, fundamentality, and essentialism. Replacing the
complex versus simple distinction allows us to understand and compare
positions better, to defend them against charges of elusiveness, and to
prevent us from making misguided commitments.
One insight from the foregoing discussions was that what matters for
a range of practical activities, most notably future-directed concern, is
less obviously connected to views of numerical identity over time than
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many think. Turning to Paul, a complementary insight became apparent:
even if we keep numerical identity over time fixed, a person undergoes
qualitative changes throughout her lives. The question arises how she
can ever rationally commit to undergo transformative experiences, i.e.
experiences that fundamentally change her epistemic perspective and/or
core preferences (chapter 7). Paul proposes that becoming someone else
in this sense is rational if we antecedently value the discovery of nov-
elty more than the status quo. I put this proposal to the test against
objections by Shupe. She argues that numerical identity and distinct-
ness is fundamentally important when justifying transformative choices:
we can grant Paul that her approach is satisfactory when making trans-
foramtive choices for ourselves. Still, the account breaks down when the
transforming individual is numerically distinct from the decision-maker
who evaluates the options. The illustrative case is one in which parents
need to decide whether their deaf child shall receive a cochlear implant.
I provided a reading of Paul’s approach that differs from Shupe’s, and
argued that it gives a plausible account of how the parents can make a
rational choice in this case. The approach cannot—and should not be
expected to—make the parents’ incredibly hard decision-problem easier,
given the nature of the case and the uncertainties that surround it. What
matters is that Paul’s approach is not bound to make demands that are
too parent-focused, ignore consequences, and/or complicate surrogate
decision-making.
Paul’s insights on transformative experience lead to a problem. The
decision-maker who faces transformative options is radically ignorant of
how she will respond to the outcomes. This applies to clinical and re-
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search contexts, where patients and subjects often need to weigh trans-
formative options and provide or refuse informed consent. If it is in-
evitable that their judgement is poorly informed, what are we doing
when we seek informed consent? I argued that the failure to projectively
imagine transformative outcomes does not stand in the way of three im-
portant purposes of informed consent: protection from interference and
harm, enabling the exercise of autonomy, and allowing self-realization
(chapter 8). Without further argument, the transformative character of
treatments and disease does not justify diminishing the importance of
informed consent.
In light of these insights, we can conclude that the interdependence
between personal identity and practical reason is overstated. I did not set
out to survey each and every possible connection between the two topics.
My goal was to evaluate paradigmatic instances where philosophers and
common sense suggest that personal identity constrains how we should
reason and care, or vice versa. My conclusions suggest that in these
instances, the two domains are in fact neutral to each other. Practical
concerns do not give us a reason to favour the simple view. The com-
plex view does not fly in the face of practical concerns. What matters
practically might be related and contribute to personal identity, but it
is something else. Intuitions that supposedly favour particular positions
about personal identity are really about practical concerns, which might
often be related to personal identity but can come apart from it. In fact,
numerical identity does not preclude a justificatory challenge about cer-
tain intrapersonal choices: if a transformation is looming, theories of per-
sonal identity and standard decision theory struggle to explain how the
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decision-maker can choose rationally. The fact that the decision-maker
is ignorant of how she will change does not diminish the importance of
informed consent procedures that allow her to make autonomous choices
expressive of her personhood about how to steer her life.
I close with two further points. First, my discussion highlights an
aspect which complicates debates about personal identity and its rela-
tion to practical concerns. Authors differ with regards to a fundamental
assumption about personhood and personal identity. On the one hand,
there is a broadly Lockean tradition. It ties personal identity to forensic
and other practically relevant kinds of unity, e.g., being one and the same
unit for the aggregation of sacrifices and benefits, or being one and the
same subject in a sense that justifies concern. Where a person begins
and ends is somehow connected to practical matters. As Eklund puts it,
these positions endorse the moral relevance assumption about persons.
On the other hand, there is the view that all these matters are entirely
irrelevant to numerical personal identity over time. In Olson’s terms,
these practical matters pertain to being the same person, but it is an
open question whether personal identity depends on them (Olson denies
it). An analogous thought is present in Schechtman’s distinction between
personal identity in the reidentification sense, and the narrative identity
of persons. Practical concerns speak to the latter and vice versa. But
practical concerns are orthogonal to reidentification.
What this divide suggests is that part of why it is so difficult to
say something principled about the interdependence between personal
identity and practical reason is that much hinges on how practice-laden
one understands the notion of personhood to be. We are bound to talk
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past each other and engage in verbal disagreements if differences in the
conceptual and terminological departure points at such a fundamental
level remain unrecognized. We are also bound to proceed on the basis of
bad evidence, as the discussion on transplant intuitions has shown. My
demand is thus that we are transparent about which side of the divide
just characterized we endorse, and engage in substantive debates about
this topic.
Finally, I close by explaining how my claims relate to Parfit’s work
on personal identity. On the one hand, the insights summarized above
bear some obvious parallels to his position. The diagnosis of a lack of
straightforward interdependence between personal identity and practical
reason resonates with the idea that identity is not what matters. We can
have all we care about without remaining numerically identical. Indeed,
I argued that the grounds for concern need not mention identity.
On the other hand, there are several points on which I disagree with
Parfit. The most obvious is the complex versus simple distinction which
he takes to be the foundation of his work. I have pointed at several
problems with the distinction. I am convinced that the distinction should
be seen as largely irrelevant to his claims about personal identity and
what matters, which require independent motivations. Parfit is surely
entitled to draw on puzzle cases like fission, the analysability of personal
identity, the divisibility of persons, etc. But if I am right, all these
resources are available to simple theorists, too.
Moreover, I denied that caring about relations of continuity and con-
nectedness means we should care less about death. Identity and deep
further facts may not necessarily matter. My point was that absence of
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a deep further fact does not settle what matters in which way. What
is left may still matter a great deal. I accept that it is permissible to
feel liberated and care less in the way Parfit suggests. But I maintained
that Parfit’s descriptive picture of personal identity does not provide a
motivation, let alone a rational requirement, to care differently than one
did back in the glass tunnel.
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